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Intellectual Property Rights and the Genetic Dispositif of Life – 
The Changing Role of Intellectual Property Law in Governing 
Participation and Knowledge in the Bioeconomy 
 
Summary 
 
This thesis analyses the problematic relation between intellectual property (IP) and 
genetic conceptions of life. The ‘gene patent’ has been controversial from its 
inception in the 1980s, and IP’s definition of genetic sequences continues to undergo 
surprising changes. Recent examples include the contested overturn of some forms of 
gene patents in the US Supreme Court Myriad judgement, and continuing 
international debates about access and benefit sharing arrangements in the newly 
established Nagoya Protocol. The Myriad case confronted an international neoliberal 
bioeconomy with new demands of patients, which increasingly define their 
understanding of health and well-being in molecular terms. This thesis argues that the 
issues surrounding the patenting of genetic sequences go beyond an already widely 
criticised ‘commodification’ of life, and points out that rather IP law is becoming a 
highly contested site in a wider problematization of the governing of life understood 
in molecular terms. Relying on an updated reading of Foucault’s concepts of 
governmentality and biopolitics, it argues that informational-genetic conceptions of 
life have opened up a new sphere of intensified biopolitics, based on a ‘genetic 
dispositif’ of knowledge and power. In its engagement with this dispositif, IP manages 
tensions between competing scientific knowledges about life, governs the 
participation of patients in medical research, and determines the rights of developing 
countries in an international bioeconomy. The analytical framework conceptualises 
these tensions as a confrontation with molecular biopower on three levels: in IP’s 
changing understanding of DNA, in IP’s relation to new ‘genetic’ subjects and 
medical research charities, and in challenges to IP’s exclusionary effects regarding the 
international sharing of benefits from research, and on demands for increased 
contributions to global health agendas. These challenges show how IP tactically 
contributes to the normalisation of knowledge, to the inclusion/exclusion of 
participation in the bioeconomy, and to the control of research agendas. 
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Chapter I Introduction 
 
“[F]or liberalism, the problem will be not a rejection of bio-political regulation but a 
way of managing it.” (Dean 2010, 121) 
 
Recently, intellectual property (IP) law has once again become an unlikely site of 
ontological debate about the ‘essence’ of the genetic code. At the same time, the 
international organisation in charge of administering the international IP regime (the 
World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO) is engaging in an ambitious 
development agenda and the renegotiation of international standards regarding the 
treatment of genetic resources and traditional knowledge. Patients and public-private-
partnerships (PPPs) are using patents on genetic materials in order to facilitate easier 
access to genetic knowledge – instead of asserting monopoly rights that limit access 
and preclude a collaborative approach to research and development of new medicines. 
The World Health Organization (WHO) actively explores the potential of alternative 
mechanisms for the financing of research and development (R&D) of medicines 
addressing global health priorities that are being failed by the current approach. 
Furthermore, WIPO and WHO are collaborating with the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) in a trilateral initiative on this issue. The question of IP’s relation to life has 
become a key area of political contestation both within national and international 
legal frameworks, and recent IP strategies have begun to prioritise access and 
collaboration over monopolies and exclusion (Morin 2014; Williams 2012).  
This thesis argues that these “paradoxes plaguing the intersection of the 
human body and intellectual property regimes in the present moment” (Waldby and 
Mitchell 2006, 136) cannot be explained through the prism of the “commodification” 
of life alone. Rather, analyses need to account for the emergence of a “new moral 
economy of R&D” (Lezaun and Montgomery 2015) and IP’s role within a “new 
somatic ethics” (N. Rose 2008a; 2007a), in which patients are incited to take active 
responsibility for their wellbeing. It argues that IP is becoming a central site that 
governs the increasing “problematization” of life (Foucault 1994, 114). Here, the 
predominant informational-genetic dispositif of life gives rise to intensifying tensions 
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between the patenting of genetic sequences and emerging practices of self-governing 
on the basis of genetic knowledge.  
This thesis analyses the role of IP in confrontation with this shifting terrain of 
a politics of molecular life, and argues that it does more than provide commodities in 
the bioeconomy: IP governs participation and normalises knowledge, and thus acts as 
a “tactics” of government (Foucault 2000, 211), engaging “responsively” (Golder and 
Fitzpatrick 2009, 56) with challenges to these roles. IP’s relation to genetic 
conceptions of life thus goes beyond the “commodification” of life, and is better 
conceptualised as a confrontation with biopower, which can shed new light on the 
“paradoxes” at the intersection of genetic conceptions of life and IP law. The 
following chapters provide an in-depth analysis of IP’s contribution to the governing 
of life by managing tensions around truth discourses over life, the subject’s 
participation in the bioeconomy, and IP strategies for control over research agendas. 
This highlights two trajectories of challenges that are neglected in an overwhelming 
emphasis on commodification: the role of IP as a regime that excludes participation in 
the bioeconomy, and the role of IP in establishing control over a normalised version 
of knowledge over life. 
 
1. Problematizing genetic conceptions of life 
Over the course of the twentieth century, the discovery of the genetic code has 
fundamentally altered the conception of life – unearthing nothing less than the code 
containing “[t]he hereditary nature of every living organism” (Lewin 2004, 1). By 
now it has become commonplace to understand the genome of any organism as “a 
long sequence of nucleic acid that provides the information needed to construct the 
organism” (Ibid., emphasis in original). This conception of life contains a shift 
towards informational and genetic paradigms, which coalesced in the vastly 
successful rendition of biological life as determined by the genetic code: “the genome 
as an information system, a linguistic text written in DNA code” (Kay 2000, xv) has 
become the central research paradigm across the life sciences, and a central point of 
reference for understanding human existence in general. This fundamental knowledge 
over life has opened up a new sphere of politics surrounding “a quest for controlling 
information […] frequently perceived as life’s logos” (Ibid.). This thesis argues that 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) on human genetic materials have become a central 
site of struggle in this quest, providing and enabling control over this informational-
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genetic rendition of life in the shape of gene patents and connected forms of 
intellectual property.  
At the same time as the rise of the gene, intellectual property has “become one 
of the major issues of our global society” (Stiglitz 2008, 103), as a global system of 
enforceable temporary monopolies on knowledge was enshrined in the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) as part of the WTO. 
This IP system became a key component for business strategies of pharmaceutical 
companies and other entities operating in the life sciences – including for example the 
“entrepreneurial university”, which actively uses IP for “rapid commercialization of 
basic research problems”, enabled for example in the US context by the Bayh-Dole 
Act (1980) (Rajan 2012, 2; Cooper 2008, 27). This commercialisation of research 
thrived especially at the intersection with the life sciences, where new “high-risk 
forms of investment” fuelled these “decidedly entrepreneurial, public-private 
alliances” (Cooper, Ibid., 27). This thesis argues that in the new political economy of 
life, IPRs became a central concern – not only for the production of commodities for 
circulation in the economy, but also in a variety of roles asserting control over 
knowledge and over participation in this economy on the national and the 
international level. In fulfilling these roles, it is argued throughout this thesis, IPRs 
are increasingly contributing to the governing of life, and are negotiating tensions 
between economic priorities and a new sphere of politics surrounding the genetic-
informational conception of life. 
This new sphere of politics reaches far beyond the life science sector and its 
commercialised research, as it fundamentally re-shapes understandings of 
“humanness, illness and health” (Kay 2000, xv). The overwhelming influence of the 
informational-genetic paradigm continues to profoundly affect the individual’s 
relation to its own body, rendering the accessibility of genetic information an 
increasingly important marker of personhood. This thesis argues that understanding 
this fundamental impact on personhood can provide a new perspective on ongoing 
challenges to the exclusive commercial ownership of genetic sequences enabled by 
IPRs. Increasingly, patients and developing countries criticise IPRs as detrimental to 
their health and are actively challenging exclusive rights on testing kits such as for 
example the breast cancer test containing the BRCA-1 and 2 sequences in the recent 
Myriad case (Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad [2013]). In a decision that 
came as a surprise to the biotech sector, this landmark case overturned some forms of 
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gene patents, arguing they contained a “product of nature” rather than an invention. 
The following chapters point out that this challenge to patentability was enabled by 
the overwhelming cultural and scientific success of the genetic code, and its claim of 
containing the essence of life. The Court however still maintained patentability of 
cDNA, arguing that it was “man-made”. This tenuous compromise shows IP’s 
precarious position in this new sphere of politics based on genetic knowledge, and at 
the same time highlights its continued importance to the industry.  
The analysis of the confrontation between IPRs and life conducted in this 
thesis re-reads conflicts as an increasing “problematization” of genetic life for 
questions of governing (Foucault 1994, 114), and argues that in this context IPRs 
increasingly function as a “tactics” of government (Foucault 2000, 211), 
accommodating and resolving tensions between life and the economy. IP’s relation to 
genetic material is reinterpreted as a confrontation with biopower, in which IP law is 
being “governmentalized” and begins to negotiate tensions between different 
priorities of a new way of governing, instead of simply inscribing sovereign claims of 
power. This reading relies on Foucault’s notion of a new way of governing, or 
governmentality, which “set[s] up an economy at the level of the entire state, which 
means exercising […] surveillance and control as attentive as that of the head of a 
family over his household and his goods” (Ibid., 207). This returns to a more original 
interpretation of ‘economy’, which emphasises the fostering of life and well-being as 
part of this new art of governing (Foucault 1978, 138) – and thus leads to the 
emergence of ‘biopower’. 
This pastoral economy focused on the life of the population as an important 
point of reference: “the welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, 
the increase of its wealth” (Ibid., 217), giving rise to particular biopolitical strategies. 
This new point of reference leads to a governmentalisation of the state apparatus, in 
which previously sovereign features of power increasingly act as tactics of economic 
governing. Sovereign aspects of power, such as law, thus become involved in the 
problematization of life for questions of governing, and contribute to the realisation of 
a pastoral yet economic fostering of life. This process of governmentalisation thus 
involves a range of adjustments and tensions for law (N. Rose and Valverde 2010, 
543; Elbe 2009, 12), and renders it a central site that contributes to the governing of 
both life and the economy – accommodating two priorities that exist in some tension 
with each other (Dean 2010, 120). In an “analytics of power” (Dillon and Lobo-
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Guerrero 2008, 272), this thesis studies IP’s confrontation with the growing influence 
of a “genetic dispositif” on the level of conflicting truth discourses over life, in 
challenges to the control of genetic materials voiced by ‘genetic’ subjects, and in new 
strategies confronting IP’s relation to life on the national and international level. 
 This analysis reveals that IPRs play a wider variety of roles in this political 
economy than previously suggested by critiques focusing on IP’s function of the 
‘commodification’ of life alone. At the intersection of life and the market, IPRs 
establish commodities for the trade of knowledge over life, but also play other 
important roles, for example privileging one vision of life over others and thus 
contributing to the normalisation of knowledge. Furthermore, they establish and 
maintain a dividing line of exclusion/ inclusion of participation in the area of IP 
policy making and in the life science economy, keeping challenges by patients and 
donors at bay. An analysis of debates on the global level shows the IP regime’s 
function as a regime of exclusion in its starkest terms. The popular author Michael 
Crichton once argued “[y]ou, or someone you love, may die because of a gene patent 
that should never have been granted in the first place” (Crichton 2007) – on the 
international level, the detrimental effects of IP law are already a very painful and 
widespread truth (Godoy 2013).  But even here, where the influence of donors and 
patients is still mostly excluded from participation in the development of IP policy, 
this division is coming under increasing pressure, as new strategies begin to contest 
this exclusion from within the core institutions of the IP apparatus. 
This chapter briefly introduces this thesis’ analytical perspective on the role(s) 
of IPRs in governing tensions between life and the economy in a neoliberal 
governmentality. After introducing the empirical scope of this analysis focusing on 
the practice of patenting information derived from human genetic material mostly by 
the pharmaceutical industry, the chapter then first outlines previous critiques of this 
practice, which deplore a growing “commodification” of life. This critique of the 
economic function of IPRs is then contrasted with the reading presented in this thesis 
that highlights the variety of roles played by IPRs confronted with genetic 
conceptions of life: the making of the commodity, the normalisation of knowledge, 
and the maintenance of the division between the economy and the sphere of influence 
of the responsible, self-actuarial subject (McNay 2009; Odysseos 2010; Novas and 
Rose 2000). This analysis will be carried out in three substantive chapters interpreting 
this as a confrontation with biopower (Rabinow and Rose 2006): the level of changing 
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truth discourses, emerging strategies for intervention challenging the existing system 
from a biopolitical perspective, and the modes of subjectification afforded to the 
individual under this system. In closing this chapter also briefly sets out the research 
methods employed in this project. 
 
2. IP, the biotech sector, and patients – Contested relations 
The issue of patents on ‘life’ has consistently been controversial and has been 
opposed vociferously by critics for example where it came to the patenting of plant 
life, seed material, and of human genetic sequences. Under US law, Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty (1980) (447 U.S. 303) established the patentability of micro-organisms, 
and Moore v. Board of Regents (1990) (51 Cal. 3d 120) settled the patentability of 
human genetic sequences in particular. However, this question has been far from 
uncontroversial ever since, and has very recently been addressed again directly by the 
US Supreme Court’s judgement on the Myriad case in a surprising turn away from 
previous legal practice regarding the definition of ‘life’ for the purposes of IP law 
(Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad [2013] 569 U.S. 12-398). On the 
international level, the relation of IPRs to life has given rise to the Doha Declaration 
on TRIPS and Public Health (2001), which explicitly acknowledged the connection 
between IPRs and health for the first time, after growing discontent with the way in 
which issues that disproportionately affect the developing world were dealt with in 
the WTO’s framework (coming to a head for example in the “Battle of Seattle” in 
1999; see also Stiglitz 2006, 76 ff.). The political force of confrontations between 
IPRs and life became obvious in instances such as the attempted lawsuit of over 40 
major pharmaceutical companies against South Africa’s legislation seeking to bring 
down prices of HIV/AIDS medication – which was dropped in the face of world-wide 
press attention and NGO protests (Godoy 2013, 42 f.). 
This thesis focuses on challenges to the use of IPRs mostly within the biotech/ 
life science sector of the pharmaceutical industry – thus mostly on patents, not 
questions of copyright. However, this is not an analysis of this industry, but of 
challenges to the use of IPRs coming from a variety of directions from outside and 
inside the industry (for example: patient groups, medical research charities, private-
public-partnerships, indigenous communities). As the wider notions of well-being and 
responsible ‘healthy’ living are undergoing change due to the genetic conception of 
life, patients and individuals in general are increasingly demanding access to genetic 
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tests and seek to conduct themselves ‘responsibly’ according to their genetic 
condition. At the extreme end, this leads to people taking gene tests for BRCA 1 and 
2 gene mutations, and then – as Angelina Jolie has famously done (Jolie 2013; Jolie 
Pitt 2015) – deciding to have mastectomies, hysterectomies, and further invasive 
surgery in order to minimise their ‘risk’. This creates a new subject: the “pre-
symptomatic ill” (Wehling 2011, 234), which act on their body in novel ways in order 
to minimise risk and to prevent illness in the future – actions which coalesce into a 
new somatic ethics with specific rights and responsibilities (N. Rose 2008b; 2008a; 
Heath, Rapp, and Taussig 2004; Kerr 2003a; Kerr 2003b). These new “active 
patients” (N. Rose 2007b, 131; 2007a, 11) are also exerting pressure to increase the 
range of available treatments, or the access to tests and treatments, as the Myriad case 
shows: here, a wide range of patients, patient organisations, and doctors were 
challenging the exclusive practices around Myriad Genetics’ patents on the BRCA 1 
and 2 test – which led to a startling partial overturn of previously recognised patenting 
practices of human genetic sequences. 
The Myriad judgement and the debates around TRIPS and life highlight the 
potentially unpredictable consequences of the developing encounter of IPRs and a 
genetic view of life, and show that this transnational legal regime is negotiating 
between informational-genetic ‘truth’ of life and its continued patentability for the 
economy. This accommodation complicates the usual legitimation of IPRs: they are 
usually portrayed as necessary measures for promoting research and development of 
new medicines, reimbursing the inventor for the inventive effort exerted in the 
development of medicines, and for the expenditure incurred in the development and 
trialling of this substance (Merges 2011; Stiglitz 2008). The inventive effort expended 
in the isolation of genetic sequences is however comparatively marginal, yet this 
classic legitimation of IPRs is successfully used in a large-scale lobbying campaigns 
for example in favour of gene sequence patents in the EU Biotech Directive. 
Interestingly, this campaign at the European Parliament involved ‘active patients’ 
chanting the slogan “No patents, no cure” (see chapter V). This shows that the views 
of patients are becoming an important point of reference for legitimations of IPRs – 
especially as allegations of ‘astroturfing’ (i.e. the use of fake grassroots movements) 
emerged in the wake of the campaign, and continue to do so in context with later 
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associations between the industry and patients.1 IP’s exclusionary relation to this new 
influence of active patients is set out in particular in chapter V, while chapter VI 
shows how IPs maintain an even more exclusionary apparatus on the international 
level – which is challenged by a “new moral economy of R&D” (Lezaun and 
Montgomery 2015) within core international organisations. 
 
3. The IP regime: connecting the national and international level  
The analysis of IP’s exclusionary function connects the international and the national 
level of IP law, with particular attention to the US IP system. This reflects the unique 
connection between the national and the international level contained in the current IP 
system. Here, the TRIPS agreement sets minimum standards on the international 
level, but their implementation depends on the particular national legal system – thus 
giving rise to national variations within an internationally guaranteed framework. 
Some larger regional bodies, such as the European Patent Office (EPO), harmonise 
rules within regions to some extent, but beyond that countries can form their own 
approaches. However, the TRIPS agreement created an internationally recognised 
standard of protection containing a very wide definition of patentable subject matter 
(i.e. any ‘invention’), and set out accepted exemptions to this. These definitions are 
very closely connected to the content given to them within the US patent system, as 
this section will briefly set out. Despite existing regional differences (see Rajan 2006 
on India), the US approach thus remains the most relevant for an analysis of the 
parameters of international IP law contained in TRIPS – not least because of its very 
strong biotech sector. The history of the TRIPS agreement is clearly dominated by the 
influence of US industry and the IP systems of industrial countries (Sell 2003).  
The TRIPS Agreement added to an international system of IP standards 
already contained in the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO), which was 
established in 1967 as a United Nations agency administering the Paris Convention 
for the Protection of Industrial Property of 1882, and the Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Work of 1886, which constituted the first attempts 
                                                
1 For leaked documents allegedly proving the “mobilisation of an army of patient groups” by the 
pharmaceutical industry see Sample (2013). The European Patients’ Forum responded with a strong 
denial of any “mobilisation” at the behest of industry (European Patients’ Forum 2013), arguing rather 
that the disclosure of raw trial data is in the interest of all patient groups. While this debate is about the 
disclosure of data, it nonetheless shows that the input of patients groups is by now an important factor 
in the deliberations on such ‘technical’ arrangements of research conditions, and that patients groups 
have become very organised – and in the process their connection to industry is not always transparent. 
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to introduce an international dimension of IPRs (Matthews 2002, 10). These 
agreements set out minimum standards in this area and introduced the concept of 
‘national treatment’, which is the concept of providing the same “national treatment 
for foreign works under domestic laws for patents, trademarks […]” as for domestic 
works – but these treaties did not provide any effective mechanisms for enforcement 
of these standards (Ibid.). The TRIPS agreement incorporated most of the Paris and 
Berne conventions, but also tried to overcome their shortcomings, which were: “first, 
the absence of detailed rules on enforcement rights […] and second, the absence of a 
binding and effective mechanism to settle disputes between states” (Ibid.). Intellectual 
Property Rights under this agreement are private rights, backed up by the principle of 
national treatment within courts, thus relying in their enforcement on public power as 
well.  
The TRIPS agreement was substantially influenced by the private pressure 
group called the Intellectual Property Committee (IPC), consisting of chief executive 
officers of pharmaceutical, entertainment and software industries in the US, Europe 
and Japan (Sell 2003, 2; Tyfield 2008). They set out to strengthen existing protection 
measures and succeeded in gaining government support for a highly protectionist new 
agreement based on the already existing IP laws of industrialised countries, and thus 
globalised a previously national system reflecting the interests of industrialised states 
(Sell 2003, 2). Developing countries were then effectively coerced into accepting this 
regime as an obligatory part of the WTO, making the protection of IP a precondition 
for their own exports (Aoki 1998, 20). Correa argues that this “was also an expression 
of an aggressive action by the US industries to establish international rules that 
counter their declining competitive position in world markets” (Correa 2000, 5) – 
showing in how far this agreement was highly politicised from its inception (see also 
chapter VI for further discussion). National industrial interests were foundational to 
this international system, and are continuing to influence its development, as the US 
and a number of countries with an IP producing industry are pushing for even higher 
international standards of IP enforcement in ‘TRIPS Plus’ agreements such as the 
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), the Transpacific Partnership (TPP), 
and to some extent also in the current negotiations between the US and the EU as part 
of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) (Sell 2008; Abbott 
2009; UNAIDS 2011; Geist 2010).  
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Foucault once argued in a lecture on the international dimension of the liberal 
system that “[t]he game is in Europe, but the stake is the world” (Foucault 2008, 56) – 
this thesis argues that this is particularly true in the case of the IP system, where the 
game is mostly in the US, while its ‘stake’ has become the world due to the global 
reach of TRIPS and the WTO. However, as chapter III demonstrates, in a neoliberal 
economy the IP regime has become even more crucial for the maintenance of the 
biotech’s industry’s interests – which rest on a functioning IP system for the raising of 
“speculative capital” (Cooper 2008). The international IP system thus is still very 
much determined by the expansive reach of US legislation and jurisdiction, tempered 
to some extent by the influence of other industrial countries or regional systems such 
as the EPO and to a lesser degree EU institutions. This thesis discusses contestations 
and debates occurring on the international level with a focus on the three most 
influential international organisations operating at the intersection of IP and life: the 
WTO, WIPO, and the World Health Organisation (WHO). Where relevant, it also 
considers tensions between the US and the EU approach (see chapter IV). In this, it 
focuses on an analysis of the IP system’s relation to genetic conceptions of life, which 
goes beyond the mere unidirectional ‘commodification’ of life, and creates increasing 
challenges for the IP system. In the negotiation of these challenges IP law becomes a 
central site for the governing of life.  
 
4. Going beyond the Commodification Critique 
The debate around IPRs and their relation to genetic conceptions of life has thus far 
centred on critiques of “biopiracy” (Shiva 1998; 2001) and of a “second enclosure of 
the commons” (Boyle 2003; 2008; May 2010). Both critiques highlight the 
“commodification” of life by means of the IP regime. The biopiracy argument 
challenges neo-colonial practices of capitalism, which are criticised for enhancing and 
exploiting international inequalities by turning the world’s biodiversity into 
commodities for the use in industrialised countries. The analogy of this situation to a 
“second enclosure” of the commons censures the monopolisation of goods belonging 
to the common wealth of the world, which impairs the free flow of knowledge and the 
potential for research. It is argued that this commodification and monopolisation of 
the ‘commons’ could potentially have equally detrimental effects to the first enclosure 
movement in 16th century England, which turned communally shared land into private 
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property, and thus created a rich class of landowners and a poor landless working 
class. The biopiracy critique looks more closely at the international distribution of the 
owners of IPRs, and highlights the inequality exploited by ‘bioprospecting’ projects, 
which transfer knowledge and human genetic materials from developing countries to 
rich IP holding industrial countries. 
The focus on the ‘commodification’ of aspects of life presents a clear 
normative critique of this process’ detrimental effects on developing countries and the 
availability of knowledge for research and development. However, this critique places 
overwhelming emphasis on the economic determination of legal and social relations, 
in which IPRs are understood as a unidirectional mechanism enabling processes of 
commodification for exchange in the economy. This unilateral reading of IP’s role in 
the economy detracts from a deeper understanding of its conflicted and less 
unidirectional role in the normalisation of knowledge and in the regulation of 
participation of patients and developing countries within the bioeconomy. It also does 
not account for the variety of motivations for participation in such undertakings, not 
all of which are driven by economic concerns.  
This thesis argues that an analysis of IP’s encounter with life needs to account 
for IP’s functions within a developing political sphere based on genetic conceptions 
of life. In contrast with the commodification critique’s unidirectional determination of 
IP’s role, Foucault’s notion of governmentality “understands the commodification of 
subjective experience not so much through ideas of passive consumerism, 
standardization and heteronomy, as through ideas of active differentiation, regulated 
self-responsibility and depoliticized autonomy” (McNay 2009, 62). Instead of looking 
at the homogenisation of society with reference to an alienating system of abstract 
value creation, Foucault’s concepts highlight how active processes of differentiation 
for instance contained in the notion of the “self as enterprise” give rise to a more 
resilient neoliberal system (Ibid., 63). The genetic conception of life here provides 
novel parameters for responsible conduct in a new “somatic ethics” (N. Rose 2008a). 
Importantly, these active processes of self-governing can both reinforce and also 
challenge the IP system, as in the case of PXE International’s use of patents on the 
genetic condition pseudoxanthoma elasticum (PXE) for the purpose of exerting 
control over research agendas without following commercial aims (see chapter V). 
IPRs on genetic conceptions of life are thus used in a less unidirectional way than the 
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notion of commodification suggests, and are rather becoming part of a diffuse net of 
power relations. 
This perspective on the governing of life directs attention to the role of law in 
setting out the conditions on which the economic system operates – for example 
putting in place the rules necessary to guarantee a ‘free’ market. These conditions 
conduct the behaviour of individuals within this market, rather than just operating as 
restrictions, or punishments. Law thus is “productive” in this function, and becomes 
increasingly included in the “governing” of economic and social relations. Foucault’s 
concept of governmentality points to the central relevance of knowledge or ‘truth’ for 
the determination of appropriate conditions that “conduct the conduct” of individuals 
for example in the market (Foucault 2008, 186). These parameters also seek to enable 
a form of governing that intervenes as little as possible in the form of direct 
punishments or orders – heeding an “economic” calculus for determining an optimum 
amount of governmental intervention (Ibid., 19, 208, 319; N. Rose and Miller 2010). 
This economic calculus can however be challenged by emerging biopolitical 
strategies, which focus on fostering the life and wellbeing of populations on the basis 
of knowledge over life itself (Foucault 1978, 138). 
This thesis argues that IPRs are increasingly embroiled in tensions between 
the operation of the market and the significance of genetic knowledge for the 
governing of life. At the intersection of knowledge and the market, the IP regime is 
doing more than merely creating commodities for exchange in the market: it elevates 
certain forms of knowledge over others, normalises an official canon of knowledge, 
enables specific forms of participation in the economy, and prevents others. In 
fulfilling these roles, the IP regime “governs” challenges arising from a genetic 
conception of life – which give rise to a particular politics of life. This analysis 
certainly does not mean to suggest that IPRs do no longer produce commodities for 
the economy, or that the entire apparatus of IPRs is undergoing a radical change, but 
rather seeks to trace an emerging engagement with a political sphere of life that can 
pose significant challenges to the IP regime on the international and the national level.  
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5. Conceptualising IP’s encounter with life as giving rise to a ‘governmentalisation of 
law’  
 
“We can say that there was a juridification of the world which should be thought of in 
terms of the organization of a market.” (Foucault 2008: 56) 
 
The analysis of the political sphere based on genetic conceptions of life in the 
following chapters relies on an understanding of a new way of governing, or 
governmentality, derived from the writings of Michel Foucault and re-read in the 
context of a molecularised conception of life and a neoliberal economy with the aid of 
the work of Rabinow and Rose (2006), Rose (2007b; 2008a), Dean (2010), Elbe 
(2009), Dillon and Reid (2009), and Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero (2009). This new way 
of governing increasingly engaged with the biopolitical question of furthering the life 
and health of the population, for example through improvements of hygiene standards 
and better urban development (Foucault 2007, 18). In this way, the governing of life 
on the basis of knowledge over life increasingly became a central question or 
“problematization” for governmentality, which requires constant adjustments 
(Foucault 1994, 114). This thesis argues that IP’s problematic treatment of human 
genetic materials shows that the question of governing life has become even more 
acute with a turn towards informational-genetic conceptions of life, which gave rise to 
large-scale bodies of statistical knowledge over the life of populations, combined with 
individualised accounts of health and future risks. Neoliberal economic forms of 
highly speculative investment in the life science/ biotech sector further intensified this 
problem (Cooper 2008). This thesis points out that economic law became crucial to 
speculative investments, which relied on IP as a security. As a result of these 
intensifications, IPRs became central to a specific part of the economy, which 
however also became increasingly involved in the question of defining and knowing 
life for the purpose of governing appropriately.  
Foucault argues that the question of governing appropriately gave rise to a 
new “economic” way of governing indirectly, without overt sovereign intervention 
(Foucault 2000, 207; 2008, 19). In his work on governmentality, Foucault analyses 
the liberal preference for governing as little as possible by means of direct 
intervention, which rather operates through normalised parameters ensuring the 
realisation of aims by “government at a distance” (Miller and Rose 2008, 33 and 60). 
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Within this form of governing, different kinds of power “do not stand on an equal 
footing. Schematically, it is the newer, governmental economy of power that 
dominates” (Elbe 2009, 70). Dean highlights the potential for contradiction in the 
relation between biopolitical strategies focusing on the promotion of the life of the 
population and the economic calculus of governmentality: biopolitical strategies 
“challenge” the governmental system, while the economic calculus “manages” this 
challenge by a imposing an economic “critique” on biopolitical power exercises 
(Dean 2010, 120).  
This reading of governmentality’s central tension between life and the 
economy can clarify the role of law within concepts of governmentality, which is one 
of the central contributions of this thesis. Law as a meaningful area of study has been 
sidelined in most Foucauldian analyses – due to the fact that Foucault’s statements on 
the study and relevance of law were often dismissive and at times contradictory. It is 
argued here that this previously marginalised area of analysis needs to be resurrected 
and re-inserted into accounts of the modes of governing under governmentality, 
where law continues to play a role in the management of the problematization of life. 
Foucault noted that the turn towards biopolitical priorities entailed a “real inflation of 
the juridico-legal code” (Foucault 2007, 7). Instead of a disappearance of law, this 
turn can be understood as bringing about a “governmentalisation” of law (N. Rose 
and Valverde 2010, 543; Elbe 2009, 12). Here, the role of law changes, and is 
increasingly operating as a “norm” promoting responsible behaviour (Ewald 2010, 
146; N. Rose and Valverde 2010, 546).  
This understanding of the governmentalisation of law, however, needs to be 
further refined. Foucault also mentioned “a juridification of the world which should 
be thought of in terms of the organization of a market” (Foucault 2008, 56) – which 
points to law’s importance as a mechanism guaranteeing the implementation of 
governmentality’s core economic priorities. Golder and Fitzpatrick emphasize that the 
“governmentalisation” of law not only entails an increasingly normative function, but 
also that law “[engages] responsively with exteriority, with an outside made up of 
resistances and transgressions that assume a constituent role in law’s very formation” 
(Golder and Fitzpatrick 2009, 56). It is argued here that in this responsive way, law 
begins to contribute to both the governing of life and the organisation of the market, 
and becomes instrumental in the resolution of tensions created by the increasing 
problematization of life. In fulfilling this governmental function, law becomes what 
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this thesis understands as a “tactics” of government (Foucault 2000, 211; Odysseos 
2010; Sokhi-Bulley 2013). 
This transformation of the function of law can be observed in the IP regime’s 
complex relation to genetic conceptions of life. IPRs stand between the interests of 
the private and the public sector, enable the control and the normalisation of 
knowledge, and confer “power effects” (Foucault 1997, 180) on the holder of 
temporary knowledge monopolies. They fulfil an important role in the market – but 
are also increasingly fulfilling other aims, as shown in Myriad’s surprising turn away 
from some forms of patentability, and the use of IPRs by patients for aims that are not 
primarily economic, but rather concerned with directing research agendas. In these 
instances, control over a normalised version of knowledge and control over the use of 
genetic information are becoming more important “power effects” conferred by IP. 
As knowledge becomes central for governing according to “the nature of things” 
(Foucault 2008, 19), control over this knowledge becomes more than an economic 
concern.  
In the ensuing tensions between the promotion of life and the guarantee of a 
working market, IPRs are functioning as more than an economic tool: they contribute 
tactically to the management of the ‘problematization’ of life. On the basis of ongoing 
contestations of IP’s treatment of genetic materials, this thesis explores the roles IPRs 
play in the management of the problematization of life, and the way in which this 
management destabilises assumptions on which IPRs are founded, such as the 
inventive step, and IP’s traditional legitimation as an economic incentive for research 
and development. Challenges arising from the encounter with life will be analysed on 
three levels, structured according to the constituent elements of biopower – truth, the 
subject, and exercises of power in the name of life (Rabinow and Rose 2006, 212). 
One chapter focuses on IP’s conflicted relation to knowledge over life (chapter IV), 
another on challenges to IP’s exclusivity posed by new modes of subjectification 
based on genetic conceptions of life (chapter V), and the last one analyses specific 
emerging strategies challenging IP’s exclusivity on the international level (chapter 
VI).2 
 
                                                
2 This chapter also engages with the problem of transposing Foucauldian ideas to the analysis of 
international relations, as debated between Kiersey, Weidner & Rosenow (2010) and Chandler (2010). 
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6. Revealing IP’s role(s) in the governing of life 
Three substantive chapters reveal different roles of IP in its function as a tactics of 
government, in which they normalise knowledges, impose a dividing line of 
exclusion/ inclusion of participation in the area of IP policy making and in the life 
science economy, and exert control over the further use of information derived from 
human genetic materials. The exercise of control over research and the exclusion of 
participation are most apparent on the international level, where IP excludes large 
parts of the world’s population from participation in the direction of research. But in 
the core international organisations of IP and health, strategies in the name of life are 
challenging the IP system’s exclusionary focus on the interests of patent holders at the 
expense of donor and patient communities around the world. Reports such as the 
Consultative Experts Working Group’s (CEWG) report on Research and 
Development to Meet Health Needs in Developing Countries: Strengthening Global 
Financing and Coordination (CEWG 2012a) even begin exploring alternatives that 
could replace the existing IP system – on the basis of finding a ‘market failure’ of 
traditional mechanisms for the improvement of public health within developing 
countries. This “new moral economy of R&D” (Lezaun and Montgomery 2015) 
highlights the emergence of a new ethics within the international IP regime, and the 
IP regime’s tactical management of challenges arising from this. 
On the national level, the IP system’s complete division between donors and 
IP derived from donation is well-established since Moore v. Board of Regents (1990), 
but a wider variety of strategies are challenging this status. The Myriad case shows 
that patients and doctors seek to minimise the exclusionary effects of the IP system, 
challenging the way in which IP can prevent access to genetic testing and to improved 
treatments. Also, patient groups at times become owners of IP to their own genetic 
condition in order to exert control over the research agenda in this area, as the case of 
PXE International and the strategic use of IP by medical research charities show (see 
chapter V). Here, IP is no longer used for primarily economic reasons, but rather in 
order to promote certain priorities based on the genetic condition of the patent holders 
– which are thus acting as “active patients” in Rose’s sense: “actively choosing, and 
using medicine, biosciences, pharmaceuticals and ‘alternative medicine’ in order [sic] 
maximize and enhance their own vitality, demanding information from their doctors, 
expecting successful therapies, and liable to complain or even go to law if they are 
disappointed” (N. Rose 2007a, 11). 
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A closer look at the challenge posed by the entrepreneurial, self-actualising 
subject within this “vitalisation” (Dillon and Reid 2009, 21) of the economic role of 
IP shows that IPRs’ exclusionary effects play a role in the management of these new 
modes of subjectification. An analysis of the use of IPRs by biobanks and personal 
genomics businesses shows that IPRs operate as a regime of exclusion, demarcating 
the area of influence of individuals (donors/patients/customers) from that of experts 
and business. Here, the sphere of participation by individuals is structured as one of 
mostly donors or customers, which are involved in informed consent procedures and 
have the option of receiving instruction by an expert based on the results of their gene 
scan. These instructions can give rise to new norms of conduct, while the sphere of 
further economic and scientific use derived from this information remains closed off 
from participation. IP transfers control over the use of this information to the 
business, while the donor is only involved in a yes/no decision of consent to the 
general use of their data. IP is thus tactically maintaining the function of the economic 
use of information derived from genetic materials, keeping the influence of the active 
patient within bounds – and contributing to tipping the balance between individual 
rights and responsibilities within a new “somatic ethics” firmly towards 
responsibilities. 
IPRs also contribute to a normalisation of knowledge (or ‘truth’) over life by 
rewarding specific types of research while side-lining other scientific paradigms. IP 
jurisdiction shows how its recognised understanding of the genetic sequence 
undergoes change from a ‘special’ chemical molecule to an informational entity, 
bringing about changes in the patentability of genetic sequences in the process. These 
changes are actually complicating the economic role of IPRs, which is why this thesis 
argues that they have to be understood as a concession to the central influence of the 
genetic view of life – here thought of as an influential ‘genetic dispositif’. This 
dispositif of the genetic code is based on valuable information on the life of the 
population and the individual, which makes it central to questions of the governing of 
life. Owning and controlling this information by means of IP directly involves this 
field of law into the definition of this life for the purpose of governing. Under this 
influence, it is argued here, IP jurisdiction can no longer maintain its understanding of 
genetic sequences as primarily chemical molecules – even if this would be more 
conducive for their commodification as information as such is not patentable.  
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By defining genetic sequences as essentially genetic-informational entities, IP 
jurisdiction contributes to the further normalisation of this relatively calculable and 
contains a ‘predictable’ conception of life. This decision shows how IP also plays a 
role in managing knowledge, as it privileges a conception of life that does not reflect 
current developments in scientific understandings. A turn away from the centrality of 
the genetic code is taking place in the field of the life sciences, moving instead 
towards accounts emphasising complexity and interaction with the environment 
(Carey 2012; Lewontin 2000; Landecker 2011). Interestingly, IP’s deliberations on 
the ‘truth’ of life have neither acknowledged nor discussed these fields of research, 
which date back to the foundational time of molecular biology. Francis Crick’s 
“central dogma” of the unidirectional mechanism of “DNA makes RNA makes 
protein makes us” marginalised other conceptions of life for most of the twentieth 
century (Crick 1970; the term “dogma” proved controversial, see Crick 1990, 109; H. 
Rose and Rose 2012, 31). The recent resurgence of an emphasis on environmental and 
systemic factors in epigenetics and systems biology produces more complex and less 
unidirectional accounts of molecular processes – which are less easily rendered in a 
form that could be patented (Calvert 2008) and also would be more difficult to 
interpret for the purposes of governing. Complexity thus endangers both the 
governing of life and the economic use derived from genetic information, which 
makes IP’s definition of genetic sequences as discrete informational objects a tactical 
production of certainty. 
 
7. Core Contributions – IP’s role as a tactics for governing 
The growing number of cases in which IPRs are used not for primarily economic 
purposes shows that in their encounter with genetic conceptions of life, IPRs are 
beginning to act as more than merely economic tools for appropriation. Instead of 
merely commodifying life, IPRs also become an important site at which the 
increasing problematization of life for governing gives rise to tensions between 
economic priorities and the definition of genetic conceptions of life, new modes of 
subjectification formed with reference to genetic knowledge, and specific 
interventions made in the name of life. By analysing these tensions in a frame of 
reference that is not entirely determined by economic relations, this thesis goes 
beyond previous critiques of IP’s role in the increasing ‘commodification’ of life and 
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contributes to the field of critical legal studies, and furthers especially the field of 
Foucauldian legal scholarship by studying a particularly underexplored area of law. 
IP’s location at the intersection of knowledge and the market makes this an especially 
interesting field of law, which governs for the market – but is also challenged by a 
focus on the governing of life. 
 This thesis carries out an analysis of IP’s role in managing challenges 
emerging from a political sphere based on genetic conceptions of life, or an increasing 
‘problematization’ of molecular life, as Foucault might have put it (1994, 114). In 
contrast to previous critiques of IP’s commodification of life, this thesis develops an 
analytical framework that traces the constituent elements of biopower as a 
“configuration of knowledge, power and subjectivity” (Rabinow and Rose 2006, 197 
and 212). In this way, it develops an “analytics of power”, which seeks to “[detail] the 
operational logics, forces and dynamics at play in a specific configuration of power 
relations” (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008, 272). This framework focuses the 
analysis on the problem of governing life within widening circuits of economic 
exchange. In analysing these different levels of change within an increasing emphasis 
on the governing of life, this framework can reveal the detailed processes through 
which governmental rationalities evolve. It furthermore allows for a reassessment of 
the role of law within Foucault’s thought, and emphasises its foundational role for the 
implementation of conditions that encourage desirable behaviour and put in place the 
parameters within which the neoliberal ‘free’ market operates. This type of analysis 
contributes to the literature in governmentality studies, placing the previously 
neglected study of law firmly back into the remit of such studies.  
Furthermore, this thesis also highlights the relevance of Foucault’s concepts 
for studying a legal regime with a distinct international dimension, especially in the 
discipline of International Relations (Rosenow 2009; Kiersey 2009; Dillon and Reid 
2009; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2009). The IP regime connects the national and 
international level of law in a unique yet very powerful way, enshrining the IP 
systems of specific industrialised nations in an internationally enforceable treaty. As 
the later chapters show (V and VI), this IP system is challenged by genetic 
conceptions of life in different ways on the national and the international level, but the 
international reach of the IP system and the global sourcing of genetic materials for 
research makes this a very particular “new political economy of vitality”, in which 
“transnational flows of knowledge, cells, tissues and intellectual property are coupled 
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with local intensifications and regulated by supranational institutions” (Rabinow and 
Rose 2006, 215). This transnational political economy faces relatively organised 
challenges in certain local intensifications such as the US, but still excludes most 
forms of participation by donor communities on the international level. However, a 
study of the debates within the supranational institutions shows how a political sector 
is forming around IP and global health, going back to the Doha Declaration on TRIPS 
and Public Health (WTO 2001). IP’s relation to donor communities in genetic 
resources is mostly debated in the field of plant and animal materials, but the 
interventions made in this field and within a wider evaluation of IP’s relation to health 
show that IP’s legitimacy is beginning to be fundamentally challenged in arguments 
about ‘market failure’ and through the use of human rights. 
 The analysis of the particular problematization of life in its genetic-
informational form also adds further to the literature on the biopolitics of life “itself” 
(N. Rose 2007b, amongst others). This thesis revisits Foucault’s concepts based on 
18th/19th century knowledge of body and argues that the genetic code’s connection 
between knowledge on the level of populations and on the level of the individual 
brought about an intensified influence of this type of knowledge over life, termed here 
the ‘genetic dispositif’. This does not only influence scientific research paradigms, but 
also deeply affects individual processes of identity formation and self-governing, 
giving rise to new molecular points of reference for conduct and enabling medical 
manipulation of the body’s basic constitutional processes (see for example debate on 
“genome editing” on human embryos, “Genome Editing: CRISPR Controls Gene 
Expression” 2015; Hilton et al. 2015; Liang et al. 2015; Sample 2015). The 
informational turn of genetic research made this even more effective, giving rise to 
new forms of technology and also to knowledge that can more easily be transferred 
into other scientific sectors, and into governmental and economic decision-making 
procedures. The neoliberal economy’s highly speculative investments in start-up 
companies founded on these forms of knowledge (Cooper 2008) further intensified 
the significance of the genetic conception of life, and thus posed an even stronger 
problematization of life for governing. At this intensifying intersection of knowledge 
and the economy, this thesis argues that IPs rapidly came under pressure to act as 
more than an economic tools and rather began to contribute to the governing of life as 
well. 
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8. Research Design 
The research conducted for this thesis evaluated a wide variety of official publications 
from international organisations and legal documents including judgements, statutes, 
and supporting materials. Due to the highly interdisciplinary research focus of this 
project, I had to familiarise myself with research output and findings across several 
disciplines (Intellectual Property Law, International law, International Relations, 
Anthropology, Life Sciences). Further to this, I conducted a number of semi-
structured anonymised elite interviews with key informants in the field of IP and 
molecular technology in London, Frankfurt, Munich and Geneva for the purpose of 
gathering information and grasping the complexity of debates that are carried out 
across various institutions and within the industry. Especially a week of intensive 
fieldwork in Geneva produced valuable insights into current debates in the three main 
international organisations operating at the intersection of IP and health: the WTO, 
WIPO, and the WHO. Key informant interviews were conducted with leading IP 
experts within the WTO, a leading representative of WIPO’s negotiations on IP, 
genetic resources, and traditional knowledge, and a legal expert concerned with the 
WHO Consultative Expert Working Group’s report on ‘Strengthening Global 
Financing and Cooperation’ (CEWG 2012a). A representative of the European Patent 
Office and a member of the UK’s Intellectual Property Office were also interviewed.  
Outside of the main international and national organisation, interviews were 
conducted with a range of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Geneva and in 
London. Interviews with an IP expert from FIND Diagnostics, with a representative 
of the Medicines Patent Pool, and with an IP expert from the International Centre for 
Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) gave valuable insights into the 
increasing relevance of Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) actively employing 
specific IP strategies in defined geographical contexts and with focus on particular 
illnesses such as AIDS and Tuberculosis. A leading expert from Genetic Alliance UK 
was interviewed on the topic of the increasing influence of patients’ groups and their 
interests in genetic information. Several independent researchers were consulted in 
this field as well. 
It proved more difficult to gain access to industry experts from within the 
pharmaceutical industry. Some of the interviewees had formerly been employed by 
large pharmaceutical companies. Beyond that, one interview was conducted with an 
IP expert representing the IP department of a medium-sized German pharmaceutical 
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company. Also, an IP lawyer specialising in the life sciences gave highly interesting 
professional insights into the developing political sphere of IP management rules, 
giving incentives for certain types of research on neglected or orphan diseases. These 
rules are a more elusive part of the sphere of IP law, however, they concern 
procedures guaranteeing data exclusivity and assigning exclusive market approval for 
example for medicines against orphan diseases (see chapter VI). A senior university 
researcher in the field of the life sciences was also interviewed on the increasing 
relevance of IP for their research. 
All interviewees were very aware of the politically charged current discourse 
around ‘TRIPS Plus’ negotiations and the critical stance towards IP’s relation to life 
and health, especially in developing countries. This became very obvious in 
interviews with the industry, and with high-level representatives of WTO, WHO, and 
WIPO, which were at the time actively engaged in publishing the trilateral study on 
‘Promoting Access and Medical Innovation: Intersections between Public Health, 
Intellectual Property and Trade’ (WHO, WIPO, and WTO 2013) – and very keen to 
avoid controversy or contradiction. It was difficult to get access to these 
representatives, and the interviews themselves were challenging as well. Virtually all 
interviewees insisted on anonymity, and most were reluctant to sign release forms for 
the content of the interviews. The interviews were semi-structured around questions 
tailored to the individual’s specialist position, aiming to gather information on the 
treatment of human genetic materials by the IP regime, and on ongoing debates within 
the respective organisation on this topic. I hoped to get an insight into several 
contested issues – such as the Convention on Biological Diversity’s unresolved 
relation to TRIPS (WTO 2015a) – but found that most interviewees were only 
comfortable talking about their current initiatives. While that somewhat broadened the 
scope of the interviews, it nonetheless reflected the complex, fractured terrain of the 
intersection of IP and life, clearly demonstrated the sensitivity of the debates, and 
showed how much is at stake in this confrontation.  
 
9. Outline of Thesis 
The following chapters first set out previous critiques of the ‘commodification’ of 
life, and then argue that tensions between molecular conceptions of life and the IP 
regime can be better grasped using an analytical framework that does not presuppose 
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the fundamental economic determination of social exchanges. Examples of the use of 
IPRs for non-commercial aims by charities confound expectations of unidirectional 
exploitation through commodification, giving rise to, as Waldby & Mitchell put it, 
“paradoxes plaguing the intersection of the human body and intellectual property 
regimes in the present moment” (2006, 136). The following chapters argue that the 
notion of commodification cannot adequately account for these paradoxes, but that 
more is at stake in these cases: the confrontation of the IP regime with a politics based 
on genetic conceptions of life. Foucault’s concepts of governmentality and biopower 
rely on an analysis of foundational conditions that give rise to economic relations, but 
also point to the governing of tensions emerging in an increasing problematization of 
life. Interrogating IP’s confrontation with elements of a new political sphere of life – 
truth, the role of the subject, and power – directs the focus onto tensions between 
knowledge and the economy without viewing them exclusively through the prism of 
capitalist market relations. This emphasises the influence of a ‘genetic dispositif’ in 
the creation of knowledge and the creation of economic value, which however also 
gives rise to challenges to the economic use of this knowledge. 
The second chapter reviews the existing critical literature on IP’s treatment of 
human genetic materials, and also evaluates literature analysing the political 
dimension of the life science/ biotech sector without specific reference to IP. In this, it 
finds that critiques of IP mostly focus on its role in the ‘commodification of life’, 
either as an instance of “biopiracy” (amongst others: Shiva 1998; 2001) or as a new 
“enclosure of the commons” (Boyle 2003; 2008; May 2010). The chapter argues that 
this critique focuses the debate on economic circuits of exchange and mechanisms of 
value attribution, without taking into account the wider social relevance of genetic 
knowledge beyond the life sciences. Some of the literature contrasts capitalist 
economic relations with the concept of the gift relationship in order to capture these 
interactions. However, this thesis argues that new incentives for the use of IP emerge 
as part of a political sphere based on genetic conceptions of life, which need to be 
analysed from a perspective that does not conceive of this sphere as predominantly 
and unilaterally determined by economic value. The chapter traces a beginning turn 
towards an analysis of “life as a productive force” (Yoxen 1981) within the emerging 
sphere of the “politics of life itself” (Franklin 2000; N. Rose 2007b), as studies begin 
to employ the Foucauldian concepts of biopolitics and governmentality to capture 
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social and power relations from a different perspective. However, the specific role of 
IPRs has not been studied by any of these scholars in depth.  
The third chapter then introduces this thesis’ analytical framework, which 
enables a more complex reading of IP’s role in the encounter with genetic conceptions 
of life on the level of truth, the subject, and exercises of power (Rabinow and Rose 
2006). Relying on Foucault’s concepts of governmentality and biopolitics, this 
analysis traces the historical emergence of a new sphere of politics centred on the 
governing of life. Instead of directly enforcing the priorities of a sovereign, this form 
of governing puts into place conditions and parameters that guide conduct towards 
desirable outcomes. This leads to an incremental change in predominantly sovereign 
areas of governing, such as law, which are increasingly involved in the promotion of 
new priorities of governing such as the improvement of life. The chapter argues that 
these processes of change and resulting tensions have been intensified through the 
molecularisation of life and the increasing financialisation of life in the bioeconomy. 
In these intensified dynamics between knowledge and the economy, the IP regime is 
emerging as a central site of contestation – and is increasingly operating as a “tactics” 
of government (Foucault 2000, 211; Odysseos 2010; Sokhi-Bulley 2013) in order to 
resolve tensions. 
This reading of IP law as a tactics of government further refines Foucault’s 
position on the role of law in a governmental system. In a departure from some other 
interpretations of the relevance of law for Foucault’s work, the chapter argues that 
law is central to the development of the “economic-juridical order” (Foucault 2008, 
163) setting up the “rules of the game” (Ibid., 173) underlying a neoliberal economy. 
However, as law becomes involved in the promotion of governmental priorities, it 
also becomes “responsive” (Golder and Fitzpatrick 2009, 56 and 71) to challenges 
and resistance. This responsive dimension encapsulates the tactical operation of law, 
in which it negotiates or manages the potentially conflicting priorities of governing 
for the market and also promoting life and well-being. IPRs thus undoubtedly govern 
for the market by setting up a regime of ownership, which is also extended to genetic 
knowledge of life. However, IP also responds tactically to increasing pressures 
generated by the genetic code’s pervasive societal influence and increasing relevance 
for questions of governing. This code integrates knowledge of the individual body 
with that of the population, and gives rise not only to new forms of medical 
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knowledge, but also to a new system of truth over life that conducts individuals’ 
choices.  
Guided by Rabinow and Rose’s understanding of the elements of biopower 
(2006), the fourth chapter begins an in-depth analysis of the changing role of IPRs 
towards a tactics of governing by analysing its confrontation with different truth 
discourses on ‘life’. As the recent Myriad judgement shows, this relation to truth over 
life is far from straightforward. The chapter first sets out the context of the surprising 
overturn of patentability of some genetic materials, and then argues that these changes 
cannot adequately be explained from a ‘commodification’ perspective alone. Rather, a 
turn towards a genetic-informational conception of life limited the patentability of 
isolated genetic sequences. However, the judgement still maintained patentability of 
other types of sequences (such as cDNA), thus can be seen as governing for the 
market as well – especially considering IP’s continuing preference for a relatively 
defined genetic-informational conception of life over more complex, interactional 
interpretations of existence. In this sense, IPRs continue to normalise a particular 
conception of life that is conducive to governing the conduct of individuals and 
populations. In elevating this conception over other forms of knowledge, however, the 
patentability criteria of the IP regime are being pushed to their limits. 
The fifth chapter then explores tensions between the subjectivities envisaged 
by the IP regime, and emerging modes of subjectification based on a genetic 
conception of life. Some ‘genetic’ subjects are contesting the IP regimes’ 
exclusionary effects, while others are actively using IPRs for a new purpose, 
prioritising the furtherance of life and health of patients. These modes of 
subjectification are incited by “ideas of active differentiation, regulated self-
responsibility and depoliticized autonomy” (McNay 2009, 62), following a new 
“somatic ethics” based on genetic knowledge of the body (N. Rose 2008a). The 
chapter argues that while these new modes of subjectification increasingly challenge 
the exclusionary function of IPRs, and begin to use them in new ways, the IP regime 
continues to separate their area of influence from the use of genetic materials in the 
bioeconomy. A new somatic ethics structures the subjects’ conduct by encouraging 
individuals to donate their tissue and their medical information to research 
endeavours, generating valuable knowledge that can be used for governing 
supplements the economic circulation of ‘life’.  
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The chapter develops a contrast between “research patients” and supposedly 
empowered “genetic” or “biological citizens”, and shows how the IP regime is 
currently limiting the participation of these active patients in decisions regarding the 
further use of information derived from their donations to biobanks or to other 
research projects. As a regime for exclusion, IPRs currently prevent disruptions to the 
bioeconomy, while for example the approach of ‘citizen’s science’ is trialling more 
democratic alternatives of data ownership. IP thus continues to govern for the market, 
while the pressure exerted by active patients is mounting. Importantly, these new 
subjectivities are mostly emerging in industrialised countries with advanced 
healthcare systems. However, a version of this challenge can also be traced on the 
international level, where new legal entities (or juridical subjects) such as Public-
Private Partnerships (PPPs), Product Development Partnerships (PDPs), Patent Pools, 
and Medical Research Charities are also employing IPRs in new strategic ways. 
This international dimension is then analysed in the sixth chapter. Here, IP’s 
function as a regime for exclusion is at its starkest level, entirely severing the 
connection between donors of genetic materials – located for example in developing 
countries – and the further use of these materials by companies located within 
industrialised countries. However, the coming into force of the Nagoya Protocol to 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) shows that some efforts address this 
disconnect, at least in the area of traditional knowledges and animal/plant genetic 
resources. While the relation between the CBD and TRIPS remains unclear, the IP 
regime’s relation to life and health is also coming under pressure within major 
international organisations operating at the intersection of life and the international 
economy: the WHO, WIPO, and the WTO. The chapter analyses an emerging conflict 
between the ‘right to health’ and IP, which could have the potential of delegitimising 
the IPRs regime’s exclusivity in an incremental way. An increasing critique relying 
on the argument of ‘market failure’ in certain developing countries may have a similar 
effect. The notion of market failure fundamentally challenges the assumptions 
underlying the neoliberal economy, arguing that measures based on the operation of 
the market were ineffective in the fulfilment of health priorities in certain contexts. 
These debates are currently only making relatively small interventions in IP’s 
international regime, but by inexorably introducing the problem of life into the field 
of IP, these interventions could be the basis for future challenges.  
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This chapter also engages with the problem of transposing Foucauldian ideas 
to the analysis of international relations, as debated between Kiersey, Weidner & 
Rosenow (2010) and Chandler (2010). It distinguishes between different 
interpretations of an international dimension of biopolitics, showing how some are 
more akin to ‘sovereign’ power exercises than others. Instead of making statements 
about a confrontation with ‘global’ biopolitics, the chapter seeks to implement an 
analysis of a specific site of contestation, which stretches across national boundaries 
and has a distinct international economic dimension in the shape of TRIPS. The 
exclusion of large parts of the world’s population from access to the products of 
research in the biotech and life science sector strongly invokes Selmeczi’s critique of 
the “abandonment” of those that do not count as part of the population, which she 
argues is constitutive of contemporary biopolitics (Selmeczi 2009). The international 
IP regime itself can be seen as a formal inscription of this abandonment, as this 
exclusive system does not account for the interests of large parts of the world’s 
population. The chapter however traces emerging challenges to this exclusivity, 
which are made in the name of life and health, and are eroding IP’s legitimacy. 
The concluding chapter then places these analyses of the challenges faced by 
the IP regime’s encounter with a political sphere of life and health in context with the 
larger struggle between biopolitical challenges and a limiting ‘economic’ critique in 
neoliberal governmentality, showing how this places IP at the heart of the contested 
relation between the public sphere of governing and the private sphere that is 
“governed at a distance” (Miller and Rose 2008). At the intersection of life and the 
economy, the analysis in the previous chapters has revealed the precarious position of 
IPRs as a concession to research and development efforts of inventors, granting a 
temporary monopoly within the otherwise ‘free’ market of neoliberalism. Its new role 
in contributing to the management of the problematization of life begins to erode IP’s 
fundamental legitimation. In this process, the economic functions of IPRs are 
increasingly exposed to tension, as the “responsive” quality of IP law is beginning to 
stretch this field of law beyond its traditional content. Golder and Fitzpatrick point out 
that law can “[disrupt] itself through becoming receptive of resistances that constantly 
challenge its position, its content, its being” (Golder and Fitzpatrick 2009, 71). As 
IPRs increasingly begin to act as a tactics of government, contributing to the 
resolution of tensions between life and the market, their importance for the economy 
could be undermined by interventions that aim at their economic legitimacy. In this 
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way, the ‘problem’ of genetic life could fundamentally disrupt the economy of 
knowledge. 
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Chapter II Intellectual Property on Life Itself – Evaluating the 
Commodification Critique and its Limits 
 
“At the centre of many of the issues that will be discussed [...] is the question of the 
commodification of knowledge.” (May 2000, 11) 
“[Foucault’s] idea of self as enterprise takes the critique in a different direction, in 
that it understands the commodification of subjective experience not so much through 
ideas of passive consumerism, standardization and heteronomy, as through ideas of 
active differentiation, regulated self-responsibility and depoliticized autonomy.” 
(McNay 2009, 62) 
 
The discovery of the genetic code fundamentally altered the conception of life and 
reconfigured understandings of illness and well-being. It gave rise to new areas of 
study and also new sectors of the economy, which grew exponentially as the genetic 
conception of life was increasingly refined in the decades since the original discovery 
in the 1950s. The confluence of genetics and informatics continues to intensify the 
speed of sequencing and processing of genetic codes, as “the traditional ‘wet lab’ of 
molecular biology is being extended, augmented, and even replaced by the ‘dry lab’ 
of bioinformatics and computational biology” (Thacker 2004, 2). The proliferation of 
uses for the genetic code however also places questions of its ownership irresistibly at 
the centre of debates about conceptions of life and their relation to society and 
economy. As a result, IPRs in human genetic sequences are increasingly contested on 
the national and international level.  
This chapter reviews existing literature on the issue of IPRs in human genetic 
materials, and their relevance for the biotech/life science sector in general. It finds 
predominantly critiques of the role of IPRs in the ‘commodification’ of life for 
economic use, a practice that has been interpreted as “biopiracy” (Shiva 1998) on the 
international level, and generally been criticised as a second “enclosure of the 
commons” of humankind (Boyle 2008; May 2010). However, this chapter argues that 
these critiques see IP’s role as a unidirectional tool of appropriation and value 
generation for the economy, and accord these economic relations foundational 
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primacy as a determining force for social relations. This analytical perspective does 
not account for the wider socio-cultural influence of the genetic conception of life, 
which gives rise to a new politics of life that contains other incentives than economic 
ones for participation in research projects. The emergence of a new “politics of life 
itself” (Franklin 2000; N. Rose 2007b) has been noted by a number of scholars, and 
has been explored with regards to the life science sector – however, the role of IPRs 
within this has never been comprehensively assessed beyond their function of 
providing commodities.  
This thesis argues that in the confrontation with the genetic conception of life, 
IPRs are increasingly becoming part of the governmental management of life. The 
following chapters set out an analytical perspective that places emphasis on law’s 
function in providing the parameters for the market – they “govern for the market” 
(Foucault 2008, 121) – and then explores IP’s role in contestations between life and 
the economy on the level of knowledge, the subject, and new strategies questioning 
IP’s relation to life. Before turning to this analysis, this chapter introduces the existing 
two strands of critique, assesses the limits of the concept of commodification 
employed in these, and highlights literature on the life science sector focusing on its 
productive relation between the economy and life. Here the shortcomings of the 
commodification paradigm are mostly highlighted by reference to the power of the 
gift relationship in the area of healthcare – which cannot be accounted for in purely 
economically motivated terms.  
 
1. Patenting ‘Life’ – Intellectual property and human genetic materials 
The gene has become an ubiquitous point of reference for contemporary life, as 
constant news about research into genetic conditions and predispositions are 
promising the ultimate insight into the human body’s innermost secrets such as 
processes of aging, learning and healing (Dawkins 2006; Ridley 1999; Frank 2012; on 
processes of aging Corbyn 2015; debate on the moral implications of new capabilities 
in the “editing” of heritable human genetic sequences see The Guardian 2015; 
Lanphier et al. 2015; Hilton et al. 2015; “Genome Editing: CRISPR Controls Gene 
Expression” 2015; Liang et al. 2015; Sample 2015). The discovery of the gene is 
influencing the understanding of human life, of human potential and of human 
relations to other humans and to the environment. The genetic paradigm has 
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dominated research within the life sciences, displacing other research areas in the 
process (Kay 1993; H. Rose and Rose 2012). Large-scale prestigious research projects 
such as the Human Genome Project (HGP) captured the public’s imagination and 
marked the beginning of a new era of research in a wide variety of fields within and 
beyond the life sciences, ranging from agriculture, food sciences, forensics, 
pharmacology, research in biofuels, to virology and various medical areas such as 
cancer treatments. Since the HGP’s completion, the development of increasingly 
effective methods of sequencing and analysis of DNA has further intensified this 
influence of genetic scientific knowledge, which has begun moving beyond the 
specialist context of the laboratory as home testing kits and even sequencing 
machines are becoming increasingly available.3 
Roughly at the same time as the rise of the gene, a new form of intellectual 
property emerged: the gene patent. This form of intellectual property on information 
derived from human, plant, animal, or micro-organism genetic materials was highly 
controversial since its inception in the 1980s, beginning with the patenting of an oil-
dissolving micro-organism (Diamond v. Chakrabarty (1980) 447 U.S. 303).  
Subsequent very broad patent claims such as the OncoMouse™ raised concerns about 
the exclusionary effects of this practice, claiming in this case an entire “transgenic 
non-human mammal all of whose germ cells and somatic cells contain a recombinant 
activated Onco gene sequence introduced into said mammal, or an ancestor of said 
mammal, at an embryonic stage” (Jaenichen, McDonell, and Haley Jr. 2002, 8). 
Further notorious examples consisted of patents applications on basmati rice, 
traditional indigenous herbal remedies, agricultural seed materials, and also human 
genetic materials, as for example in the case of the surreptitious patenting of John 
Moore’s genetic material (Moore v. Board of Regents [1990]).  
In the unfolding debates about the implications of genetic research and the 
ownership of genetic materials, the pharmaceutical industry, researchers, 
philosophers, ‘bioethicists’, patients, IP lawyers, politicians, and national 
governments all contributed to ethical arguments. These debates resulted in slightly 
different regional approaches to the regulation of the patentability of human genetic 
materials, in which in theory every country can establish its own particular regime. 
                                                
3 See for example a recent crowd-funded project aiming to produce an open-source real-time PCR 
(polymerase chain reaction) thermocycler, which not only amplifies specific segments of DNA, but can 
also turn this DNA into data (https://www.kickstarter.com/projects/chaibio/open-qpcr-dna-diagnostics-
for-everyone accessed 26.11.2014). This machine is crucial for DNA analysis. 
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However, this changed in 1994 with the introduction of international minimum 
standards of patentability laid down in the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) as part of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
In this treaty, a US model of IP law was implemented worldwide, at the behest of 
influential US industry interests (Sell 2003). IP has since become a highly charged 
topic in international negotiations, as these legal standards are mostly perceived to be 
in the interest of industrial countries, and are widely criticised for their detrimental 
effects on developing countries – especially in the context of pharmaceuticals and 
health (Hestermeyer 2007).  
This chapter presents an evaluation of critiques made of IP’s treatment of 
genetic conceptions of life, and argues that they are overly focused on the role of IPs 
within the economy, and do not take into account the wider political dimensions of 
the emergence of the gene (referred to later as “the genetic dispositif”) and the 
establishment of exclusive ownership over this knowledge. These dimensions will 
then be explored throughout the thesis, on the level of contestations over the 
recognized “truth” of life, of demands for participation and openness voiced by 
“active patients”, and of critical interventions made upon the international level, 
seeking to challenge the IP system’s exclusivity in the name of health. This section 
first briefly explains the legal concepts establishing intellectual property rights 
especially in the form of patents, and then shows how the national and the 
international intersect in the IP regime guaranteed by TRIPS. After establishing this 
background, this chapter then turns to an evaluation of several strands of critiques. 
 
1.1. IPRs in human genetic materials – ‘Inventing’ a commodity 
Intellectual Property Rights comprise a range of different legal mechanisms for 
establishing ownership over abstract ‘intellectual’ creations – thus making an abstract 
idea or invention into a tradeable commodity. Without this, the distribution of 
knowledge would remain “non-rivalrous”, as knowledge does not diminish when it is 
distributed, unlike more conventional objects (Boyle 2008, 3). Making commodities 
out of information derived from ‘life’ pushes the boundaries of intellectual property, 
as the subsequent discussion shows. In this, the focus of this work rests predominantly 
on patents, which are the most important means of ‘owning’ information derived from 
human genetic materials. Copyright is involved in this area to a much more limited 
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extent.4 Patents are the tool that assure ownership over an idea, whereas Copyright is 
the means by which ownership of a particular way of expressing an idea is 
established, as for example in a novel or a computer programme (see May 2010, 5).  
Copyright is not in itself a new invention but rather creative usage of pre-existing 
concepts such a language. Patents confer a “limited monopoly” on the patentee “in 
return for the disclosure of technical information” (Bently and Sherman 2009, 335).  
Patents are usually defined as “a monopoly which is granted for an invention 
after application to, and examination for patentability by, the Patent Office and lasts 
for a maximum of 20 years. To be patentable, an invention must be new, show an 
inventive step, be industrially applicable and not fall into one of the excluded 
categories of invention” (Colston and Galloway 2010, 4). Most important for IPRs in 
human genetic materials is the notion of the inventive step, which seeks to ensure that 
patents are granted for inventions, not discoveries. An invention is the creation of a 
novel product by a scientist/ inventor, whose creative effort warrants reward (see for 
example Jasanoff 2012, 165f.). Mere discoveries, on the other hand, are fundamental 
‘truths’ that cannot be owned, as this would “inhibit competition and deprive the 
public of a truth that had always existed, only waiting to be uncovered” (Colston and 
Galloway 2010, 126; they give an example of the discovery of a new chemical 
element as one such “truth”).  
This distinction may seem straightforward at first, but becomes most 
problematic in the context of human genetic materials, where a determination has to 
be made whether the human genome or individual genetic sequences constitute a 
discovery or an invention (see discussion in chapter IV). Even IP’s most basic 
precondition of the ‘inventive step’ is immersed in debates involving different 
interests and different interpretations of the truth over life. At stake in these debates is 
nothing less than the question of IP’s legitimacy in this area – and an entire economy 
of funding for research. This thesis does not seek to normatively decide this debate, 
but rather to provide an analytical perspective on debates surrounding parameters of 
IP that foregrounds contestations about truth contained in technical assumptions such 
as the inventive step, industrial applicability, or ‘novelty’. Rather than focusing 
predominantly on the economic role of IPRs in human genetic materials and their 
                                                
4 There are also ways of establishing de facto control over genetic information by means of copyright, 
for example through ownership of the copyright over the programme showing information in the 
browser rendering the genetic sequence of the individual legible and usable (O’Riordan 2010, 9 and 
21). 
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making of the commodity, this perspective can account for a wider variety of power 
exercises surrounding the creation of intellectual property over life – especially IP’s 
role in the normalization of knowledge and in the management of political challenges 
emerging from the predominance of genetic conceptions of life. 
This analysis of the different roles of IP does, however, not seek to argue that 
IPRs do not fulfill the function of providing commodities. It rather argues against a 
primary focus on this role, which interprets tensions surrounding IPRs with reference 
to this role alone. This chapter shows that emphasis on the creation of commodities 
comes at the expense of a more detailed appreciation of the rise of genetic 
conceptions of life’s wider political implications – and the way in which this account 
of life presents problems for governing, negotiated especially in this legal field 
situated at the intersection of genetic accounts of life and the economy. The economy 
here becomes a project of government, which puts into place the parameters of the 
‘free market’ and regimes such as IPRs, which can be used to ensure the appropriate 
functioning of this market. Thus, rather than arguing that IPRs are “commodifying 
life” because of demands of the market, this thesis reverses the analysis on IPRs as a 
constitutive part of laws governing for the market (see next chapter), arguing that they 
fulfill more functions in this process than the provision of commodities alone. In this, 
IPRs contribute to the management of problems for the governing of life while 
simultaneously maintaining objects for circulation in the economy. 
 
1.2. IP: Connecting the national and international context 
The establishment of an international IP system built on enforceable minimum 
standards in the early nineties gave soon rise to fierce criticism and controversy, as 
later negotiation rounds on WTO treaty amendments showed. The next few decades 
saw this previously relatively obscure technical area of economic law develop into a 
hotly debated issue, challenging for example its connection to health concerns and the 
relative imbalance of interests served by IP. Developing countries succeeded in 
securing a declaration on the relation between IPRs and public health in the Doha 
Round of WTO negotiations commencing in 2001, but this declaration fell short of 
actually introducing new options into the already established system (WTO 2001, see 
also chapter VI for details of changes that were nonetheless enabled by this 
declaration). In the field of genetic resources and traditional knowledge, indigenous 
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peoples increasingly challenged the use of IPRs on traditional indigenous knowledge 
and genetic resources gathered by bioprospecting operations across the globe. 
Separate treaties were drafted to respond to such concerns, for example the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and its Nagoya Protocol on Access to 
Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their 
Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity (2010), but are still not (to date) 
endorsed by some of the most important industrialised countries such as the US – 
which are most in favour of high IP standards and strong enforcement measures.  
The history of TRIPS and the uneven distribution of IP-producing industries 
world-wide reveal a very strong interconnection between national and international 
agendas within the field of IP policy – especially where it comes to the influence of 
some very powerful industrialised countries such as the US. The standardisation in the 
field of IP law brought about by TRIPS was heavily influenced by these interests, 
which also continue to push for more stringent (‘TRIPS Plus’) agreements. As Sell 
points out, the TRIPS agreement was substantially drafted by a private pressure group 
called Intellectual Property Committee (IPC), consisting of chief executive officers of 
pharmaceutical, entertainment and software industries in the US, Europe and Japan 
(Sell 2003, 2; Tyfield 2008). In the TRIPS agreement’s negotiation, these lobbyists 
set out to strengthen existing protection measures and succeeded in gaining 
government support for a highly protectionist new agreement based on already 
existing IP laws of industrialised countries, thus effectively globalising a previously 
predominantly national system reflecting the interests of industrialised states (Sell 
2003, 2). A similar US-led undertaking can currently be witnessed in the negotiations 
seeking to introduce TRIPS Plus standards in international agreements such as the 
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), the Transpacific Partnership (TPP), 
and to some extent also in the current negotiations between the US and the EU as part 
of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) (Sell 2008; Abbott 
2009; UNAIDS 2011; Geist 2010).  
The biotech sector also traverses national boundaries in a variety of other 
ways. Biotech companies, for instance, are most likely based within countries with a 
beneficial IP system. One early high-profile example is deCode Genetics, which set 
up and ran the Icelandic Biobank – a private corporation formed under US law but 
with its physical location in Iceland. This is a common occurrence in the biotech 
sector, where “most biotech companies in the world are given a fictitious Delaware 
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location for legal, tax and patent advantages” (Pálsson and Rabinow 1999, 14). A 
large proportion of biotech companies are thus actively seeking out the US IP system, 
which is less restrictive than the European approach especially in the area of human 
genetic materials. For example, since the Bayh-Dole Act (1980), the US system 
allowed for IPRs being derived from publicly funded research projects, “[facilitating] 
the transfer of technology between academe and industry in the United States, and 
thereby [enabling] rapid commercialization of basic research problems” (Rajan 2012, 
2). This gave rise to the “entrepreneurial university” such as Stanford, which gave a 
“huge spur to the overall commercialization of biotechnology, and specifically to the 
development of Silicon Valley”, and has “a full-fledged technology-licensing office 
that focused exclusively on marketing university inventions” (Ibid., 3, this notion of 
the entrepreneurial university is now also being implemented outside of the US). 
Generous IP provisions such as these gave rise to an extraordinary influence of the 
US within the international biotech sector. Beyond this particular expansion of private 
interests, medical research in general has also become internationalized, as drug trials 
are increasingly recruiting test subjects from countries in which the population is not 
already exposed to a large number of pharmaceuticals, trials can be conducted more 
cheaply, and ethical standards are less strictly enforced (Petryna 2006, 37 and 42). 
Within this complex intersection of national and international private and public 
interests, IPRs’ economic role has been analysed from a variety of perspectives, as the 
next section shows. 
 
2. Critiques of the “commodification” of life 
The patenting of genetic conceptions of life has been the focus of several strands of 
critical analysis, with different emphases on either its detrimental effects on 
developing countries on the international level or on the general prevention of the 
spread of knowledge throughout society. This section shows how both lines of 
argument foreground the economic role of IPRs of forming commodities for 
exchange. This evokes an economically determined order, in which the relations of 
the market dictate regulations (such as IPRs) that are beneficial for them. In this way, 
the requirements of the market determine the use of IPRs as either an “instrument of 
conquest” (Shiva 2001, 11), acquiring new materials from around the world without 
offering compensation, or as a tool enabling the expansion of the capitalist system 
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through a “new enclosure of the commons” (Boyle 2008; May 2010), which creates 
private property out of previously open and shared resources. Both emphasize the 
reinstating of “‘proper” bounds of property”, which “bind patent law and its 
opponents to the very distinctions between nature and culture, or discovery and 
invention, that biotechnology has rendered transparent or implausible” (Pottage 1998, 
745). 
Both strands of critique contain strong normative assumptions, as one 
highlights neocolonial practices and the other deplores the loss of the common 
heritage of mankind to a capitalist system operating through individual monopolies. 
This section will briefly set out both critiques, and then evaluate the focus on life’s 
“commodification”. In this it argues that this perspective neglects to explore the wider 
cultural and political significance of the genetic vision of life, which has more 
complex implications than the unidirectional process of commodification can account 
for, giving rise for example to new practices of the self that can either challenge or 
promote IPRs. The chapter then turns to a number of more recent analyses of the 
biotech sector, which have begun to explore these political implications. 
 
2.1. Denouncing “biopiracy” – IPRs as international “instruments of conquest” 
Forceful critiques of the international dimension of the IP regime have decried IP’s 
role in “biopiracy”, referring to a mechanism by which knowledge or materials that 
are indigenous to one place can be appropriated by private companies from a more 
industrialised country. Shiva for example argues that IPRs historically started out as 
“instruments of conquest” and that “[p]atents which refer to knowledge as ‘property’ 
remain an instrument of colonization” (Shiva 2001, 11 and 18). According to Shiva, 
“Biopiracy refers to the use of intellectual property systems to legitimize the 
exclusive ownership and control over biological resources and biological products 
and processes that have been used over centuries in non-industrialized cultures” 
(Ibid., 49; see also Odek 1994; Sarma 1999; Aoki 1998; Mushita and Thompson 
2007; Mgbeoji 2006; Robinson 2010). Common examples include the patenting of 
traditional medicinal knowledge and plants, for instance the (attempted) patenting of 
plant species such as Basmati rice, or the patenting of the Kwao Krua herb from 
Thailand – and larger ‘bioprospecting’ missions gathering human genetic or plant 
materials from remote areas across the globe (Robinson 2010; Mgbeoji 2006). 
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Stanford’s Human Genome Diversity Project (HGDP) became particularly 
controversial as it sought to gather human genetic materials from remote tribes in the 
quest for the discovery of different genetic markers.  
Odek likens these practices to “the Age of Exploration, [when] researchers 
and travelers […] transported discovered plant species back to their own countries as 
new foods and raw materials for plant breeding”, and denounces this “uni-directional 
and uncompensated appropriation” (Odek 1994, 141 and 145). He emphasises that 
“the characterization of such acts as piracy serves as a normative assertion by 
developing countries that they have an entitlement to their plant genetic resources” 
(Ibid., 145). Robinson points to the origins of the term in language used by the NGO 
Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI) (Robinson 2010, 14; Mgbeoji 
2006, 12), stating that “[t]he use of the biopiracy discourse in these contexts is an 
indication that the term is politicized, reactive, and, in many cases, imprecise” 
(Robinson 2010, 15).  
Biopiracy criticises the commodification of indigenous pre-existing 
knowledge and materials through a Western hegemonic system of appropriation. This 
system employs “mechanisms of appropriation” which conceptually exclude pre-
existing forms of knowledge, characterizing “certain natural materials that indigenous 
and local communities have cared for, preserved, improved, and developed as mere 
‘wild’ species” and “while the products of formal knowledge systems […][are being] 
protected as ‘property’, those of informal, traditional systems have been tagged the 
freely available ‘common heritage of humanity’” (Roht-Arriaza 1995, 292). This 
mechanism is “[p]erhaps the most prevalent and insidious form of appropriation of 
indigenous knowledge and resources”, which “systematically exclude[s] the 
knowledge and resources of local communities, farmers, and indigenous people” 
(Ibid.; Sarma 1999, 115). This exclusion “works against indigenous groups primarily 
due to various procedural qualifications, such as the requirement of written 
documentation of knowledge or invention under US patent laws” (Sarma, Ibid., 116). 
The result is that “[t]he intellectual contribution of societies and communities which 
have not been motivated by the objective of profit is thus exploited, but not 
recognized” (Shiva 1998, 55).  
These effects are not accidental side effects of the IP system, as Shiva points 
out:  
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“Western patent systems were designed for import monopolies, not for 
screening all knowledge systems to exclude existing innovations and 
establish prior art in other cultures. […] Terra nullius has its 
contemporary equivalent in ‘Bio-Nullius’ – treating biodiversity 
knowledge as empty of prior creativity and prior rights, and hence 
available for ‘ownership’ through the claim of ‘invention’.” (Shiva 
2001, 49; emphasis in original) 
 
The procedural hurdles of IP and their inbuilt preference for “formal” knowledges are 
thus found to be part of an economic system that profits from resources gathered 
around the world in a unidirectional movement of appropriation. Biopiracy thus leads 
to a “pattern [that] is becoming depressingly familiar: resources flow out of the 
Southern regions and are transformed by Northern entrepreneurial authors and 
inventors into intellectual properties, which in many cases are priced so high that the 
people from whom such knowledge originated cannot afford to license them” (Aoki 
1998, 27). Hamilton calls this “old-fashioned, Western-style imperialism” (Hamilton 
1996, 615). 
 Treaties such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and the 
Nagoya Protocol’s system for access and benefit sharing are designed to prevent these 
exploitative tactics from reoccurring. Chen, for example, argues that the CBD lets 
“source countries exert complete control over the physical, phenotypical layer of 
information in bioprospecting” (J. Chen 2006, 12). As a result, biopiracy “must be 
consigned to the realm of ‘rural’ legend”, as “an appropriately utilitarian view of 
property and its relationship to each layer of biological information […] dissolves any 
allegation of Biopiracy” (Ibid., 5 and 6). According to Chen, problems only arise 
when the national government fails to do its job ‘properly’: “Responsibility for this 
plant’s [the jaborandi plant in Brazil] decline does not rest with the multinational 
pharmaceutical company merely because it has developed anti-glaucoma drug from 
jaborandi. Rather, the government of Brazil is accountable for its failure to control 
access to jaborandi in its natural range or otherwise to regulate its harvest” (Ibid., 13).  
Chen’s understanding of the relation between IP and knowledge highlights the 
common response to accusations of ‘biopiracy’: an adjustment of the parameters of 
the commodification procedure. This side-steps biopiracy’s fundamental normative 
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critique of hegemonic knowledge structures.5 However, the biopiracy critique also 
understands this knowledge structure as determined by an economic system, and 
predominantly contests the legitimacy of the appropriation (see for example Aoki 
1998, 46ff.). Shiva for example criticises the CBD and access and benefit projects as 
“merely a sophisticated form of Biopiracy” (Shiva 2001, 63). The fundamental 
normative complaint is that these also “[take] the biodiversity and intellectual heritage 
of indigenous communities and [convert] it into commodities protected by IPRs” 
(Ibid., 64). Thus debates focus on the definition of the “‘proper” bounds of property” 
instead of interrogating IP’s function in the field of biotechnology on a deeper level 
(Pottage 1998, 745). 
This focus precludes a more detailed engagement with IPRs as a site of 
complex political contestation, in which IP’s role can be understood as less 
unidirectionally determined by a global economic hegemony but rather the site of 
various power struggles, such as for example between different knowledges – even 
between different genetic conceptions of life, as chapter IV of this thesis points out. 
IP’s relation to knowledge is not straightforward, as shown in the US Supreme 
Court’s endorsement of genetic-informational conceptions of life in the Myriad case, 
which entailed the abolition of certain types of gene patents. This decision cannot be 
explained with reference to commodification alone, but rather needs to be seen in 
context with challenges produced by a political dimension surrounding genetic 
conceptions of life, as this thesis argues. The extraordinary success of the genetic 
view of life had much broader effects than just the enabling of the commodification of 
life, and continues to create problems that are constantly requiring new forms of 
governing. This understanding of “life as a productive force” (Yoxen 1981) in the 
wider sense will be set out below, after a discussion of IPRs as a tool for the enclosure 
of the commons – predominantly by means of commodification. 
 
2.2. The “new enclosures” and the political economy of commodification 
Shiva criticised bioprospecting not only as a form of biopiracy, but also because it 
“leads to the enclosure of the biological and intellectual commons” (Shiva 2001, 64). 
                                                
5 Chen also exaggerates the reach of the CBD and the Nagoya Protocol, which only came into force on 
12.10.2014. The US are signatories but have not ratified these agreements. The relation of the CBD and 
TRIPS is also entirely unclear. Ongoing deliberations at the WTO have thus far not reached a clear 
position, especially in the area of Art. 27.3b TRIPS on traditional knowledge and biodiversity (see 
current state of the debate and list of documents at WTO 2015a). 
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This alludes to another critique of the IP system, referring to the historical process of 
the enclosure of the commons, which occurred between the 15th and 18th century in 
England. In this process, community-owned land was suddenly transformed into the 
exclusive property of an individual, who then had the power to own and to derive the 
benefits from it (May 2010, 12; Boyle 2008; Boyle 2003). Proponents argue that this 
process is occurring again, in a new enclosure of humankind’s ‘commons’, which are 
for example biodiversity, genetic resources, the human genome, the Internet and 
knowledge in general (see for example Halbert 2005; Dickenson 2013, 193; to some 
extent also Marlin-Bennett 2004; Zeller 2007).  
The concept of the ‘new enclosures’ is often used with reference to copyright 
and the way in which it increasingly infringes on knowledge exchange in the area of 
information and communication technology (Lange 1981; 2003; Benkler 1999; 
Carstensen 1999; Travis 2000; P. Evans 2005; Boyle 2003, 37, Footnote No. 12), 
whereas the ‘biopiracy’ argument is prevalent with regards to the area of agriculture 
and medicine. References to the ‘commons’ and their ‘enclosure’ evoke the historical 
background of this movement in the same way as references to imperialism and 
colonial practices. This is highly emotive and effective in setting the scene for their 
accounts, but relies on importing a particular normative position. Much of the 
literature concerning the second enclosure movement focuses on the appropriate 
division between what ought to be openly available and what can be legitimately 
‘enclosed’ and be turned into private property. Both concepts in effect question the 
legitimacy of the IP regime where it comes to the common heritage of mankind – 
contained in indigenous knowledges, biodiversity, the internet and open source 
software products. Both approaches refer to IP’s role in this commodification as 
entirely determined by its function in the economy. While the ‘biopiracy’ debate 
follows a post-colonial line of argument, the ‘new enclosures’ literature is modeled on 
the libertarian tradition of Locke’s writings and often engages with US civil rights 
standards and copyrights’ possible infringement on these standards (see for example 
Benkler 1999; Travis 2000).  
May’s comprehensive and thorough political economy of the global IP regime 
argues that “the recognition of such commodification as enclosure has become more 
than a merely spasmodic polemic and is now one of the key tropes of those who seek 
to critique and resist the expansion of the realm of intellectual property” (May 2010, 
12; see also Halbert 2005, 112 ff.). He points out that the allusion to the historical 
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background of 15th to 18th century England serves to draw attention to the artificiality 
of the boundaries around private property. May finds that IP is “allied to the complex 
institutional arrangements of modern capitalism” and argues, “intellectual property 
enables the expansion of capitalism into areas hitherto regarded as a realm outside 
direct exchange relations” (May 2010, 11 and 48). His political economy of IPRs 
employs a complex analysis of the expansionary logic of capital with a neo-
Gramscian emphasis on the function of ideology (Ibid., 47)6, exposing in particular 
IP’s reliance on the “construction of scarcity” in the otherwise non-rivalrous area of 
knowledge (Ibid., 23; May and Sell 2005; May 2006).  
However, this concept of commodification or ‘reification’ tied to a 
Gramscian-Marxist economic analysis sees IP law as entirely determined by its 
function for the (expansionary) logic of capital. May is critical of IP’s narrow focus, 
and argues against the “manner in which intellectual property’s supporters have 
sought to reduce the political economy of IPRs to a set of technical problems with 
little regard for […] the wider question about the social construction of intellectual 
property and its associated markets themselves” (May 2010, 148). However, in a neo-
gramscian/marxist analysis, ideas remain conceptually tied to the determining force of 
the relations of the market, and are seen as primarily and exclusively conducive to the 
maintenance of them. May highlights that “[t]he reification of IPRs into natural rights 
of individual innovators […] obscures the interests served by the protection and 
enforcement of […] intellectual property” (Ibid.). He thinks mostly of interests such 
as the maintenance of a “market advantage” (Ibid.). This thesis argues that the 
overwhelming focus on the economic function of IPRs as part of the market obscures 
a wider political struggle surrounding the relation between knowledge and life, in 
which they are also fundamentally involved.  
Bollier’s analysis of IP’s commodification of life begins to draw attention to 
the limits of an exclusive focus on economic exchange mechanisms and the necessary 
commodification for these mechanisms. He argues that certain areas 
 
“require personal participation in a gift economy, where the coin of 
exchange is not money but freely given gifts (personal attention, acts 
                                                
6 This theoretical approach is an adaptation of the perspective used in the first edition of May’s book, 
which connected material forces and ideas in a dual-dialectic movement of change according to Hegel 
and Marx, moving between “contradiction and change” (May 2000, 39). 
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of kindness, sacrifices of time). Markets and money are impersonal. 
Gift exchange is the only real way to achieve the satisfactions of 
family life or sexuality” (Bollier 2003, 23; emphasis added).  
 
This notion of a separate gift economy has been used widely in the field of 
anthropology to highlight alternative exchange mechanisms, which provide stronger 
incentives for donations of blood and body tissue than a purely economic monetary 
exchange mechanism (see Titmuss 1997; Eriksen 2001; Waldby and Mitchell 2006; 
Lock 2002; Sharp 2000; Nelkin and Andrews 1998). This concept emphasises 
powerful incentives such as altruism for the donation of tissues and information, and 
for participation in patient groups. Crucially, these ‘economies’ defy the rules of the 
market: “It is precisely the effectiveness and speed of gift economies in facilitating 
certain kinds of value-exchange that have so alarmed entrenched industries” (Bollier 
2003, 30). While analyses seek to highlight interpersonal values and relationships that 
are not captured by the notion of the market, they understand this contrast as a 
“dichotomy of gift and commodity” (Waldby and Mitchell 2006, 8, emphasis added).  
However, attempts at categorizing IPRs as gift or commodity reveal a more 
complex situation. IPRs on information derived from human genetic materials 
incorporate elements of both categories of the commodity and the gift, as IP 
‘commodifies’ information in a manner that actively separates any connection 
between the donor and the owner of IPRs derived from the donation. Titmuss pointed 
out that the free donation of blood ensured a higher quality of the donation compared 
to that of paying donors– arguably because of “an altruistic motive” (Titmuss 1997, 
124 and 125). But in the case of IP, donors are “legally excluded from any stake in 
[…][IP’s] profitability” (Waldby and Mitchell 2006, 24). Instead of giving rise to the 
socially beneficial effects of the gift relation observed by Titmuss in the area of blood 
donation, IPRs preclude donors from any form of societal recognition – especially on 
the international level. In the case of IP, the dichotomy of gift and commodity results 
in a rather cynical situation, in which “[Titmuss’] strategy to make the human body a 
bulwark against the commodification of social life, a strategy now institutionalized in 
bioethical procedure, has simply rendered the body an open source of free biological 
material for commercial use” (Ibid.). 
This opportunistic exploitation of altruistic motives for donation goes beyond 
a dichotomous relation between gift and commodity, and needs to be understood as 
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more than a coincidence. While the contrast between commodity exchange and gift 
economies can reveal some of the limits of an analysis determined by a focus on 
economic relations in a market, it cannot further explain the connection between the 
“moral enforcement” of donations and the exploitative function of IPRs with regards 
to donations. Rather than producing societal cohesion, the moral duty to provide 
voluntary donations here becomes embroiled in a different political project, as chapter 
V of this thesis argues. Using the example of active patients who participate in 
research in the endeavour to improve their own condition, this chapter points out that 
patients are encouraged to take responsibility for their physical condition, now 
defined in genetic terms according to a new “somatic ethics” (N. Rose 2008a), and 
become actively engaged in improving their self in an entrepreneurial manner 
(McNay 2009). Focusing on reinstating a more ‘appropriate’ kind of property cannot 
account for the way in which these patients challenge exclusion from research by 
using IPRs in order to promote their own well-being. This behaviour confronts IP 
with a new ethics based on genetic truth, which challenges IP’s exclusionary role 
towards patients, preventing them from participating in the use of their donation. 
After briefly drawing attention to the limitations of the commodification critique’s 
focus on market relations as the determining force of IP’s relation to life, the last 
section of this chapter then shows how other analyses of the biotech/ life science 
sector have begun to engage with the ways in which “life as a productive force” 
(Yoxen 1981) is harnessed by the economy but also continues to produce problems 
and challenges for governing.  
 
2.3. The Limits of the Commodification Paradigm – ‘Forgetting’ Life 
Critical perspectives on IP’s ‘commodification’ of life thus debate the appropriateness 
of the underlying parameters of IP, and in this way “serve to reproduce the very 
processes that they criticise” (Pottage 1998, 758). This focus on the parameters of 
commodification engenders an economically determined understanding of social 
relations, and marginalizes a wider politics of life. A deeper understanding of the 
notion of ‘commodifcation’ derived from the work of Marx and the Frankfurt School 
reveals the extent of the economic determination implied in the commodification 
critique. While IP’s role in the commodification of life certainly needs to be seen 
critically, the “paradoxes” (Waldby and Mitchell 2006, 163) at the intersection of the 
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economy and knowledge over life demand a less unidirectional understanding of IP’s 
role in this. Genetic conceptions of life also challenge IPRs, by undermining the 
distinction between inventions and discoveries (see chapter IV), and by giving rise to 
new demands on laws and policies regarding the treatment of life (see chapter V and 
VI). This thesis argues that in the management of these challenges, law takes on a 
new role as a mode of governing tensions – which goes beyond IP’s unidirectional 
role in the economy as a tool for commodification. 
Marx’s critical analysis of capitalism centres on the relation of labour to the 
commodity, which is constituted by a process of abstraction or alienation not from its 
use or purpose, but with reference to the amount of human labour spent on it (Marx 
1990, 127). This objectification of labour in the commodity gives rise to its “fetish 
character” 7:  
 
“A commodity is […] a mysterious thing, simply because in it the 
social character of men’s labour appears to them as an objective 
character stamped upon the product of that labour; because the relation 
of the producers to the sum total of their own labour is presented to 
them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between 
the products of their labour.” (Ibid., 164)  
 
The objectification of “men’s labour” in the commodity by means of contingent 
processes of value attribution is here seen as the basis for social relations. It 
“transforms every product of labour into a social hieroglyphic… [which] [l]ater on, 
men try to decipher […] to get behind the secret of their own social product” (Ibid., 
167). The process of commodification thus has objective and subjective implications:  
 
“Objectively a world of objects and relations between things springs 
into being […] [whose] laws confront [man] as invisible forces that 
generate their own power. Subjectively […] a man’s activity becomes 
estranged from himself, it turns into a commodity which, subject to the 
                                                
7 Marx points out that “[a]s the commodity-form is the most general and the most undeveloped form of 
bourgeois production […] its fetish character is still relatively easy to penetrate” (Marx 1990, 176). 
The same kind of fetishism operates also in more particular forms of exchange, such as the Monetary 
System and capital in general. 
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non-human objectivity of the natural laws of society, must go its own 
way independently of man just like any consumer article.” (Lukáçs 
1971, 87) 
 
This determination of the social realm by a system of meaning formed with reference 
to the exchange value of the commodity is decisive for the understanding of critiques 
of commodification – which thus focus their critique on a sphere of politics 
fundamentally determined by the exchange value of commodities. Crucially, this 
critical focus on commodification entails a marginalisation of understandings and 
content of social relations that do not fit this economic rationale, as the processes of 
abstraction already entail a “forgetting” of those less commodifiable contents. As 
Adorno and Horkheimer point out, “[a]ll objectification is a forgetting” (1979, 230). 
 The use of the concept of commodification in critical theory thus serves as a 
reminder of the processes of abstraction and alienation involved in the constitution of 
the commodity, and the net of social relations that emerges from this process, 
enveloping the individual. The commodification of human tissue, in extension, folds 
the individual into these relations (determined by exchange value) on the level of 
physical existence, and critiques focus on the ever-increasing sphere of this 
economically determined net of social relations. This critique of commodification has 
a particular normative content, as Honneth notes: 
 
“it signifies a type of human behavior that violates moral or ethical 
principles by not treating other subjects in accordance with their 
characteristics as human beings, but instead as numb and lifeless 
objects – as ‘things’ or ‘commodities’.” (Honneth 2005, 94) 
 
Importantly, pervasive “invisible forces” created through economic relations 
of exchange are “confront[ing] [man]” (Lukáçs 1971, 87) and bringing about these 
morally reprehensible effects of commodification. From this perspective, IP’s 
economic role on the one hand confronts the individual as an abstract regime that is 
virtually unchangeable, and on the other, turns the subject’s involvement in research 
into a commodity which “must go its own way independently of man just like any 
consumer article” (Ibid.). In this vein, Haraway for example criticises IP as “the kind 
of relationality that poses as the-thing-in-itself, the commodity, the thing outside 
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relationship, the thing that can be exhaustively measured, mapped, owned, 
appropriated, disposed” (Haraway 1997, 8). But she also notes that this relationality 
prefers measurable and knowable content at the expense of all other “bumptious” 
qualities of nature and life, which are sidelined (Ibid., 135) – for example in the 
overwhelming focus on the mapping of the human genome, and the discarding of 
“junk” DNA.  
This ‘forgetting’ or dismissing of a vast array of nature’s ‘content’ highlights 
IP’s reliance on measurable forms of knowledge, but it also assumes a clear 
unproblematic complementarity between genetic understandings of life and IP, and 
does not further complicate this relation. But genetic sequences, as the Myriad 
judgement shows, can pose significant problems to the IP regime, which in response 
struck a compromise ensuring some patentability while also acknowledging the 
informational content of genetic sequences. Also, as chapter V shows, patients often 
freely volunteer their genetic information and even in some cases actively patent their 
own condition to exert control over research in this area. This thesis argues that these 
uses of IP require a different perspective, which places emphasis on changes in the 
use of IPRs beyond the sheer provision of commodities for the market.  
Foucault’s critique takes a “different direction” to that of the Frankfurt School, 
especially where it comes to the construction of notions of selfhood (McNay 2009, 
62; Burchell 1993). It “understands the commodification of subjective experience not 
so much through ideas of passive consumerism, standardization and heteronomy, as 
through ideas of active differentiation, regulated self-responsibility and depoliticized 
autonomy” (McNay 2009, 62). Instead of looking at processes of homogenisation 
through the production of false freedoms, Foucault’s accounts look at how processes 
of “active differentiation” for instance encouraged by the notion of the “self as 
enterprise” give rise to a more resilient neoliberal system (Ibid., 63). As the next 
chapter sets out in more detail, this productive way of governing through inciting 
“active” forms of self-actualisation is explored on three different levels in the 
remainder of this thesis, exploring the contributions of IP law to the governing of life 
on the level of knowledge, the subject, and the exercise of power. An emphasis on 
processes of identity formation and governance has also been applied in some recent 
analyses of the life science/ biotech sector (N. Rose 2007b; Rajan 2006; Cooper 2008; 
Rouvroy 2008). While none of them focus on the role of IP in this context in a 
 56 
comprehensive and rigorous manner, the last section of this chapter shows how they 
account for the wide influence of the genetic vision of life in their analyses.  
 
3. “The Politics of Life Itself” – Moving beyond commodification? 
Lately the focus of analyses of the life science/ biotech sector has turned towards 
different ways in which value is generated in this area, and to a specific political 
economy emerging around life and value – in the Foucauldian sense of an economy 
building on a “knowledge […] of government [that] is absolutely inseparable from 
that of a knowledge of all the processes related to population in its larger sense” 
(Foucault 2000, 217). This marks a turn away from critiques focusing on 
commodification, and begins to explore an emerging politics of “active 
differentiation, regulated self-responsibility, and depoliticized autonomy” (McNay 
2009, 62) that promotes the neoliberal economy’s reach in a productive manner. 
However, studies of IP’s role in this sphere continue to concentrate on processes of 
commodification, despite growing attention to facets of productivity in the life 
sciences. In this general turn towards a political economy focused on governing life’s 
“productive force” (Yoxen 1981), scholars have increasingly drawn upon Foucault’s 
concept of biopolitics – at times in a more metaphorical manner, illustrating the fact 
that the life sciences’ interaction with ‘life’ has a political dimension (Lock 2001; 
Haraway 1997; Lock and Nguyen 2010), and at times more comprehensively (N. 
Rose 2007b; Rouvroy 2008; Thacker 2005a; Rajan 2006). IPRs are usually mentioned 
in these studies as one of the means by which value is being generated (and 
commodified) in this area. Their particular complex role in the governing of life has 
to date not been at the centre of such an analysis. However, this focus “on the 
emergence of a new genomic governmentality” (Franklin 2000, 188) shows how the 
biotech sector’s interaction with the productive quality of life can be analysed outside 
of the commodification paradigm. 
 
3.1. ‘Life as a Productive Force’ – Capturing the politics of the bioeconomy 
A number of analyses of the biotech sector begin by pointing out that instead of an 
inevitable development, the historical emergence of molecular biology in the life 
sciences had a distinct political dimension (Yoxen 1981; Kay 1993; H. Rose and Rose 
2012). Yoxen sets out “the history of molecular biology as a research programme and 
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as a technological project – formed, organised and regulated by economic and 
political forces” (Yoxen 1981, 67). In his account of the formation of molecular 
biology as a discipline, he shows how “science managers” (Ibid., 88 ff.) selectively 
funded one direction of research amongst many, which studied life based on “the 
concepts of ‘information’ and ‘program’ […] [which] draw[s] attention to the fact that 
our current rules of biological thought direct us to a specific level or mode of 
interaction in living nature” (Ibid., 70; also Kay 1993). This direction, Yoxen argues, 
was  
 
“not only about new institutions, new techniques and new styles of 
research. It has also allowed the formation of new conceptions of life, 
nature and humanity, which are fundamentally important to both the 
pursuit of the research itself and its relation to contemporary society” 
(Yoxen 1981, 69).  
 
In this way, molecular conceptions of life can be understood as being productive of 
more than just economic value, but are “a productive force” (Ibid., 1981) of 
understandings of the self and of an entirely new socio-cultural frame of reference for 
the governing of populations and the self. 
Yoxen draws attention in particular to “the reductive shift to molecular 
processes” and the treatment of “nature as a program” in the promotion of molecular 
biology (Ibid., 77 and 101; see also Boyle 1996; 2008; Thacker 2004; 2005a; Nelkin 
and Lindee 1995; Kay 1993; 2000; see also chapter IV). The notion of the code has 
become central for the understanding of life at its intersection with information 
technology, as Thacker argues (Thacker 2005a, xx), and given rise to a range of new 
entities of “biomedia”, in which bioinformation is being stored and generated, for 
example in Biochips (used for the automation of repetitive laboratory tasks) and in 
BioMEMS (biomedical microelectromechanical systems, see Thacker 2004, 63 ff.). 
Landecker’s account of “the practice of growing living cells outside the body in a 
laboratory” shows how the life and the components of the human body have been 
transformed into entities that can be mass-produced and lead an immortal existence 
away from the donor, within the confines of the laboratory – thus changing “practices 
of plasticity and temporality of living things” (Landecker 2007, 1).  
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The shift to the molecular level of knowledge entailed “a redefinition of life: 
life as meaning” (N. Rose 2007b, 44). Undoubtedly, the emergence of these technical 
capabilities for the long-term storage, indefinite replication, and global distribution of 
cell lines gave rise to a new industrial sector, in which IPRs enabled the integration of 
life into the economy. But the promotion of one research agenda over others also 
points to this vision of life’s contingency on a particular programme. This affected the 
conception of ‘life’ in fundamental ways, as new living entities such as immortal cell-
line were created in laboratories. It also affected lived experience beyond the confines 
of the laboratory, as the notorious case of the HeLa stem cell line shows. In 1951, 
particularly aggressive cancer cells were taken from Henrietta Lacks before her death 
without her knowledge or consent, and were developed into the highly successful 
immortal HeLa cell-line – and “have now been living outside her body far longer than 
they ever lived inside it” (Skloot 2011, 4). The development of this new living entity 
continues to cause controversy, and claims of Henrietta Lacks’ family for some form 
of limited control over the use of this very identifiable genetic material have only very 
recently been acknowledged in debates around the release of HeLa’s genome 
sequence (see Skloot 2013; Hudson and Collins 2013; Collins 2013). This cell-line 
was not patented, but its long-term implications for the Lacks family show how the 
development of these entities have effects far beyond their economic use, deeply 
affecting the identities of individuals and families. 
Rose argues that on the basis of information generated in the laboratory, “we 
are increasingly coming to relate to ourselves as “somatic” individuals, […] as beings 
whose individuality is, in part at least, grounded within our fleshly, corporeal 
existence, and who experience, articulate, judge, and act upon ourselves in part in the 
language of biomedicine” (N. Rose 2007a, 26). IP is thus becoming a contentious 
issue within a wider political economy of the molecular conception of life, situated at 
the intersection between economic circuits and knowledge that is increasingly 
important for the self-actualisation of “somatic” individuals. At this intersection, this 
thesis argues, IPRs are fulfilling more than a unidirectional function of creating 
commodities, and are rather involved in the governing of the “problem” in the sense 
of a “problematization” (Foucault 1994, 114) of life. 
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3.2.  A “new genomic governmentality” 
More recently, a number of scholars noted the particular problem of governing life in 
its molecularised form, and increasingly turned to Foucault’s notions of biopolitics 
and governmentality for their work on a new “politics of life itself” (Franklin 2000; 
N. Rose 2007b) based on knowledge created in the laboratory. Here, Franklin argues 
that “[w]e are currently witnessing the emergence of a new genomic governmentality” 
(Franklin 2000, 188). This refers to the emergence of new form of governing based on 
this knowledge, derived from Foucault’s concept of a new art of governing or 
governmentality (Foucault 2000; see next chapter). This thesis analyses how IP’s 
treatment of life could be better understood with reference to this concept of 
governmentality, in which new priorities for governing such as life can challenge the 
operation of economic relations. The politics of life ‘itself’ in the life science/ biotech 
sector have been explored specifically (Cooper 2008; Rajan 2006; Rouvroy 2008), 
and in more general terms (Rabinow 1996; 1999; Rabinow and Dan-Cohen 2005; 
Rabinow and Rose 2006; N. Rose 2007b; Dillon and Reid 2001; 2009; Dillon and 
Lobo-Guerrero 2008; 2009; Elbe 2009). These and other uses of Foucault’s ideas will 
be discussed in the next chapter, where the parameters of this governmentality and its 
increasing emphasis on biopolitical strategies for the governing of life will be set out.8  
The discussion here merely seeks to point to some studies and their conception of the 
politics of molecularised life in order to provide a contrast to the commodification 
critique’s perspective on IP. 
The issue of IP is raised consistently within these studies of molecular “life 
itself”, but mostly with regards to its function of creating commodities for the 
economy. There is to date no comprehensive study of IP’s contribution to the 
governing of life within the life science sector. However, Pottage’s article on “Genes, 
Patents and Bio-politics” explores IP’s function in stabilizing hybrid genetic concepts 
of life in order to establish “singular scientific ‘fact[s]’”, thus understanding patents as 
“vectors” (Pottage 1998, 752 and 749). But he connects this to a notion of 
“governing” only in so far as “[bio-political programmes] treat the distinction 
[between norm and nature] itself as a provisional programme which serves to govern 
their own operations” (Ibid., 747). Yet this statement on the intermediary position of 
                                                
8 Bruno Latour (1987) and Sheila Jasanoff’s (2005; 2004) work in the area of Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) are other noted sociologist that discuss broad topics such as the influence of politics on 
science and vice versa, but their work cannot be considered here due to space constraints. 
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biopolitical programmes can hint to the mode in which IPRs are understood to 
function as a “tactics” of government (Foucault 2000, 211) by this thesis. IP’s 
contribution to the management of the individual’s involvement in the bioeconomy 
and to the normalization of knowledge consists in the negotiation of tensions between 
the different priorities of life and the market in a neoliberal governmentality, thus 
“[engaging] responsively with exteriority” (Golder and Fitzpatrick 2009, 71, see next 
chapter).  
The engagement of other studies on the biotech sector with Foucauldian 
concepts can range from a mere mention of Biopolitics to a more in-depth exegesis of 
an emerging ‘politics of life’ and its relation to the economy. Franklin’s work 
introduced the notion of “life itself” and expressly drew on Foucault, but then turned 
towards highlighting the pervasive cultural reception of genomics rather than towards 
connections with the economy. Rajan’s comparative study of the life science sector in 
India and in the US contains a more direct engagement with the notion of biopolitics. 
He explicitly sets out to combine the Marxist concept of capital with the Foucauldian 
concept of biopolitics, arguing “that the life sciences represent a new face, and a new 
phase, of capitalism and, consequently, that biotechnology is a form of enterprise 
inextricable from contemporary capitalism” (Rajan 2006, 3). In this phase, 
“Biocapital”:  
 
“operates explicitly in two distinct yet simultaneous analytic frames: 
one the one hand, as the circuits of land, labor, and value (in a classic 
Marxist sense) that are inhabited by biotechnological innovation and 
drug development; on the other hand, as the increasingly constitutive 
fact of biopolitics in processes of global capitalism. In other words, on 
the one hand, what forms of alienation, expropriation, and divestiture 
are necessary for a ‘culture of biotechnology innovation’ to take root? 
On the other hand, how are individual and collective subjectivities and 
citizenships both shaped and conscripted by these technologies that 
concern ‘life itself’?” (Ibid., 78) 
 
Rajan’s comparative study of biotech companies in India and the US highlights the 
coexistence of the economy and life as priorities for governing – as also set out in the 
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next chapter. He also points out the fundamental impact of genetic knowledge on 
individual and collective subjectivities. 
However, his discussion of IPRs focuses on the “fluid and constantly 
contested boundaries between what constitutes the public domain and what private 
property” (Ibid., 59). His understanding of IPRs in this is influenced by Coombe’s 
emphasis on IP “as a constitutive object in commercial and popular lifeworlds, as a 
source and sink of social power” (Ibid., 65; Coombe 1998) – thus in a way that goes 
far beyond the role of providing commodities. But he focuses on challenges emerging 
in the public policy sphere, as the question of IP is deemed to have been “settled” in 
law and thus not discussed as a part of bioethics (Rajan 2006, 64). Rajan traces the 
“fluidity” of IPRs in the complex positions of India and the US in the biotech sector, 
and shows that these countries’ presumed positions regarding IPRs are far from 
certain. This shows surprising fluidity in the parameters of the making and 
enforcement of IP as a commodity. In contrast, this thesis inspects IP’s “fluidity” in a 
more directly governmental context, arguing that this flexibility enables IP to 
negotiate tensions surrounding the relation of knowledge over life and the market. 
Cooper takes a different approach to the study of the biotech sector, focusing 
on the financialisation of life in the neoliberal economy. Here, she argues, this 
neoliberal system has a special foundational connection with the emergence of the life 
sciences sector through the use of speculative capital (Cooper 2008). This study 
resonates with topics from Foucault’s study of liberal and neoliberal governmentality, 
and she draws expressly on the Foucauldian concepts of genealogies and biopolitics, 
but states that she does not wish to engage in their detailed definition (Ibid., 5). 
Nevertheless, her emphasis on the role of IPRs as economic instruments shows how 
speculative neoliberal economic relations fundamentally rely on the creation of stable 
objects for exchange. On the basis of this, the next chapter argues that IP is becoming 
even more relevant as molecular knowledge’s influence spreads beyond the scientific 
sector. However, this increasing influence also gives rise to a more contested status of 
exclusive ownership over this knowledge. 
Rouvroy’s analysis of Human Genes and Neoliberal Governance (2008) 
explores the connection between genetic and economic reductionism, and what she 
terms the “disciplining effects” of genetic knowledge on the level of the individual. 
These insights tease out interesting aspects of the connection between 
governmentality and molecular conceptions of life, which will also be explored in the 
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next chapter. She focuses on IP as part of the convergence between economic and 
genetic reductionism, and argues that patentability promotes reductionism (Ibid., 41). 
However, the Myriad judgement and problem of patenting “information” partially 
contradict this correlation. Chapter IV shows that the IP regime’s turn to an 
informational-genetic reductionist vision of life endangered the patentability of 
genetic sequences. Interestingly, the influence of the ‘disciplining’ effects of genetic 
knowledge on the individual can also produce increased demands for access to 
knowledge – and thus give rise to claims against the exclusive ownership of such 
knowledge. The convergence between economic and genetic reductionism thus gives 
rise to an intensified political dimension of molecular conceptions of life, in which 
IPRs play more roles than a unidirectional tool for the formation of commodities. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter surveyed the existing critical literature on the role of IPRs in human 
genetic materials, and traced a recent emergence of studies turning to the wider 
implications of the genetic conception of life beyond the life sciences/ biotech sector. 
In this it found that studies focusing specifically on IP were critical predominantly of 
IP’s role in promoting the ‘commodification’ of life. Arguments focus either on a 
post-colonial critique of international system facilitating biopiracy, or on a more 
libertarian critique of IP’s legitimacy in enclosing the shared ‘commons’ of 
humankind. This focus on economic systems of exchange has been criticized for 
neglecting other social relations of exchange, which are particularly effective in the 
area of tissue donation and health. However, this debate failed to engage with the 
social influence of genetic knowledge beyond a discussion of more appropriate 
boundaries of property. More recently, analyses of the turn to molecular biology 
began using Foucauldian concepts of governmentality and biopolitics in order to 
emphasise the fundamental influence of genetic conceptions of life on processes of 
identity formation of individuals and their understanding of responsibility in medical 
terms. The coming chapters analyse IP’s treatment of genetic materials as located 
within this wider “problematization” of life (Foucault 1994, 114) in molecular terms, 
and argue that IP here contributes to the governing of tensions arising from the 
formation of new modes of subjectification and between competing forms of 
knowledge over life. This understanding of IP’s role in the governing of genetic life 
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highlights the relevance of law within governmentality’s management of biopolitical 
challenges, and explores IP’s role as a “tactics” for governing on the intersection of 
life and the market.  
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Chapter III Intellectual property as a tactics of government at the 
intersection of life and the economy 
 
“[…] I think that you are completely free to do what you like with what I am saying. 
These are suggestions for research, ideas, schemata, outlines, instruments; do what 
you like with them. Ultimately, what you do with them both concerns me and is none 
of my business.” (Foucault 1997, 2) 
 
“The […] perhaps most revealing aspect of liberalism is the relation between 
liberalism and law.” (Dean 2010, 140) 
 
This chapter develops a different analysis of IP’s problematic relation to life. Rather 
than focusing on the commodification of life by means of patents, it puts forward a 
perspective that foregrounds a comprehensive “problematization” of molecular life 
for governing (Foucault 1994, 114) – understood here as the ‘genetic dispositif’. This 
“analytic” of power (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008, 272) allows for closer scrutiny 
of the complex dynamics and political aims at work at IP’s intersection with life – 
conceived of as information derived from human genetic materials. However, 
Foucault’s concepts of biopolitical priorities pursued in a new art of governing 
(governmentality) need to be re-read to reflect the challenge of governing an 
informational-genetic conception of life (understood here as a genetic dispositif), 
which is giving rise to intensified contestations of IP’s increasingly significant role 
within a neoliberal economy. Both these modalities show how a previously 
“mundane” (N. Rose and Valverde 2010, 546) field of rather technical law such as IP 
suddenly became centrally involved in a way of governing and also in the operation 
of a significant sector of the neoliberal economy. At the intersection of life and the 
market, this field of law is increasingly forced to operate as a “tactics” of government 
(Foucault 2000, 211), negotiating tensions and challenges while still enabling the 
operation of the bioeconomy relying on IPRs.  
Besides adapting Foucault’s analyses to a molecularised view of life and a 
neoliberal economy, this reading also further refines the understanding of the function 
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of law within Foucault’s concept of governmentality, and argues that because of these 
intensifications, law becomes a central site of governing within governmentality, 
resolving tensions while continuing to govern for the market. This chapter sets out the 
analysis of the governing of life in Foucault’s concepts of governmentality and 
biopolitics, and then shows how these need to be adapted to the influence of the 
informational-genetic conception of life (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2009) and the 
particular connection between the neoliberal economy and the biotech sector (Cooper 
2008; Thacker 2005a). It argues that the concept of the ‘gene’ has been particularly 
effective in connecting knowledge of the individual with that of the population in a 
genetic dispositif, and in facilitating an easier inclusion of this informational-genetic 
view of life into an economic system that relies on stable IP rules for generating 
economic value from future potentialities of life. This analytical perspective shows 
how IPRs are becoming a central consideration for the function of the economy but 
are also increasingly challenged because of their simultaneously increasing relevance 
for the governing of individuals and populations. After setting out the particular 
analytical framework for the study of IP’s role in the problematization of life 
(adapting Rabinow & Rose’s work on biopower 2006), the chapter then argues that at 
the intersection of life and the market, IPRs are increasingly operating as a “tactics” 
of government in reconciling these two at times divergent priorities. 
 
1. The problematization of ‘life’ in a new way of governing 
In his books and lectures at the end of seventies, Foucault famously argued that from 
the seventeenth century onwards, “the ancient right to take life or let live was replaced 
by a power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death” (Foucault 1978, 138, 
emphases in original). He traced the increasing turn of the art of governing towards 
the life of populations in a fostering or productive9 manner, and charted the historical 
emergence of this logic in the development of the liberal system and the later 
neoliberal variant. This ‘productive’ way of governing stood in opposition to the 
                                                
9 This notion of the productive character of neoliberal governmentality is used as a reminder of the turn 
away from restrictive and prohibitive practices of governing, towards the provision and normalisation 
of ‘good’ practices promoting the life and health of a population. It refers to processes of “active 
differentiation, regulated self-responsibility, and depoliticized autonomy” (McNay 2009, 62) on the 
basis of a “new somatic ethics” (N. Rose 2008a; N. Rose 2007a, 26). This productive nature facilitiates 
new strategies for political intervention, creates new modes of subjectification, and reinforces the 
prevalence of a particular truth discourse on life, as the continuing success of the genetic-reductivist 
version of genomics in comparison to other accounts shows (see next chapter). 
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restrictive character of sovereign power exercises, which mainly governed by directly 
imposing punishments for undesirable behaviour. In this process of change, medical 
and technical knowledges became crucial sources of information for the formulation 
of governmental strategies. However, this connection entailed a wider 
“problematization” of conceptions of life, meaning that it gave rise to “the 
development of a domain of acts, practices, and thoughts that […] pose problems for 
politics” (Foucault 1994, 114): life became a political problem. This chapter argues 
that the relevance of knowledge over life for questions of governing was even more 
intensified by the emergence of the informationalised and molecularised vision of life. 
Laws establishing property over these forms of knowledge gained in significance as a 
result. A better understanding of the changing role of law in a new way of governing 
thus can highlight intellectual property’s complex engagement with a politics 
produced by a molecular conception of life.  
  
1.1. Governmentality’s productive relation to ‘life’ 
Foucault’s fragmentary conceptions of governmentality and biopolitics were based on 
his analysis of the emerging bureaucratic state apparatus of the 18th century, in which 
advances in medical science and statistical method coalesced with newly centralised 
state power. This opened up an entirely new field of political intervention: the 
population. Foucault argues that the new emphasis on the life of populations, a 
biopolitics, was part of the emergence of a new art of governing, or 
“governmentality”, which “has as its purpose not the act of government itself, but the 
welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition, the increase of its 
wealth”, which is achieved by means of “[direct] large-scale campaigns” or 
“[indirect] techniques that will make possible, without the full awareness of the 
people, the stimulation of birthrates, the directing of the flow of population into 
certain regions and activities” (Foucault 2000, 217; see also Dean 2010; 2013; N. 
Rose, O’Malley, and Valverde 2006; Lemke 2007; 2011; Elbe 2005; 2009; T. C. 
Campbell and Sitze 2013; Muhle 2008; N. Rose 2007b; Rabinow and Rose 2006; 
Dillon and Reid 2001; 2009; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008; 2009). In this sense, the 
art of governing sought to put into place parameters that would ‘produce’ improved 
conditions of life – in a sense, “produce what you need to be free” (Foucault 2008, 
63). But this very need to produce the conditions of freedom “entails the 
establishment of limitations, controls, forms of coercion, and obligations” (Ibid., 64). 
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Direct interventions consisted for example of the developments of new norms for the 
construction of cities (Foucault 2007, 18), and indirect interventions consisted of new 
social norms for the individual’s responsible and healthy conduct, enforced not 
centrally, but in a decentralised “capillary” manner (Foucault 1977, 198). 
In this new art of governing, the population is directly and indirectly incited to 
contribute to the improvement of two different yet increasingly intertwined priorities 
of governing – life and the market. Instead of intervening with direct force, 
government rather “conducts the conduct of men” indirectly (Foucault 2008, 186), 
thus puts into place arrangements that “govern at a distance” – for example through 
the intermediary function of the expert translating the goals of government to the 
individual and incorporating individual demands into advice to policy makers (Miller 
and Rose 1992; 2008). The epistemological conditions according to which conduct is 
judged to be appropriate, or conducive to the “right disposition of things” (Foucault 
2000, 208), are influenced by the notion of an “economical way of governing”, in 
which the “constitution of knowledge [savoir] of government is absolutely 
inseparable from that of knowledge of all the processes related to population in its 
larger sense – that is, what we now call the economy” (Ibid., 217).  
This meaning of the term economy 10  encompasses and presupposes the 
production of different knowledges as basis for appropriate actions of government. 
Rose, O’Malley & Valverde point out that “[t]o govern […] it was necessary to know 
that which was to be governed, and to govern in the light of that knowledge” (2006, 
87). Scientific knowledge of the ‘nature’ of life became increasingly important, as 
biopolitical priorities began to determine the “border between the too much and too 
little […]” of governmental intervention according to “the nature of things” (Foucault 
2008, 19). ‘Economic’ governing thus had to adapt to appear appropriate according to 
the scientific knowledges of life. However, knowledge “of all the processes related to 
population in its larger sense” (Foucault 2000, 217) also enabled an evaluation of 
potential strategies according to “the principle of the self-limitation of government” 
(Foucault 2008, 19). The neoliberal economic critique thus poses a limit to 
biopolitical strategies emphasising the welfare of populations, as governmentality 
“will not be content to derive norms of the optimal conditions for the population to 
                                                
10 ‘Economy’ is understood in a wider meaning: “To govern a state will mean, therefore, to apply 
economy, to set up an economy at the level of the entire state, which means exercising toward its 
inhabitants, and the wealth and behavior of each and all, a form of surveillance and control as attentive 
as that of the head of a family over his household and his goods” (Foucault 2000, 207). 
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expand and prosper. It will balance these considerations against another set of norms 
[…] derived from the delicate, unstable disequilibrium between the population and 
the resources necessary for its maintenance” (Dean 2010, 137). In this sense, Dean 
points out that “[a]t one level, liberalism is a version of bio-politics; at another, it 
exists in a kind of permanent tension with bio-political imperatives” (Ibid., 133). The 
two priorities of governmentality – life and the market – are exerting challenges to 
and act as limiting critiques on each other (Ibid., 120).  
The ‘market’ acts as a central site of this economic critique of governance, 
acting as “a site of veridiction, […] a site of verification-falsification for 
governmental practice” (Foucault 2008, 32). Here, an economic calculus replaces the 
(moral) determination of true and false made by the previous “juridico-disciplinary 
model” (see for example Foucault 2007, 37 ff.) with “the question of the too much 
and the too little” of governmental intervention (Foucault 2008, 28). The influence of 
this calculus on the realisation of biopolitical strategies means that “[population 
phenomena] are considered as natural phenomena in relation to which one needs to 
calculate the costs, the required level of expenditure to manage these costs, and the 
likelihood that the expenditure will achieve the desired ends” (Elbe 2009, 67). This 
highlights that in governmentality, life is understood in economically contingent ways 
– and that particular biopolitical strategies are not necessarily primarily beneficial for 
health as such.11 While a greater priority is placed on the promotion of life and health 
through governing, any definitions of life are also increasingly understood in terms of 
economic “cost-benefit” calculations (Ibid.).12 Furthermore, what is judged to be 
‘good’ for the population is also extremely contingent on social context and the value 
judgements made within this context – which is also the underlying argument of 
Foucault’s explorations of the foundations of contemporary power structures. 
Scientific knowledge of ‘life’ thus became decisive to the determination of 
appropriate interventions, which were based on the knowledge of the “regularities” 
within the population (Foucault 2000, 216). The original conception of life of the 
population arose from the close study of the individual in the institutions of the penal 
system and the clinic – where individuals were physically re-educated or disciplined 
                                                
11 As Agamben’s work for example points out, these preoccupations with population health can be far 
from actually benefical for the individual (Agamben 1998, further discussion in later section of this 
chapter). 
12 This simultaneous effect on health policies was brought to my attention by Simon Rushton. For his 
work on global health and neoliberalism see Rushton & Williams (2012). 
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into new modes of conduct (see for example Foucault 1963; 1977). This knowledge 
of the individual was compiled in an “apparatus of writing” and analysed according to 
a new comparative system “that made possible the measurement of overall 
phenomena, […] the calculation of the gaps between individuals, their distribution in 
a given ‘population’” (1977 Ibid., 190). These observations of the physical body 
created the notion of the population, and opened up the processes of life to the 
intervention of politics on the physical level. In this way, the definition of life became 
“problematised” for questions of governing – resulting in an ongoing process of 
definition and contestation that continues to raise new questions for political 
interventions. Foucault highlights similar ongoing problematizations concerning the 
issue of madness, sexuality, and crime and punishment, and argues that these can 
never be resolved “completely” by government (Foucault 1994, 114). 
Governmental interventions in the area of life and the body comprise an 
individualizing and a collectivizing method (Muhle 2008, 27; Foucault 1978, 139). 
Two series of power technologies operate “in a double mechanism” on the human 
body: as a “thorough administration of the individual body as machine” in the case of 
“the body-organism-discipline-institutions series” of “anatomo-politics”, and in “a 
planning of life as a biological process according to calculations” in the case of the 
“population-biological processes-regulatory mechanisms-State” series of “biopolitics” 
(Muhle 2008, 27 emphasis in original, my translation; Foucault 1997, 250; originally 
taken from Foucault 1978, 139). Importantly, both levels remain tied to the new logic 
of “power that has a positive relation to life, that fosters and protects it” (Muhle 2008, 
27, my translation).  
It is argued below that these methods, which address either the body of the 
individual or the biological processes of the population, are intensified by the new 
molecular ‘truth’ about life. The genetic code of the individual contains information 
that can only be interpreted with reference to databases of knowledge compiled from 
large numbers of people – thus with reference to a new “apparatus of writing” in the 
language of DNA – but address the body of the individual on the sub-cellular, 
molecular level, which goes beyond Foucault’s original analysis of the disciplined 
bodies of soldiers. It is argued that genetic knowledge thus has a more profound effect 
on the conduct of the individual and also on interventions on the collective body of 
the population, producing new norms for behaviour but also new problems for 
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governing in the process. Before this chapter turns to this reinterpretation of 
Foucault’s ideas in the light of the influence of the genetic dispositif, it first sets out 
how ‘governmentalisation’ manages tensions in an unfolding process of 
accommodation, and briefly explores the limits of this productive way of governing. 
 
1.2. Accommodating tensions between life and the market in a process of 
governmentalisation 
In Foucault’s work, the notion of biopolitical strategies aimed at the life and health of 
population is presented as a priority that unfolds over time and that increasingly 
affects the more traditional modes of power exercise (sovereign and disciplinary) – 
making it more productive over time (Dean 2010, 125; Foucault 2000). Elbe sets out 
the precise correlation of the three levels of exercise of power contained in Foucault’s 
analyses – sovereign, disciplinary, biopolitical (or more broadly: governmental) – and 
points out that “they do not stand on an equal footing. Schematically, it is the newer, 
governmental economy of power that dominates” (Elbe 2009, 70). As already set out 
before, this governmental economy of power judges the appropriateness of 
governmental intervention with reference to the market as a “site for veridiction” 
(Foucault 2008, 32), relying on technical knowledge of the “nature of things”, and 
with an increasing emphasis on biopolitical priorities. The governmental ‘productive’ 
way of governing here promotes biopolitical priorities, but also acts as a limiting 
economic critique on these strategies. 
Setting this new economy of power as a point of reference for the other two 
power exercises resulted in a process of reorganisation and adaptation of the other 
modes of power exercises (sovereign, disciplinary). This process of reorganisation 
takes place in a “double movement”:  
 
“On the one hand, it saw the development of new forms of 
governmental mechanisms of political rule that managed the welfare of 
populations explicitly at the level of population. On the other hand, it 
also involved increasingly redirecting older forms of sovereign and 
disciplinary power in such a way that they now explicitly contributed 
to this governmental goal of enhancing the welfare of populations.” 
(Elbe 2009, 71, emphasis in original) 
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The redirection of older forms of power according to this new goal resulted in a 
process of “governmentalisation” of previously predominantly sovereign regimes 
such as law (see also N. Rose and Valverde 2010, 543; and Dean 2010, 133 on this 
process of reorganisation, especially with regards to law). The implications of this 
process especially for the field of IP law are explored at the end of this chapter and 
throughout this thesis, in a specific re-reading of Foucault’s understanding of law that 
emphasizes law’s new role as “tactics” that ensures the right disposition of things 
within the new art of governing (Foucault 2000, 211). In this role, law increasingly 
negotiates tensions between priorities of governmentality, accommodating the 
pressure to be conducive to life within a legal framework that continues to govern for 
a market. Law – and especially IP law – thus responds to and negotiates tensions 
arising from the problematization of life within the existing economic legal 
framework.  
In this context, the role of IP can be re-read as contributing to the governing of 
life, which allows for example for a different perspective on statements made by 
representatives of international organisations emphasising the fundamental 
compatibility of health concerns and IP (see WHO, WIPO, and WTO 2013). Such 
statements and programmes seeking to reconcile IPRs with public health can now be 
understood as an accommodation or “constant adaptation of the legal order to 
scientific discoveries, to the progress of economic organization and technique, […] 
and to the requirements of contemporary consciousness” (Foucault 2008, 161). In this 
sense, these statements on IP can be understood as a product of tensions between the 
aim of fostering the life of populations and the normalisation of knowledge over life 
for their economic circulation. As the next chapters point out, at this intersection IP’s 
role goes beyond the sheer commodification of life, with IPRs exerting normalising 
and economic powers on the accepted scientific conception of life.  
This governmental accommodation of challenges in the name of life can be 
traced in other ways. Elbe points out that “biopower […] [was] not merely deployed 
downwards from the state into society, but [was] consentingly invoked by many 
social groups […]. The health of all, he noted, became a priority of all” (Elbe 2005, 
407). As subjects were increasingly “encouraged to view […] lives and identities as a 
type of enterprise” (McNay 2009, 56), they began to be actively engaged in 
generating knowledge about their body. As a result, “active patients” (N. Rose 2007a, 
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11) began to demand access to genetic knowledge about their own life and health, 
thus challenging the exclusivity of the IP system in a bid to improve their own 
condition – highlighting the radical potential of biopolitical challenges. In responding 
to these challenges demanding participation in the bioeconomy, the IP regime comes 
under pressure to ‘governmentalise’, and contributes to the management of the 
political problem of life as a tactics of government.  
 
1.3. The limits of productive biopolitics 
The notion of a productive way of governing life in a new governmentality has given 
rise to a variety of critical studies, which interpret Foucault’s work in different ways 
(see for example Esposito 2008; T. C. Campbell 2011; Clough and Willse 2011; 
Debrix and Barder 2012; see also overview in Lemke 2007, 9). Not all emphasise 
governing through the conduct of conduct and conditions of productiveness which 
“[seek to] increase the means of subsistence, to augment the wealth, strength and 
greatness of the state, to increase the happiness and prosperity of its inhabitants, and 
to multiply their numbers” (Dean 2010, 125). This section briefly outlines the 
difference between an emphasis on the production of the conditions of freedom and 
the study of biopower at its limits, where the distinctions between sovereign and 
governmental power exercises are blurred.  
 Agamben presents a reading of biopolitics that is deeply connected to 
considerations of (state) sovereignty, looking at the “hidden point of intersection 
between the juridico-institutional and the biopolitical models of power” (Agamben 
1998, 6). In contrast to Foucault’s work, in Agamben’s interpretation “the production 
of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power”, which places this 
connection between biopolitics and sovereign power at the heart of “Western 
politics”, in which “the inclusion of zoē in the polis (…) is, in itself, absolutely 
ancient” (Ibid., 6 and 9). This entails a “correction” (Ibid., 9) of Foucault’s 
understanding of the emergence of biopolitics as a marker for modern politics and 
reconceptualises biopolitics as a foundational element of state power. Agamben’s 
analysis focuses on the most “exemplary places of modern biopolitics: the 
concentration camp and the structure of the great totalitarian states of the twentieth 
century” (Ibid., 4).  
Lemke argues that as Agamben’s account fails to acknowledge “that 
biopolitics is, at its heart, a political economy of life, his [Agamben’s] analysis 
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remains tied to sovereign power and blind towards all those mechanisms, which 
operate below or beyond the law” (Lemke 2007, 80).13 Similarly Fassin points out 
that Foucault was not concerned primarily with ontological questions of bios and zoē, 
but “rather [with] the way in which impersonal ‘living beings’ were turned into 
populations and individuals, how governmentality and subjectification shaped our 
modern vision of the world and of humanity” (Fassin 2009, 47; in a similar vein 
Lazzarato 2002, 101; Meloni 2010). Furthermore, in the context of his analysis of 
neoliberalism, Foucault cautioned against neoliberal “state phobia” and its 
“inflationary critical currency” which leads “an analysis of social security and the 
administrative apparatus […] to the analysis of concentration camps” (Foucault 2008, 
187f.). A similar caution should be made against focusing critiques exclusively on the 
extremes of biopolitical strategies at the expense of an analysis of the productive 
operation of power within the neoliberal system. 
However, important analyses of the operation of power at the limits of 
biopolitics have drawn attention to the conditions of possibility on which the concept 
of biopolitics is founded. Selmeczi shows that the biopolitical fostering of some parts 
of populations always also entails an abandonment of others – which are not counted 
amongst the numbers making up the respective population (Selmeczi 2009). 
Furthermore, analyses emphasise the politics of death at the limits of biopolitics (for 
thanatopolitics, or the “politics of death”, see Foucault 1997, 254ff.; Clough and 
Willse 2011; Ailio 2013; evaluated in detail by T. C. Campbell 2011; Esposito 2008, 
110ff.; T. C. Campbell and Sitze 2013) showing how the securing of the life of the 
population justifies death and destruction at its limits, and as part of its exercise. The 
promotion of life in the liberal system produces life in a way that necessarily also 
depends on death – as shown for example in the Obama administration’s 
condemnation of torture methods, which however was accompanied by a 
normalisation of coercive practices and increased reliance on drone strikes (see 
Clough and Willse 2011, 2; see also Dillon and Reid 2009). 
Godoy’s analysis Of Medicines and Markets suggests a particular connection 
between IP and biopower in its concluding remarks on “intellectual property and 
                                                
13 In this critique, Lemke does not question Agamben’s approach to law, which focuses on law as 
sovereign power in an echo of Carl Schmitt’s ideas, and in an Austinian sense, where its characterising 
feature is primarily that it is in force, rendering the content of the law insignificant (Agamben 1998, 
51). In opposition to this understanding of law, this chapter argues that the function of law changes in a 
governmental system. 
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human rights in the free trade era”, arguing: “It is difficult to imagine a more 
quintessential example of biopower than intellectual property” (Godoy 2013, 141). 
She does not elaborate on this statement in much greater detail, except for finding in 
contemporary Western politics “it become[s] necessary, in the name of prosperity and 
progress, to sign laws condemning the poor to lack medicines”, which “is the genius 
of biopower; it permeates false divisions between private and public, […] determining 
who lives and who dies, all in the name of scientific advancement and the rule of law” 
(Ibid., 140). Explicitly drawing on Agamben’s reading of Foucault’s Biopower (and 
that of Hardt and Negri 2000), she thus equates IP’s role in determining the price of 
medicines with the power to decide “who lives and who dies” (Godoy 2013, 140, 
Footnote 10).  
Godoy’s brief statements thus find the globally enforced system of minimum 
standards of IP protection enshrined in TRIPS to be implicated in a more sovereign 
exercise of biopower, instrumental in drawing the dividing line between those that 
“count” and those that are left “abandoned” (Selmeczi 2009). In contrast, Pottage’s 
succinct reflections on IP find “the patent process […] almost the paradigmatic 
example of a bio-political programme”, which “[does] not identify [itself] with one 
side of the distinction between norm and nature, rather [it] treat[s] the distinction 
itself as a provisional programme which serves to govern [its] own operation” 
(Pottage 1998, 746 f.). This interpretation of IP as biopolitical programme emphasises 
IP’s contingency on changing definitions of ‘truths’, rather than a re-inscription of 
absolute boundaries. The notion of IP as a biopolitical programme can be interpreted 
as an earlier statement on the “responsive” function of law (Golder and Fitzpatrick 
2009) within governmentality, reflecting “the productive capacity of power” (Lemke 
2005, 3). This moves away from a straightforward equation of IP with biopower, and 
rather begins to explore the interaction of IP with notions of life, where IP re-inscribes 
boundaries and faces challenges in the name of life. 
 
1.4. IP as global biopower or IPRs as a tactics of government? 
The exclusionary and destructive effects of the productive logic of biopolitics are 
especially noticeable within the IP regime on the international level, as chapter VI of 
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this thesis argues. 14 Here, the fostering of some populations is taking precedent over 
that of others, one of the foundational conditions of biopolitical governing according 
to the critical use of the concept of biopower. However, tensions are emerging at the 
core of the international neoliberal economy, questioning the effects of the IP regime 
on the lives and health of disadvantaged parts of the (global) population (see WTO 
2001; WTO 2002; CIPIH 2006; CEWG 2012a; WHO, WIPO, and WTO 2013). This 
thesis traces these emerging contestations and the way in which IP here “engage[s] 
responsively with exteriority, with an outside made up of resistances and 
transgressions” (Golder and Fitzpatrick 2009, 56). This does not declare the 
emergence of a global biopolitics in the manner of Hardt and Negri’s comprehensive 
Empire, in which “a new global form of sovereignty” is ruling “social life in its 
entirety” in a “paradigmatic form of Biopower” (Hardt and Negri 2000, xii and xv). 
The analysis rather focuses on tensions within a specific legal regime that operates on 
the intersection of the economy and genetic conceptions of life – uniquely connecting 
national jurisdictions with international organisations and standards, and giving rise to 
debates on the relation of IP and life especially within international organisations at 
the core of the neoliberal international economy. 
This specific focus on a particular legal regime seeks to contribute to recent 
debates about the defensibility of claims about global governmentality and biopolitics 
(see Kiersey 2009; Chandler 2010; Rosenow 2009; Kiersey, Weidner, and Rosenow 
2010; Selby 2007). Selby for example argues that the “scaling-up” of Foucauldian 
ideas involves a “double reading”, where “[international political relations] are read 
first as liberal and, on the strength of this, these global liberal realities are analysed as 
the products of disciplinary and bio-political power” (Ibid., 334; see also Chandler 
2010 for a critique of reaching beyond the liberal state). This, he finds, “support[s] 
what are in essence reworked and reworded liberal accounts of international politics” 
(Selby 2007, 334). While “global” versions of governmentality and biopolitics are 
thus criticised for neglecting “the specificity of the international”, some analyses are 
however endorsed as “bringing to the fore, the diverse liberal discourses, practices 
and techniques of international politics” (Ibid., 332). 
 Instead of putting forward an understanding of ‘global biopolitics’ in general, 
in response Kiersey emphasises the potential of Foucault’s work on governmentality 
                                                
14 The exclusionary function of IP is also explored in the chapter on modes of subjectification 
engendered by the IP regime’s connection with genetic conceptions of life. 
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and biopolitics to “address the role of economic ideology in contemporary 
globalisation” (Kiersey 2009, 365). He argues that Foucault’s recently published 
lectures in particular can provide an understanding of how “contemporary capitalism 
relies on the market as a potential vector for the solicitation of specific norms of 
individual responsibility” (Ibid.). Rosenow furthermore argues that governmentality’s 
strength in analyses of decentred relations of power radically questions the validity of 
universal categories such as “the international” (Rosenow 2009, 500). She advocates 
the analysis of “a particular set of practices at a particular site” rather than being 
drawn into statements of a universalist nature – and shows how different forms of 
neoliberalism can be found at different international sites, for example in negotiations 
at the WTO on the import of genetically modified organisms to the European 
Community (Ibid., 502 ff.). 
This thesis argues for the use of Foucauldian concepts in analyses of specific 
debates within core organisations at the intersection of the international neoliberal 
economy and the international administration of health. IP law is particularly unique 
due to its connection between the international and the national level, with the US 
exerting an especially strong influence (Sell 2003; Tyfield 2008). It thus has strong 
connections to the neoliberal variant of the US as described in Foucault’s recently 
published lectures (Foucault 2008). This US version of neoliberalism connects life 
and economic relations in a “theory of political economic practices that proposes that 
human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial 
freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private 
property rights, free markets, and free trade” (Harvey 2005, 2). But the IP system’s 
exclusion of large parts of the global population is also strongly reminiscent of 
Foucault’s statements on the global dimension of the earlier liberal notion of limitless 
European progress, which made it “necessary to summon around Europe, and for 
Europe, an increasingly extended market and […] everything in the world that can be 
put on the market” (Foucault 2008, 55). In this sense, “[t]he game is in Europe, but 
the stake is the world” – with “Europe on the one side, with Europeans as the players, 
and then the world on the other, which will be the stake” (Ibid., 55 and 56).  
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Thus the IP regime stands uneasily between liberal and neoliberal priorities of 
governing. 15  The exclusion of large parts of the world’s population from any 
meaningful participation in the making of IP policy, or in the proceeds (be they 
medicines, knowledge, or profits) asserts a version of 19th century liberalism’s “global 
calculation” of governmentality promoting European and US progress – comparable 
to Foucault’s example of maritime law (Ibid., 55). But the extension of IP law to 
genetic materials and IP’s foundational significance for the raising of speculative 
capital for the biotech sector (Cooper 2008) increasingly intensify tensions around the 
ownership of molecular knowledge over life – even on the international level. 
Importantly, the influence of genetic knowledge reaches far beyond this economic 
function, as the genetic dispositif redefines life, identity, and well-being pervasively. 
The molecularisation of life thus also further intensifies tensions around IP on genetic 
materials. The following sections first turn to these two transformations and the 
pervasive influence of the genetic dispositif, and then highlight this dispositif’s 
governmentalising effects on IP law. This generates a framework for analysis that 
provides a deeper understanding of the changing role of law in a governmental 
system. The following chapters then illuminate IP’s responsive engagement with 
challenges, and its function as a “tactics” of government in managing emerging 
tensions and challenges specifically within this international legal regime. 
 
2. Intensifying biopolitics – Two transformations and the gene as a ‘dispositif’ 
Much has changed since the beginnings of statistical measurements of population 
phenomena. This section argues that in the light of scientific advances since the 
discovery of the genetic code, and the formation of a much more institutionalized 
form of international trade with the WTO, Foucault’s original studies have to be 
adapted to new exigencies raised by an economy of governing based on knowledge of 
life formed at the molecular-genetic level. The shift to the molecular level of life led 
to the body being conceived of “on a different scale” (N. Rose 2007b, 44) – which 
was much more than a mere change of scale in the way that medicine could analyse 
the processes within the body. Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero argue that this led to the 
emergence of a “new order of the real”, which consisted of two transformations: of 
the subject and of the integration of life into the economy (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 
                                                
15 It was strongly contested and considered a tenuous compromise from the very beginning of US 
liberal politics, as Thomas Jefferson’s disparaging comments on IP show (see Boyle 2008, 17 ff.). 
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2009, 9). This section points out that the transformation of the conception of life 
intensified the governance of individuals and populations, and argues that it is helpful 
to conceive of the far-reaching effects and influence of the change to the molecular 
level by introducing the notion of a genetic dispositif. The second transformation of 
life into value intensified the tensions between the creation of speculative value from 
life and legal regimes such as IP, which enable this integration. These two 
transformations, which are particular to the informational-genetic conception of life’s 
relation to the neoliberal economy, problematize the governing of life beyond 
Foucault’s original notion, and can better explain the increasing significance of and 
controversies around IP law. On the basis of these transformations, this section then 
introduces a framework of analysis that accounts for these contestations and tensions 
by interrogating changes on the level of truth, the subject, and emerging strategies for 
contestation. 
 
2.1. The molecular transformation of life and the emergence of a ‘genetic dispositif’ 
The scientifically accepted definition of the essential content of ‘life’ has undergone 
dramatic change since the discovery of the genetic code.  The magnitude of this 
change is akin to that described by Foucault at the emergence of 19th century 
observational methods in the “clinic”, transforming the clinical “gaze” (N. Rose 
2007b, 44).16 This transformation of observation adjusts “[n]ot only the names of 
diseases, not only the grouping of systems[…]; but the fundamental perceptual codes 
that were applied to patients’ bodies, the field of objects to which observation 
addressed itself, the surfaces and depths traversed by the doctor’s gaze, the whole 
system of orientation of this gaze” (Foucault 1963, 64). The shift to observations of 
the molecular-genetic constitution of patients entails a “transformation of what it is to 
be a living thing” (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2009, 2), and in extension also what it is 
to be a patient, as shown in the emergence of the “pre-symptomatic ill” based on 
genetic definitions of risk (Wehling 2011, 234). Now, instead of curing illness, 
medicine can “transform its basic logic […] to one engaged in the molecular re-
engineering of life itself” (Rabinow and Rose 2006, 212; emphasis in original). 
                                                
16 Rose points out: “It was a reorganization of the gaze of the life sciences: their institutions, 
procedures, instruments, spaces of operation, and forms of capitalization” and also “a redefinition of 
life: life as meaning” (N. Rose 2007b, 44).  
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This turn also involves a change from a chemical conceptualisation of the 
body to an informational-genetic one, which has a strong scriptural element: 
“[c]ontemporary biology has ‘dropped the vocabulary of classical mechanics, physics 
and chemistry […] in favor of the vocabulary of linguistics and communication 
theory. Messages, information, programs, codes, instructions, decoding: these are the 
new concepts of the life sciences’ […] If we are to understand life, its message must 
be decoded before it can be read” (Canguilhem 1994, 316–317; quoted after N. Rose 
2007b, 44). In this way, the shift brought about “a redefinition of life: life as 
meaning” (Ibid., 44) – interpreted as a somatic destiny which gives rise to new rights 
and responsibilities of the individual (N. Rose 2008a; McNay 2009; Metzl and 
Kirkland 2010). In a new somatic ethics “[h]uman beings identify and interpret much 
of their unease in terms of the health, vitality, and morbidity of their bodies; they 
judge and act upon their soma in their attempts to make themselves not just physically 
better, but also to make themselves better persons” (N. Rose 2008a, 46). This somatic 
reinterpretation of identity however also poses a political challenge, as governing has 
to adjust to new knowledge of the population determined by genetic science, and the 
demands of (pre-symptomatic) patients made on the basis of new conceptions of well-
being and illness.17  
This transformation of “what it is to be a living thing” (Dillon and Lobo-
Guerrero 2009, 2) led to an intensification of the problematization of life and thus to 
an increasing emphasis on strategies for the governmental management of tensions 
arising around the informational-genetic conception of life – which has a far-reaching 
influence on the subject and throughout society. It is argued here that this central 
influence can usefully be subsumed under the notion of a ‘genetic dispositif’. As 
already pointed out above, the study of governmentality shows how the body is 
governed on two different levels: individual disciplinary anatomo-politics, and 
biopolitical strategies aimed at the population directly and indirectly. These different 
levels of power exercise often come together in Foucault’s work as “concrete 
                                                
17 However, the reach of this new molecular vision of life is not universal – the new somatic ethic of a 
‘genetic’ or ‘biological citizenship’ (N. Rose 2007b) can only emerge in contexts where genetic testing 
and medical treatment on this basis are widely available (see critique in Braun 2007; Wehling 2011; 
Raman and Tutton 2010, see also discussion in chapter V and VI). Only against this backdrop are 
identities reformulated pervasively, and new forms of governing are enforced. 
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arrangements (agencements concrets)” (Foucault 2008, 140; Muhle 2008, 30), or 
‘dispositifs’18.  
Agamben defines the term dispositif as “a heterogeneous set that includes 
virtually anything, linguistic and non-linguistic, under the same heading: discourses, 
institutions, buildings, laws, police measures, philosophical propositions, and so on. 
The apparatus itself is the network that is established between these elements” 
(Agamben 2009a, 2). He points out that Foucault never defined the term in detail, 
even though it is central to many of his works on governmentality. Foucault stated: 
“The apparatus is precisely this: a set of strategies of the relations of forces 
supporting, and supported by, certain types of knowledge” (quoted after Agamben 
Ibid.). The “deployment of sexuality” is an example of such a dispositif (Foucault 
1978, 140, emphasis in original), where “sexuality allows for the accessing of life in 
both conditionalities, the individual life of the body and the global life of the species”, 
sexuality being “at the same time essentially individual (…) and essentially global”, 
and “functioning thus as a political dispositif, which connects the individualising 
techniques of discipline with the globalising mechanisms of regulation” (Muhle 2008, 
31, my translation; also Foucault 1977, 149). 
This thesis argues that the concept of the gene (and genetic knowledge in 
general) is ideally situated on the axis between the individual and the population, as a 
central code that enables the formulation of individual disciplinary actions and 
collective biopolitical strategies in the name of life. Genetic information gives on the 
one hand a very individual account of ‘life’, but at the same time the interpretation of 
its implications in terms of likely illnesses involves a large amount of statistical data 
gathered on a population or even global level (Rouvroy 2008, 3; Raman and Tutton 
2010, 721).19 Deciphering an individual’s personal genetic code provides knowledge 
about future risk potentialities that incite individuals to more responsible conduct, and 
to act on themselves in order to better their condition (N. Rose 2008a; Rouvroy 2008, 
                                                
18 Foucault’s idea of the dispositif has recently been taken up by an increasing number of scholars, 
especially in the context of liberalism and security (Agamben 2009a; Bührmann and Schneider 2008; 
Shapiro 2011; Lemke 2004; Opitz 2011).  
19 Rouvroy notes this “unavoidably collective nature of genetic information”, interpreting it as a 
“[disruption of] the liberal representations of the modernist sovereign subject” as an isolated individual 
(2008, 3). This statement only highlights the paradoxical notion of highly individualised accounts of 
‘life’ being formed by population-wide knowledge.  Understanding these two levels as seamlessly 
interconnected within the genetic code, or as a genetic dispositif, enhances our understanding of the 
particular success of the molecular vision of life, places it right at the centre of neoliberal 
governmentality, and gives an indication to the wide reach of the political and cultural impact that this 
notion has had. 
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55 ff. -  Rouvroy refers to this as the gene’s “disciplinary” power). The generation of 
genetic knowledge on the population level enables the evaluation of the individual 
sample – but it also provides a valuable dataset of the population’s genetic make-up, 
which can be used for the targeted deployment of biopolitical strategies. Thus this 
thesis argues that the genetic code can be seen as a dispositif in the Foucauldian sense 
– addressing life in collective and individual “conditionalities”. Understanding the 
genetic dispositif as such a power/knowledge apparatus draws attention to its 
intensifying potential to bring about far-reaching effects and amplify modes of 
individual and collective governance.  
Re-reading the relation between IP and conceptions of life in this context 
reveals how they are centrally placed at a very significant intersection between 
increasingly important technical knowledge for governing, and an intensified 
problematization of life for questions of governing, enhanced by the influence of the 
genetic dispositif. This influences and redefines individual and collective identities, as 
for example pre-symptomatic patients join interest groups demanding greater control 
over the direction of research on their condition, and individuals are encouraged to 
contribute to the formation of profitable ventures such as population biobanks. IPRs 
thus have to govern the economic use of technical knowledge in a political sphere that 
is marked by the increasing influence of the informational-genetic conception of life. 
This growing influence of the genetic dispositif however also complicates the 
function of IPRs. The informational-genetic understanding of DNA has only recently 
been formally accepted by IP law (in Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad 
[2013]), threatening to unsettle IP’s economic role as information alone is not 
patentable (see chapter IV). As IP negotiates tensions between patentability and the 
normalisation of informational-genetic conceptions of life, it also plays particularly 
important other roles in a neoliberal economy, as the second transformation of life 
into value shows.  
 
2.2. The transformation of life into value and the role of IP in a neoliberal economy 
The second transformation integrated this genetic account of ‘life’ into the economy, 
in “the transformation of life into value, into the form of commodity and capital, 
which is taking place under the globalization of capital” (Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 
2009, 2). This transformation was aided by the informational paradigm, which made 
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the genetic code easily transferrable to the economic sphere, in a proliferation of 
various “bioinformatic artifacts” (Thacker 2005a, 52). Cooper argues that this 
merging of the life sciences and the economy was further intensified by their 
“common ambition to overcome the ecological and economic limits to growth 
associated with the end of industrial production, through a speculative invention of 
the future” (Cooper 2008, 11). This unlocking of speculative value, she points out, is 
part of the neoliberal financialization of life - which does “not so much [seek] the 
generalized commodification of daily life” but in a departure from the previous liberal 
model rather “installs speculation at the very core of production” (Ibid.). 
Cooper highlights IP’s central position in this neoliberal financialisation of life 
using the example of the contested patentability of pluripotent stem cells, which 
contain the potential of developing into virtually any cell in the human body. In 
contrast to the emphasis on the commodification of life, she argues that the patenting 
of stem cells does not aim at establishing “an exchangeable equivalent” value, but 
rather lays claim to “a self-regenerative surplus value, a biological promise whose 
future self-valorizations cannot be predetermined or calculated in advance” (Ibid., 
148). This turns “biological life […] into speculative surplus value” (Ibid.), and 
results in an unprecedented preoccupation of IP law with “the ontological problem of 
our humanness” (Ibid., 146). In this neoliberal economy of speculative surplus value 
derived from biological life, the field of IP law has emerged as a central site 
establishing the control of intellectual (potential) value – life’s “future powers of 
emergence” (Ibid., 190). However, while highlighting this particular relevance of IP 
for the neoliberal economy, Cooper does not question the relation of IPRs to different 
genetic conceptions of life in more detail. As IP law becomes fundamentally involved 
with defining the essence of “humanness” it also normalises predictable 
informational-genetic conceptions of life at the expense of complexity and 
environmental influence (see chapter IV). Thus IP contributes to the governing of 
knowledge and manages tensions between complexity and control in a neoliberal 
economy.  
This thesis argues that the emphasis on IPRs and their role in the appropriation 
of surplus potential value renders them central to the question of the governing of life, 
where they for example accommodate the challenge of genetic complexity while they 
also ensure the continued function of economic exchange. The following chapters 
approach the question of the governing of genetic life on three different levels in a 
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framework that conceptualises this confrontation as an encounter with biopower. Of 
course, this thesis does not seek to argue that IPRs are not generating commodities for 
trade, but finds that the problem with IP’s relation to life goes far beyond this 
function, and rather involves questions of the normalisation of certain types of 
knowledge and managing challenges to the exclusive power over this knowledge. 
This analysis re-evaluates the role of law at the intersection of life and the economy 
using the understanding of an increasing governmentalisation of IP law. The 
conceptual framework for analysis traces tensions between IP and the productive 
capacity of life in three different ways. The use of this perspective can show how 
tensions created by a neoliberal economy of life are met by a changed “responsive” 
role of law within neoliberal governmentality, in which a deregulation of economy 
paradoxically caused “regulatory activities of government [to become] hyperactive” 
(Martin 2011, 271; see last section below).  
 
2.3. Analysing IP’s role(s) in governing ‘life’ - A conceptual framework 
The two transformations of life into an informational-genetic code and of life into 
value thus have resulted in IPRs’ increased importance for the economic circulation 
of life, but also rendered it more central to questions of the governing of life. Both 
these developments can explain increasing challenges to IP in the name of life, as the 
growing influence of knowledge over life leads to contestations over its control by 
‘genetic’ subjects, while IP’s role in the financialisation of life continues to increase 
the economic relevance of this control. IPRs have thus become a central site of 
negotiation of tensions in what Rose terms new “economies of vitality”, where 
“biopolitics [have] become inextricably intertwined with bioeconomics” (N. Rose 
2007b, 6). The question of the government of life thus intensifies not only the 
relevance of genetic knowledge of the individual and the population, but its relation to 
the economy. This gives rise to a novel political field that traverses traditional 
divisions between biology and economy, and between the national and the 
international as “transnational flows of knowledge, cells, tissues and intellectual 
property are coupled with local intensifications and regulated by supranational 
institutions” (Rabinow and Rose 2006, 215). IPRs are a central “power relation” at the 
intersection of this emerging transnational “economy of vitality”, and the genetic 
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dispositif, and this thesis argues that their function at this intersection needs urgent 
attention beyond the focus on their role in commodification.  
The roles of IPRs within this economy and the challenges they are 
encountering will be analysed in the coming three chapters, which argue that in their 
confrontation with genetic conceptions of life, IPRs are undergoing a process of 
governmentalisation in which they are becoming a tactics of government. The 
chapters investigate IPRs’ exposure to the problematization of life on three separate 
yet connected levels, in an “analytic”, which seeks to “[detail] the operational logics, 
forces and dynamics at play in a specific configuration of power relations” (Dillon 
and Lobo-Guerrero 2008, 272). IPRs are here treated as “epistemic objects”20 that are 
“constituted through practices of power” (Lobo-Guerrero 2011, 9). They for example 
reflect struggles between scientific truth discourses, and are involved in and 
challenged by the formation of new responsibilities and duties.  
This thesis interrogates contestations of IP as an exposure to biopower and its 
productive logic as a part of govermentality. A conceptual framework for analysis 
accounts for the ways in which biopower problematizes life for questions of 
governing, following Rabinow and Rose’s rigorous examination of biopower’s 
relation to a neoliberal economic context, specifically with regards to informational-
genetic conceptions of life and their productive capacity. They point out that at its 
basic level, the governing of life (or the engagement with biopower) encompasses a 
“configuration of knowledge, power and subjectivity” (Rabinow and Rose 2006, 212). 
In a definition of biopower that is “not trans-historical or metaphoric, but precisely 
grounded in historical, or genealogical, analysis” (Ibid., 199), they state: 
 
“the concept of biopower designates a plane of actuality that must 
include, at a minimum, the following elements: [1] One or more truth 
discourses about the ‘vital’ character of living human beings, and an 
array of authorities considered competent to speak that truth. […] [2] 
Strategies for intervention upon collective existence in the name of life 
and health, initially addressed to populations that may or may not be 
territorialized upon the nation [….] [3] Modes of subjectification, 
                                                
20 Lobo-Guerrero adapts the term “epistemic objects” from Rheinberger’s original use, and deploys it 
in an analysis of insurance. Lobo-Guerrero argues that insurance also seeks to “capitalize life”, and 
runs into significant problems in the “molecular age” (Lobo-Guerrero 2011, 38 and 53). 
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through which individuals are brought to work on themselves […] by 
means of practices of the self, in the name of their own life or health 
[….]” (Ibid., 197). 
 
This thesis uses this constellation of elements involved in the exercise of biopower as 
a framework structuring the analysis of the conflicts and contestations of IP’s relation 
to life in order to grasp the productive capacity of the political sphere surrounding 
genetic conceptions of life. The following chapters analyse the problematization of 
life and the role of IP in the governing of life on the level of truth discourses, modes 
of subjectification, and strategies for intervention. 
This thesis does not argue that this analysis will show that the IPR apparatus 
changing beyond recognition or undergoing a radical overhaul – it rather focuses on a 
persistent area of debates about legitimacy and reform of IPRs’ relation to life and 
health. Challenges giving rise to small changes and surprising developments that are 
not explained by the question of ‘commodification’ can thus be reinterpreted as part 
of a process of accommodation to demands produced by a new point of reference: 
molecular life. IP’s involvement in the definition of truth over life shows how the IP 
system attempts to accommodate the overwhelming influence of the informational-
genetic dispositif while still ensuring its patentability, in an otherwise inexplicable US 
decision against the patenting of certain information derived from human genetic 
sequences (Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad [2013], chapter IV). The 
relation of IP to the subject can be analysed with reference to demands incited by a 
new “somatic ethics” (N. Rose 2008a) or notions of “biological citizenship” based on 
genetic conceptions of life (N. Rose 2007b). These are shown to contest options for 
participation in the bioeconomy but also to work alongside the IP regime, as subjects 
are encouraged to voluntarily contribute to research but are prevented by means of IP 
transfer from any further participation in the use of results (chapter V). On the 
international level, the question of participation appears even more starkly, but the 
exclusionary function of the IP apparatus is also increasingly challenged by means of 
the right to health and within Global Health agendas. These new strategies for 
intervention are explored in contestation of IP’s centrality to an economy deriving 
value from life from different peoples across the globe (chapter VI).  
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Thus, while there are of course many ways in which IPRs are still 
representative of interests of sovereign power and enforced by means of disciplinary 
power, it is shown that they have several roles to play – and that these roles are 
undergoing change as they are ever more centrally involved in the governing of life. 
The last section of this chapter explores in more detail how an understanding of the 
productive capacity of a political sphere of life can trace changes in the previously 
entirely sovereign apparatus of law. This understanding of the governmentalisation of 
law departs from some conceptions of law in Foucault’s work, and advances the 
analysis of law’s function in governmentality by arguing that its operation as a 
“norm” (Ewald 2010, 146) entails it becoming a “tactics” (Foucault 2000, 211; 
Odysseos 2010, 755; Sokhi-Bulley 2013) of government, ensuring the right 
disposition of things – especially at the intersection of life and the economy. 
 
3. The Governmentalisation of Law 
The relevance of law and legal forms for Foucault’s concepts has been the source of 
much debate. While some regard Foucault as generally dismissive of the role of law 
for the processes he was setting out (Hunt and Wickham 1994), others (Ewald 2010; 
N. Rose and Valverde 2010; Golder and Fitzpatrick 2009; 2010) have formed a more 
detailed account of the various roles of law that can be discerned in Foucault’s work. 
This section further refines previous conceptions of law within governmentality, 
arguing that the turn into a “norm” entails a tactical process of accommodation 
between different priorities, carried out in the field of technical forms of law. Previous 
understandings of law within Foucault’s work focused either on it as part of the 
sovereign apparatus, a “mask” (Foucault 1977, 222), or on Foucault’s later conflicted 
accounts of the special nature of human rights. However, it is argued here that recent 
publications of Foucault’s lectures enabled a re-evaluation of the role of law in 
governmentality, unearthing law’s central part in the establishment of a “economic-
juridical order” in which “[t]he juridical gives form to the economic, and the 
economic would not be what it is without the juridical” (2008, 163). This illuminates 
Foucault’s earlier statement on law operating increasingly as a “tactics” of 
government (Foucault 2000, 211; 2007, 99), showing that law tactically resolves the 
need to govern for the market (Foucault 2008, 121) within “a technology of power 
centered on life” (Foucault 1978, 144). This understanding of the governmentalisation 
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of law can then be used in the analysis of IP’s “responsive” engagement (Golder and 
Fitzpatrick 2009, 56) with the genetic dispositif. 
 
3.1. Dismissing Law(s)? 
On first glance, Foucault seems to generally dismiss studies of certain types or forms 
of law, or jurisprudence, and devotes large parts of his argument to a deconstruction 
of its relevance. Law is presented as mostly a legal-philosophical justification for the 
establishment of sovereign power21: “the essential role of the theory of right has been 
to establish the legitimacy of power; the major or central problem around which the 
theory of right is organized is the problem of sovereignty” (Foucault 1997, 26). These 
statements serve both one the one hand to show how far legal arguments and structure 
are imbued with considerations of power, but also on the other hand to then dismiss 
forms of law as a possibly fruitful site of investigation of change. Law’s legitimacy is 
not addressed by Foucault, in fact, he states: “Right must, I think, be viewed not in 
terms of a legitimacy that has to be established, but in terms of the procedures of 
subjugation it implements” (Ibid., 27). This clearly equates law with sovereign and 
disciplinary power exercises only. 
These dismissive statements are also repeated in the context of the concept of 
biopower – but here a change from law towards the norm is set out:  
 
“Another consequence of this development of bio-power was the 
growing importance assumed by the action of the norm, at the expense 
of the juridical system of the law. Law cannot help but but [sic.] be 
armed, and its arm, par excellence, is death; [….] I do not mean to say 
that the law fades into the background or that the institutions of justice 
tend to disappear, but rather that the law operates more and more as a 
norm, and that the judicial institution is increasingly incorporated into 
a continuum of apparatuses (medical, administrative, and so on) whose 
functions are for the most part regulatory. A normalizing society is the 
historical outcome of a technology of power centered on life. We have 
entered a phase of juridical regression […] we should not be deceived 
                                                
21 “In Western societies, the elaboration of juridical thought has essentially centered around royal 
power ever since the Middle Ages” (Foucault 1997, 25). 
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by all the Constitutions framed throughout the world since the French 
Revolution, the Codes written and revised, a whole continual and 
clamorous legislative activity: these were the forms that made an 
essentially normalizing power acceptable.” (Foucault 1978, 144, 
emphasis in original)22 
 
This passage reveals a very particular understanding of law as opposed to the ‘norm’: 
Law is most clearly understood as a system that enforces the will of a (17th century) 
sovereign with absolute force, subjugating the individual through punishment. There 
is a clear distinction being made between this “juridical system of law” and “the 
norm”, which is highly instrumental in the establishment of a normalizing society. 
The norm is thus marked as the new form of law within governmentality.  
Despite this apparently clear dichotomy of the law and the norm, Foucault 
employed several different understandings of legal forms in an at times ambiguous 
fashion. For example, the passage quoted above hints at the role that human rights and 
constitutions may have played in the establishment of this society: a trade-off at best, 
and a smoke-screen at worst. But in later references to “absolute rights” (Keenan 
2010, 506; see also Golder 2011; 2013; Whyte 2012; Patton 2005), Foucault is 
decidedly more in favour of human rights, and attributes them with a certain potential 
for resistance to existing arrangements – so for example in “a new human rights 
initiative in defense of Vietnamese boat people” or in defence of “Spanish militants 
condemned to death in Franco’s court” (Keenan 2010, 503 and 505, originally 
published in 1997). Foucault’s speech on human rights at the UN argued in favour of 
“an international citizenry, which has its rights […] and promises to rise up against 
every abuse of power”, commissioned by “[n]o one. And that is precisely what 
establishes our right” (quoted after Keenan Ibid., 504; also reproduced in Foucault 
2000, 474). These changes further complicate Foucault’s notion of rights – even if 
this particular version of human rights is bracketed as a special case. 
Hunt and Wickham have put forward the view that “Foucault is concerned 
with law only illustratively” and that “the most distinctive features of Foucault’s 
account of the historical emergence of modernity led him to present a view which can 
be aptly summarised as the expulsion of law from modernity” (Hunt and Wickham 
                                                
22 Parts of this passage are quoted widely within accounts of Foucault’s attitude towards law: see for 
example Rose & Valverde (2010); Tadros (2010); Ewald (2010); Hunt (2010). 
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1994, 41 and 56, emphasis added). Other scholars have challenged this “expulsion 
thesis” and have instead focused on an interpretation of Foucault’s statements based 
on a more differentiated understanding of the legal domain, looking beyond criminal 
and constitutional law (Golder and Fitzpatrick 2009, 12).  
In his assessment of Foucault’s concept of law, Tadros finds “[t]he term 
juridical […] refers to the conception of power relations which one might call 
Austinian” (Tadros 2010, 150, originally published 1998, emphasis in original). John 
Austin famously admitted only those forms of law to be law that are backed up with 
real powers of enforcement or punishment through a sovereign (Austin 1954). Thus, 
in Austin’s understanding, almost all of international law is not actually law, as it 
cannot be enforced. This is also commonly referred to as the “Austinian Handicap” 
(for an extensive discussion see for example Barker 2000, 14 ff.). This alignment of 
the concept of the juridical with this very sovereign – and highly controversial - 
conception of law limits the area that could be termed ‘juridical’ to such examples as 
criminal law, which are directly enforceable by the state apparatus and the prison 
system – an area that is by no means representative of the whole of what is commonly 
seen as law. Other areas of law, which are closer to the regulatory apparatus of norms 
or normalization, cannot be equally dismissed as irrelevant emanations or sheer 
disguises of sovereign power.  
Following this interpretation of Foucault’s notion of law allows Ewald to 
reverse the claim of “a phase of juridical regression”, shifting the emphasis of 
interpretation of the notorious passage quoted above towards the recognition that 
“normalization tends to be accompanied by an astonishing proliferation of legislation. 
Practically speaking, legislators never expressed themselves as freely or as 
extensively as in the age of bio-power” (Ewald 2010, 123, originally published 1990).  
Foucault also recognised this proliferation of law connected to the emergence of 
biopower (what he then still called “mechanisms of security”): “it is quite clear that 
this does not constitute any bracketing off or cancellation of juridico-legal structures 
or disciplinary mechanisms” (Foucault 2007, 7). Rather, “getting these systems of 
security to work involves a real inflation of the juridico-legal code” (Ibid.). What 
really changes for law “is the dominant characteristic, or more exactly, the system of 
correlation between juridico-legal mechanisms, disciplinary mechanisms, and 
mechanisms of security” (Ibid., 8).  
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3.2. The changing role of law in governmentality: Towards the ‘norm’ 
Ewald thus argues that Foucault’s notion of “the juridical” does not equate to all 
legislation (see also Golder and Fitzpatrick 2009, 35), and particularly addresses the 
different relation of biopower to law. Here the role of law is not yet fully understood: 
 
“Foucault’s analysis leaves open two questions: first, if the juridical is 
an inappropriate category to use in interpreting bio-power, how do we 
make sense of all those ‘instruments of the law’ (codes, constitutions, 
laws, regulations) that have developed and expanded during the era of 
bio-power? Second, if the actions of norms replaces the juridical 
system of law as the code and language of power, what role remains 
for law?” (Ewald 2010, 146; quoted also in N. Rose and Valverde 
2010, 179) 
 
Ewald’s questions raise the problem of a practical interpretation of the law’s turn 
towards the norm in the promotion of biopolitical priorities. As Foucault’s statements 
above point out, the “dominant characteristic” or “correlation” of power exercises is 
undergoing change in governmentality. In this turn towards new priorities for 
governing, such as the life of populations, law becomes enmeshed with the operation 
of biopolitics and starts to be framed as a norm that translates biopolitical priorities. 
Elbe puts this change of direction, as part of a governmentalisation of power 
exercises, thus:  
 
“For example, the much older institution of law (sovereign power) is 
increasingly used not just to augment the powers of the sovereign or 
the state but also to improve the welfare of populations by drafting 
new regulations – such as making it compulsory to wear seat belts, 
levying taxes on alcohol […] The older forms of sovereign and 
disciplinary power […] begin to play a much more subservient and 
“supporting” role for the wider purposes of managing the welfare of 
populations – giving rise to a complex ‘triangle’ of sovereignty, 
discipline, and governmental management.” (Elbe 2009, 12)  
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This statement already refers to a much wider, and more contemporary, interpretation 
of the content of ‘law’, and highlights how the change towards the norm relegates 
more traditional forms of law to a supporting role. Instead of an emphasis on 
traditional fields of law, Rose and Valverde also argue that the emergence of the norm 
entails an overall  
 
“[…] turn towards the minor, the mundane, the grey, meticulous and 
detailed work of regulatory apparatuses, of the control of streets, of the 
government of transport, of the law of health and hygiene […], of the 
laws of property and trust, […] of all the places where, in the 
bureaucratic working of our over-governed existence, laws, rules and 
standards shape our ways of going on, and all the little judges of 
conduct exercise their petty powers of adjudication and enforcement.” 
(N. Rose and Valverde 2010, 546, originally published 1998)  
 
This highlights the increasing relevance of previously “mundane” sectors of law in a 
process of governmentalisation of law containing a turn to biopolitical priorities – 
drawing attention to areas such as health and hygiene, but also the administration of 
property and trust. This chapter already set out the increasing relevance of technical 
knowledge and the control of such knowledge for biopolitical strategies. This finds its 
correlate in an increased importance of laws administrating technical sectors – which 
are now centrally involved in the realisation of governmental priorities. 
However, Ewald states “the language of bio-power is purely technical and has 
almost nothing to do with the law as such” (Ewald 2010, 146), thus arguing that 
biopower’s mechanisms are not what Foucault considered ‘law’ in the first place. The 
distinction between technical types of law, norms, and “regulatory apparatuses” 
remains difficult, as not all fulfill the function of a norm in the same way. A law 
making seatbelts obligatory clearly introduces a new norm containing biopolitical 
priorities, but a system addressing the laws of property and trust does not establish 
norms as straightforwardly as that. In the case of IP, law introduces a method of 
normalising ‘accepted’ and ‘novel’ scientific knowledge and assigning clear 
ownership over this knowledge. IP is a technical area of law that is engaged in 
classifying technical knowledge – thus doubly relevant for the new art of governing. 
A predominantly US-American version of IPRs also became a global norm for IP by 
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virtue of the global reach of the TRIPS agreement, which sought to introduce a 
uniform minimum standard of IPRs worldwide. These aspects of IP’s role as a norm 
have, however, first and foremost been analysed with reference to establishing 
property in an economic context – and not with reference to their relation to 
contestations over medical knowledge and the governing of life.  
At the intensifying intersection between governing of life and also of the 
market, IP’s function needs further attention, beyond declarations of law’s changed 
status as a norm. The normalisation of knowledge and the normalisation of 
participatory regimes in research and the bioeconomy involve a complex negotiation 
of tensions. Relying on Golder and Fitzpatrick’s instructive analysis of law within 
Foucault’s work, the next section argues that at the intersection of life and the 
economy, law operates in an “illimitable” manner, “[engaging] responsively with 
exteriority, with an outside made up of resistances and transgressions” (Golder and 
Fitzpatrick 2009, 56 and 71). In this way, law as a tactics of government contributes 
to the resolution of tensions arising from, in the present case, the governing of life 
while ensuring the functioning of an economic system. Foucault’s lectures 
specifically point out this constitutive function of law and thus turn the emphasis 
away from economic determinacy, highlighting the need to govern for the market for 
example by means of formal privileges. 
 
3.3. Reversing the perspective: Governing through formal privileges  
In his work, Foucault specifically proposed a different type of analysis to Marxist 
theory’s overwhelming focus on the power effects of economic relations23, or, the 
“‘economic functionality’ of power” (Foucault 1997, 14). With regards to law, 
Foucault intentionally reversed the analysis, arguing that “the juridical is clearly not 
part of the superstructure” (2008, 162), instead “the juridical gives form to the 
economic” in “an economic-juridical order” (Ibid., 163). The functioning market is no 
longer understood as a product of nature but as a deliberately constituted system that 
is being kept in its desired form by means of a juridical order. For example, the 
conditions for competition in the market are put in place by “formal privileges”:  
 
                                                
23 Foucault was quite expressly non-Marxist: see for example Hunt & Wickham (1994, 33). Foucault 
questions: “Is power modeled on the commodity?” (Foucault 1997, 14), and argues for “different 
instruments, even if power relations are deeply involved in and with economic relations” (Ibid.). 
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“[t]he beneficial effects of competition are not due to a pre-existing 
nature, to a natural given that it brings with it. They are due to a formal 
privilege. [….] [C]ompetition as an essential economic logic will only 
appear and produce its effects under certain conditions which have to 
be carefully and artificially constructed” (Ibid., 120, emphasis added).  
 
In similar way, IPRs are formal privileges conferring property rights necessary for 
creating value in a market economy. For a functioning market, the objects of property 
need to be stable and clearly identifiable – even more so in the case of scientific 
knowledge objects, which need to be artificially constructed in the form of exclusive 
monopolies in order to gain particular economic value. Without this, the 
dissemination of knowledge would remain “nonrivalrous”, as the sharing of 
knowledge does not diminish the value of the information itself (see for example 
Boyle 2008, 3).  
Emphasising the constitutive role of law for the market, especially in the 
technical field of law comprising the rules of property and trust, consequently shows:  
 
“that the relation between an economy of competition and a state can 
no longer be one of the reciprocal delimitation of different domains. 
[….] Government must accompany the market economy from start to 
finish. The market economy does not take something away from 
government. [….] One must govern for the market, rather than because 
of the market.” (Foucault 2008, 121, emphasis added)  
 
This understanding reverses Marxist theory’s analysis of the relation between the 
forces of the market and of government, and instead stresses that the economy is a 
product of law. Connecting this point of reference for law with an understanding of 
law’s changes towards the norm shows that especially technical fields of law such as 
IP law are governing for the market – and in this function also increasingly 
contributing to the governing of the problematization of life. IP’s growing relevance 
thus confronts this field of law with tensions between two aims of governing, which 
need to be resolved incrementally by IP policy and jurisprudence. 
Law’s constitutive relation to the economy emphasises the political relevance 
of the field of law, and highlights that it also constitutes an important site for 
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resistance: “we must be able to act on this ensemble and intervene in such a way as to 
invent a different capitalism” states Foucault, and stresses that instead of “economic 
interventionism”, interventions need to take the shape of “maximum legal 
interventionism” (Ibid., 167). This makes a clear case for renewed attention to 
economic law, understanding tensions within this sector as modes of resistance that 
can influence the constitution of the economy. Law therefore ceases to be an 
afterthought for political analysis, and rather becomes a central site of analysis. 
The change towards a norm thus entails more than a change in status, it is 
rather a change towards becoming a site of contestation at which law is acting as a 
tactics governing challenges. Golder and Fitzpatrick show that law operates in two 
different modalities in governmentality, as a norm and also “in a constitutive 
engagement […][with] resistance and transgression”, in which it “extends itself 
illimitably in its attempt to encompass and respond to what lies outside its definite 
content” (Golder and Fitzpatrick 2009, 71). In this responsive mode, law can even 
“[disrupt] itself through becoming receptive of resistances that constantly challenge 
its position, its content, its being” (Ibid.). Using this understanding of law’s 
responsiveness to challenges sheds light on the role of law as a “tactics” determining 
“the right disposition of things” (Foucault 2000, 211).  
At the intersection of governing for the market and governing for life, tensions 
are growing around the influence of genetic conceptions of life (the ‘genetic 
dispositif’) and the rising importance of IPRs for deriving economic value from life. 
Here, IPRs begin to respond to challenges regarding their relation to life while 
maintaining their economic function – thus becoming operative in the determination 
of the “right disposition of things”, as a tactics that accommodates challenges while 
maintaining order. Golder and Fitzpatrick’s understanding of law’s responsiveness 
towards challenges highlights that this accommodation of resistance can even lead to 
a disruption of law. The analysis of contestations surrounding IP’s relation to life in 
the coming chapters shows how engaging with different ‘truths’ of life could very 
quickly disrupt the economic function of IPRs, and how challenges relying on human 
rights and the notion of ‘market failure’ could contest IP’s legitimacy even on a 
fundamental economic level. However, it is also shown that as a tactics of 
government, IPs continue to play a variety of roles that maintain the function of the 
economy by limiting the participation of donors in the further use of their donated 
material, transferring ownership to other participants in the bioeconomy, and by 
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normalising scientific knowledge that ensures certainty and predictability instead of a 
complex genetic conception of life. As IPRs negotiate these pressures and roles, they 
change from a “mundane” form of technical knowledge to an important site of 
contestation in an unfolding governmentality. 
 
Conclusion 
The problem of governing life has intensified beyond Foucault’s original 
understanding, as an informational-genetic conception of life enhanced processes 
enabling the governing of individuals and populations – in the emergence of a genetic 
dispositif. At the same time, IPRs were found to be of growing importance for the 
neoliberal bioeconomy by generating speculative value from life in the life sciences. 
While the neoliberal economy turned towards banking on the life science sector’s 
future, IPRs became one of the key methods ensuring control over this form of future 
potentiality within the economy. IP thus became increasingly relevant for the 
economy and for the governing of individuals and populations. This gave rise to new 
strategies of challenge and intensified the continuing question of the definition of life 
for the purpose of governing and of economic utility. 
This chapter set out a different analytic perspective on IP’s relation to life, 
which it argued can better account for tensions and developments that contradict an 
emphasis on commodification. The chapter introduced a framework for analysis of 
these developments in the coming chapters, which investigates the challenges of 
governing life on three different levels: contestations around normalised truth 
discourses, emerging new modes of subjectification, and new strategies for 
intervention in the name of life. This analytic of power illuminates how an increasing 
emphasis on the life and health of populations gives rise to changes in the role of law. 
The chapter argued that a growing relevance of knowledge over life turned IP into a 
central site of contestation within a “problematization” of life for governing. A deeper 
understanding of this process can account for growing debates around IP law, which 
in response acts as a tactics of government in accommodating challenges while also 
continuing to ensure IP’s function for the circulation of value in the economy. 
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Chapter IV Normalised truths - IPRs and the challenge of the genetic-
informational vision of ‘life’ 
 
“Each age says everything it can according to the conditions laid down for its 
statements [….] [This is] perhaps Foucault’s greatest historical principle: Behind the 
curtain there is nothing to see, but it [is] all the more important each time to describe 
the curtain […]” (Deleuze 2006, 46 f.) 
 
“By [the late 60s] the genome had become widely perceived as an information system, 
an authorless Book of Life written in the speechless language of DNA.” (Kay 2000, 
14) 
 
The challenge of accommodating genetic conceptions of ‘life’ into the IP regime is 
particularly obvious in recent surprising changes concerning the patentability of 
information derived from human genetic materials. The US Supreme Court judgement 
in the Myriad case (Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad (2013) suddenly 
overturned IP’s long-established chemical-molecular understanding of DNA, and 
instead began to foreground DNA’s informational content. Paradoxically, this change 
marked a turn away from patentability of DNA in certain instances, and thus cannot 
be explained in terms of commodification alone. This chapter argues instead that this 
adjustment of ‘truth’ over life is evidence of IP’s confrontation with biopower exerted 
by the overwhelming influence of genetic-informational conceptions of life (or the 
‘genetic dispositif’). This confrontation creates tensions between IP’s role of 
normalising predictable and stable forms of knowledge and the safeguarding of 
continued patentability of a genetic-informational conception of life. The fusion of 
genetic knowledge with the information sciences gave rise to forms of knowledge that 
can readily traverse the boundaries of science into areas of economic exchange and 
the governing of individuals and populations, but informational entities also challenge 
the accepted criteria for patentability. 
As the patenting of sheer information is not strictly possible, the adoption of 
an informational-genetic conception of life by the Myriad decision came with a 
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caveat: complementary DNA (cDNA) continues to be seen as a man-made markedly 
different molecule that is not predominantly determined by its informational content. 
This uneasy compromise maintained the patentability of some forms of DNA – and 
thus fulfilled IP’s continuing role as a regime that is governing for the market. But 
this compromise also shows that IP law acted as a ‘tactics’ of government reconciling 
the growing influence of the genetic dispositif and the need for a continuing role of 
patents for the market. In this way, IP also contributes to the governing of genetic life 
as it continues to normalise predictable and stable versions of the informational-
genetic conception of life. This elevates some forms of scientific knowledge over 
others, which emphasise complex environmental interactions, such as systems biology 
and epigenetics. IP thus continues to maintain a central truth as a point of reference 
for the governing of life and its economic use.  
 
1. Intellectual Property Rights and the Molecular Vision of Life: Patenting the 
Contested Truth of ‘Life’ 
The relation of IPRs to ‘life’ has been a contested one – especially where it came to 
the patenting of human genetic sequences. Science’s ethical treatment of research 
subjects and the relation to patients and donors of tissues has been problematic 
throughout history24, and the patenting of human genetic materials has been one of the 
latest instances in this conflict. However, questions about the ethical treatment of life 
fail to interrogate IP’s relation to particular scientific ‘truths’ about life. IP law is 
central to the intersection of knowledge and the economy, and exercises significant 
power on the direction of research endeavours by endorsing a normalised canon of 
scientific advances, and supporting a predominant scientific paradigm. But this 
process of the normalisation of knowledge contains challenges and compromises, as 
for example in the recent change of IP’s understanding of life from a chemical-
molecular notion of DNA to an informational-genetic one. This conflicted and 
ambivalent development cannot be adequately explained by a commodification 
critique alone, as it diminished the extent of the ‘commodification’ of life instead of 
further intensifying it. This change can be better explained, it is argued, with 
reference to the overwhelming success of the informational-genetic conception of life 
                                                
24 See for example the already mentioned notorious story of Henrietta Lacks and the HeLa cell line 
(Hudson and Collins 2013; Collins 2013; Skloot 2011; Skloot 2013). 
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(‘the genetic dispositif’) over the course of the 20th century, influencing research 
agendas and the identities of individuals far beyond the field of the life sciences.  
IP’s changing conception of life is set out first in its fundamental opposition 
between DNA as “occurring in nature” and DNA as a man-made “composition of 
matter” in the cases of Diamond v Chakrabarty (1980) and Howard Florey /H2 
Relaxin (1995). This distinction is complicated by the Myriad cases (Assoc. for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad [2013]), which discussed whether DNA is either 
essentially “informational” or merely a “markedly different” chemical molecule. This 
discussion shows a strikingly delayed impact of the truth discourse of the 
informational character of genetics, which was held off by “the life/nature-is-nothing-
more-than-chemistry argument” (Carolan 2010, 117; Calvert and Joly 2011) for a 
long time. The Myriad decision maintained a tenuous division between elements 
“occurring in nature” and those deemed “man-made” – but also adopted an 
informational understanding of DNA. IP’s unprecedented preoccupation with “the 
ontological problem of our humanness” (Cooper 2008, 146) thus produces challenges 
that can be better interpreted as part of ongoing processes of accommodation between 
the two main governmental aims of life and the market. 
 
1.1. Patenting DNA: ‘Occurring in Nature’ or man-made ‘Composition of Matter’? 
The patenting of genetic material became routine practice in the 1990s, when the 
human genome was in the process of being deciphered. Great expectations were being 
held when it came to this new vision of ‘life’, anticipating the revelation of the 
‘blueprint’ of all living beings on the molecular level. The driving force behind the 
increased patenting of human genetic material was the hope of finding ‘special’ 
strains of genetic sequences (to put it briefly) that showed resistances to certain 
diseases, or that were connected to the development of diseases in some way - which 
led to a relative ‘hype’ in this area.25 In the patenting of such material, the definition 
of the essential nature (or ‘truth’) of genetic material became the central question for 
the determination of whether it could constitute patentable subject matter. 
                                                
25 A prime example is the story of deCode, the company founded by Craig Venter, which aimed to 
identify and isolate specific ‘special’ strands of DNA with the help of the Icelandic biobank and full 
access to Icelandic health records. For a while the company offered ‘disease risk tests’ over their 
website www.decode.com (accessed 17.1.2012), but the expected breakthrough in monetary and 
medical terms did not materialise (Pálsson and Rabinow 1999; H. Rose 2003; Fortun 2008). The 
company merged with Amgen in the end of 2012, and has since abstained from providing personal 
genome scans as part of this merger. 
 99 
 
1.1.1. Diamond v Chakrabarty (1980) – “a new bacterium with markedly different 
characteristics” 
The US26 practice of granting patents on genetic material goes back to the decision of 
Diamond v. Chakrabarty (1980) 447 U.S. 303, which decided for the first time that “a 
live, human-made micro-organism is patentable subject matter” – confirming the 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals’ determination “that the fact that micro-
organisms are alive is without legal significance for purposes of the patent law” 
(Diamond v. Chakrabarty, Preamble). This case was concerned with the patenting of 
a “genetically engineered bacterium capable of breaking down crude oil, a property 
which is possessed by no naturally occurring bacteria” (Ibid.).27 Starting with this 
patenting of a “man-made” micro-organism, a determination of the essential 
characteristics of ‘life’ became part of IP’s purview. In the wake of Diamond v. 
Chakrabarty, the US Patent Office laid down this new approach in an official notice 
stating that it is “now examining claims directed to multicellular living organisms, 
including animals” (1077 Official Gazette 24, 21st April 1987; quoted after 
Jaenichen, McDonell, and Haley Jr. 2002, 8). At this point, this practice was still 
limited to non-human organisms, but these cases established the foundation of IPR’s 
relation to ‘life’, which became internationally influential with the formation of the 
US’ industry-influenced TRIPS agreement (1994) and its reach to the rest of the 
world (Sell 2003). 
The patenting of ‘life’ needs to resolve the fundamental question of how 
genetic materials should be understood for the purposes of determining ‘novelty’ and 
the ‘inventive step’ rewarded by the patent. A standard definition of a patent is that it 
“is a monopoly which […] lasts for a maximum of 20 years. To be patentable, an 
invention must be new, show an inventive step, be industrially applicable and not fall 
into one of the excluded categories of invention” (Colston and Galloway 2010, 4). 
                                                
26 The US approach has a fundamental effect on IP law in the rest of the world. The US remain the 
determining force in the sector and exported their view of the matter to the rest of the world via the 
means of international treaties such as TRIPS and international organisations such as WIPO. The most 
important cases in this field are those determined by US courts, and, to a lesser degree, those 
determined in the EU by the European Patent office and also the (separate) EU Courts. Most of the 
biotech sector reliant on IPRs is still located in the US and the EU, despite the increasing prominence 
for example of India. 
27 Further cases involving ‘man-made’ varieties included the patenting of seed and tissue cultures of 
maize in Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q.443 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1985), and of oysters in Ex parte 
Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425 (Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 1987), thus extending the principle to “multicellular 
animal varieties” (Jaenichen, McDonell, and Haley Jr. 2002, 8). 
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What is most notable for the present context is that patents are granted for inventions, 
not discoveries (such as chemical elements or natural laws), a distinction that is 
contained in the idea of an inventive step, in which the scientist invests his or her own 
creativity and comes up with something new that, as a product of their efforts, 
warrants protection. This distinction between inventions and discoveries is central to 
IP law, and especially central to the issue of patentability of human genetic materials. 
In line with the question of the inventive step, the question of patentable 
subject matter was viewed in Diamond v. Chakrabarty as one of whether the material 
occurred “in nature” or represented a man-made “composition of matter”. The court 
considered the exclusion of discoveries, stating that  
 
“a new mineral discovered in the earth or a new plant found in the wild 
is not patentable subject matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his 
celebrated law that E=mc2; nor could Newton have patented the law of 
gravity. Such discoveries are "manifestations of . . . nature, free to all 
men and reserved exclusively to none." Funk Brothers Seed Co. v. 
Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 130” (Diamond v Chakrabarty p. 309).  
 
The court argued that in this case, the micro-organism in question was not ordinarly 
found in nature, hence: “Judged in this light, respondent's micro-organism plainly 
qualifies as patentable subject matter. His claim is not to a hitherto unknown natural 
phenomenon, but to a nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter -- 
a product of human ingenuity "having a distinctive name, character [and] use." 
Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U. S. 609, 121 U. S. 615 (1887)” (Diamond v 
Chakrabarty p. 309).  
Interestingly, the Court elaborated on the distinction in more detail than 
strictly necessary for the inventive step, stating “the patentee has produced a new 
bacterium with markedly different characteristics from any found in nature, and one 
having the potential for significant utility. His discovery is not nature's handiwork, but 
his own; accordingly it is patentable subject matter under § 101” (Diamond v 
Chakrabarty p. 310). This passage introduces the concept of “markedly different 
characteristics”, which became central in later cases determining the patentability of 
genetic material – and the question of whether they can all be regarded as “man-
made”.  
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The difference between the Chakrabarty micro-organism and other patents on 
‘life’ becomes apparent when compared to a later case in the European courts, 
Howard Florey /H2 Relaxin [1995] EPOR 541, where the patent claimed “a 
genetically engineered human protein, H2 relaxin, which women produce during 
childbirth to soften the pelvis” (MacQueen et al. 2011, 442). This application 
concerns a protein found in nature, however, the argument made here is that it is 
materially changed in the procedure of isolation from the human donor – a process 
that takes place in the isolation of any genetic material from the donor’s body for the 
purposes of research. This change does not amount to the “manufacture” of a new 
micro-organism as in the Chakrabarty case – but it is still perceived as an inventive 
step creating something markedly different. 
 
1.1.2. Howard Florey /H2 Relaxin (1995) – “DNA is not ‘life’, but a chemical 
substance” 
The essential characteristics of this marked difference are however contested, as the 
deliberations about DNA as either a chemical substance or as an informational 
representation of ‘life’ show. A few years after Diamond v Chakrabarty, the Howard 
Florey/H2 Relaxin case directly addressed the question of the patentability of human 
genetic material (judged by the European Patent Office’s (EPO) Opposition Division, 
thus not affecting rules in the US)28 . The European Parliament’s Green Party 
complained, amongst other, that the isolated DNA “invention” contained nothing 
novel; that it constituted a discovery; that the “use of a particular female condition 
(pregnancy) for a technical process oriented towards profit” […] “constitutes an 
offence against human dignity”; that the practice described in the patent “amounts to a 
form of modern slavery since it involves the dismemberment of women and their 
piecemeal sale to commercial enterprises throughout the world”; and that “human life 
is being patented”, which is “intrinsically immoral” (Howard Florey / H2 Relaxin, p. 
549, at 6.1). They relied on Art. 53(a) EPC, which declares patents inadmissible that 
are “contrary to ‘ordre public’ or morality”.  
                                                
28 There are significant differences between the US and the European approach to patentable subject 
matter. Europe focuses on the “‘inventive step’, […] the US interpretation focuses on ‘non-
obviousness’ [….] This latter is a lower threshold and consequently means that genetically engineered 
products remains [sic.], potentially at least, more easily patentable in the US than in Europe” 
(MacQueen et al. 2011, 517). 
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The Opposition Division of the EPO rejected all of these claims and pointed 
out, amongst other, that “every evidence indicates that this practice is perfectly 
acceptable to and even welcomed by the vast majority of the public” (p. 550, at 6.3.1). 
Furthermore, patents on genes  
  
“do not confer on their proprietors any rights whatever to individual 
human beings [….] No woman is affected in any way by the present 
patent – she is free to live her life as she wishes and has exactly the 
same right to self-determination as she had before the patent was 
granted. […] The only stage at which a woman was involved was at 
the beginning of the making of the invention, as a (voluntary) source 
for the relaxin mRNA.” (Howard Florey / H2 Relaxin, p. 550-551, at 
6.3.3) 
 
The Court thus confirmed that an isolated protein was markedly different to that 
found in nature.29 Elaborating on the essence of this difference, the EPO’s Opposition 
Division insisted most crucially on the determination “that DNA is not ‘life’, but a 
chemical substance which carries genetic information and can be used as an 
intermediate in the production of proteins which may be medically useful” (p. 550, at 
6.3.4). DNA was thus understood as predominantly a chemical substance which has 
the coincidental attribute of carrying genetic information – making ‘life’ not the 
essence, but a mere feature of this chemical. 
This understanding of a “marked difference” between a genetic sequence 
isolated from the body and a sequence still within the human body is also echoed by 
the EU’s 1998 Biotech Directive (EU Directive 98/44/EC), which engages with the 
definition of ‘life’ and the treatment of genetic materials in more detail than US 
documents.30 While Art. 5 (1) of the Directive states that the “simple discovery” of 
one of the elements of the human body “at the various stages of its formation and 
                                                
29 The isolation process has become so commonplace that its results are by now no longer considered 
“non-obvious”. Ex parte Kubin (83 USPQ2d 1410 Bd. Pat. App. & Int. 2007) found an “increased level 
of skill in the art“ overall  (Yamanaka 2008, 1086). The notion of ‘gene patents’ has not been 
challenged by Ex parte Kubin – “rather it corrects the anomalously low threshold for nonobviousness 
established by Deuel” (Cook-Deegan and Rai 2009, 122). In re Deuel (1995 34 USPQ 2d 1210 [Fed. 
Cir. 1995]) established “ per se non-obiousness for all new DNAs obtained from their amino acid 
sequences” (Ducor 1996, 35, emphasis in original). 
30 The European approach to patenting of ‘life’ has historically been more restrictive than US practice 
(see previous footnote 28). 
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development [....] including the sequence or partial sequence of a gene, cannot 
constitute patentable invention”, Art. 5 (2) then states “An element isolated from the 
human body or otherwise produced by means of a technical process, including the 
sequence or partial sequence of a gene, may constitute a patentable invention, even if 
the structure of that element is identical to that of a natural element.” This is as long 
as “the rights conferred by the patent do not extend to the human body and its 
elements in their natural environment” (Recital No. 20 Preamble, emphasis added). 
While “a mere DNA sequence without indication of a function” is not patentable 
according to Recital No. 23 Preamble, this means that ‘isolated’ sequences are 
generally patentable – just like in the US. The European Patent Convention (EPC) 
also shares this understanding of ‘man-made’ sequences.31  
 
1.2. The Myriad Case: DNA as ‘information’ or a ‘markedly different’ chemical 
molecule?  
However, the understanding of genes as chemical molecules (also referred to as the 
“life/nature-is-nothing-more-than-chemistry argument” by Carolan 2010, 117) has 
been drawn into question by the latest instance of the debate conducted in the US in 
the Myriad case. This case started at the District Court level and rose to the level of 
the US Supreme Court in 2013, where the nothing-more-than-chemistry paradigm 
was finally partially overturned. The different judgements issued over the course of 
this case are an excellent showcase of IP law’s deliberation of different competing 
‘truths’ over genetic materials within the field of IPRs. 
The detailed reflections at the District Court, Court of Appeals, and Supreme 
Court level concerning the ‘nature’ of DNA and the isolated versions of sequences 
reveal a conflict of different perspectives on ‘life’ in this landmark case, which 
resulted in a surprising turn away from the previously established chemical-molecular 
paradigm. Instead the Supreme Court finally endorsed a genetic-informational 
understanding of life, but also partially upheld the notion of isolated sequences’ 
“marked difference”. This shows how the Court in the last instance seeks to reconcile 
                                                
31 This convention contains the European Patent’s Office (EPO) guidelines for the issuing of patents. 
The equivalent of the EPO and the EPC in the US is the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
with the US Patent Act (1952), now under United States Code Title 35, setting out patent eligibility in 
section 101. In the UK the Intellectual Property Office (IPO), the Patents Act (1977, as amended) and 
the Patents Rules (2007) consolidate relevant legislation and provisions. Section 1 of the Patent Act set 
out the patentability of inventions, requiring novelty, an inventive step, and industrial application. See 
also Bently & Sherman (2009, 346 f.). 
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the turn to the informational view of ‘life’ with the notion of patenting of human 
genetic sequences in general – thus extending an olive branch to the biotech industry 
reliant on those patents. This seemingly contradictory judgement can be better 
understood as part of an ongoing process of accommodation in a new art of 
governing, showing how the central influence of genetic- informational accounts of 
life is being balanced against the need of the market for IPRs.  
 
1.2.1. The District Court and the Court of Appeals 
The landmark Myriad case concerned Myriad Genetic Ltd.’s patents on the BRCA 1 
and 2 cell line, which are “two genes linked to susceptibility for breast and ovarian 
cancer (…). The risk of falling ill increases if these genes show certain mutations” 
(WIPO 2006).32 Myriad registered patents on the isolated cell lines, on methods of 
analysing and comparing this information with other cell lines, and methods to screen 
for those mutations (for example with the help of test kits).33 This patent was initially 
challenged in 2010 in the US District Court for the Southern District of New York, 
where Judge Sweet declared the practice of patenting of genetic information to be in 
general invalid in Association for Molecular Pathology et al. v. US Patent and 
Trademark Office et al. (also called ACLU v Myriad Genetics, 2010, US District 
Court for the Southern District of New York, 09 Civ. 4515).  
In this surprise verdict at the district level, Judge Sweet found that “[b]ecause 
the claimed isolated DNA is not markedly different from native DNA as it exists in 
nature, it constitutes unpatentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. §101”34 (ACLU v 
Myriad Genetics at p. 135). In this, he states, the judgement follows “the clear line of 
Supreme Court precedent (…) establish[ing] that purification of a product of nature, 
without more, cannot transform it into patentable subject matter”, pointing out that 
“the purified product must possess ‘markedly different characteristics’ in order to 
                                                
32 The test for these mutations has for example motivated Angelina Jolie to have a double mastectomy 
in 2013 and further preventative yet very invasive treatment (Jolie 2013; 2015). This high profile 
example shows what kind of choices the ‘pre-symptomatic ill’ (Wehling 2011, 234) are facing on the 
basis of genetic ‘truth’. This emerging “somatic ethics” (N. Rose 2008a) will be discussed in more 
detail in the next chapter. This notion of responsible conduct also highlights why these tests are in 
particular demand. 
33 These tests, of which Myriad is the sole provider after having enforced these patents against its 
competitors, cost up to 3000 dollars a piece (Pollack 2007). This very high price is the reason why the 
patent on BRCA 1 was only upheld within the EU in a limited form. The patent on BRCA 1 had been 
revoked there after an apparent unwillingness to offer licenses “at a reasonable price” had “angered the 
genetic community” according to Gert Matthijs from the Center for Human Genetics, University of 
Leuven, Belgium (quoted from Siva 2009, 8). 
34 For full text of 35 U.S.C. §101 see footnote above. 
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satisfy the requirements of §101” (ACLU v Myriad Genetics at p. 121). Crucially, he 
states “Myriad’s focus on the chemical nature of DNA (…) fails to acknowledge the 
unique characteristics of DNA that differentiate it from other chemical compounds” 
(at p. 122). Thus the usual analogy to chemical compounds without regard to the 
specific content of DNA is set aside, and DNA is for the first time seen as “a physical 
embodiment of information” (p. 125), whose “informational quality is unique among 
the chemical compounds found in our bodies” (p. 123). This leads to the finding that 
since the informational content is not changed in the process of isolation, the isolated 
genetic sequence is not “markedly different” to the sequence occurring in nature – and 
thus cannot be patented. 
This determination could have taken away the basis for all basic human gene 
patents registered in the US.35 However, in July 2011 the US Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit overturned the judgement in part, except where it came to method 
claims.36 With regards to the nature of the patentable material, this Court returned to 
the notion that “the challenged claims are drawn to patentable subject matter because 
the claims cover molecules that are markedly different (…) from molecules that exist 
in nature” (Association for Molecular Pathology et al. v. US Patent and Trademark 
Office et al., 2010-1406, at p. 41). “Isolated DNA is not purified DNA”, rather, “it has 
(…) been manipulated chemically so as to produce a molecule that is markedly 
different from that which exists in the body” (at p. 42). This re-instated the previous 
status quo and the focus on the chemical nature of the molecule, not the informational 
content.  
 
1.2.2. Myriad at the Supreme Court 
But in yet another surprising37 development, this judgement was partially overturned 
again by the US Supreme Court in 2013 in Association for Molecular Pathology, et 
                                                
35 For an impression of the discussion at the time see for example Morgan & Haile (2010), Hoffenberg 
(2010). 
36 The court followed the district court’s judgement and declared “Myriad’s method claims directed to 
“comparing” or “analyzing” DNA sequences” as ineligible patent matter, as they “cover only (…) 
abstract, mental steps” (at p. 8). But Myriad claims that it still retains “237 method claims for 
BRACAnalysis which were not affected by this ruling and remain in full force and effect” (Myriad 
Genetics Inc. 2011; 2013). 
37 Or maybe not so surprising after all – the US government supplied an amicus curiae brief to the 
proceedings in 2012, in which it was argued that “[s]ynthesized genetic materials such as cDNA 
molecules are patent-eligible subject matter, while isolated but otherwise unmodified genomic DNA is 
not” (US Department of Justice 2012; Pollack 2010). 
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al., Petitioners v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., et al. 569 U.S. 12-398 (2013). This court of 
the highest instance determined that 
 
“a naturally occurring DNA segment is a product of nature and not 
patent eligible merely because it has been isolated, but that cDNA is 
patent eligible because it is not naturally occurring” (Assoc. for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad (2013) p. 1).  
 
This distinction draws a very fine line between the isolated DNA sequence that was 
claimed in some of Myriad’s patents, and the sequence in complementary DNA 
(cDNA), which has to be synthetically created in the laboratory, and which was 
claimed in some of the other patents of Myriad. As this judgement sets out in detail, 
the Court of Appeals had in its judgement been divided on the rationale for 
patentability of isolated genetic sequences, but had all agreed on the patentability of 
cDNA (Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad (2013) p. 10). Judge Sweet of the 
District Court however had not seen this as a “marked difference” (Assoc. for 
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad (2013) p. 7). 
Regarding isolated sequences, the Supreme Court decided, with reference to 
the requirement of “markedly different characteristics from any found in nature” set 
out in the Chakrabarty case, that “[i]n this case, by contrast, Myriad did not create 
anything”, and that “[t]o be sure, it found an important and useful gene, but separating 
that gene from its surrounding genetic material is not an act of invention” (at p. 12). 
Most importantly, the Court brushed aside the previous understanding of genetic 
sequences as primarily chemical molecules. It argues  
 
“[n]or are Myriad’s claims saved by the fact that isolating DNA from 
the human genome severs chemical bonds and thereby creates a 
nonnaturally occurring molecule. Myriad’s claims are simply not 
expressed in terms of chemical composition, nor do they rely in any 
way on the chemical changes that result from the isolation of a 
particular section of DNA. Instead, the claims understandably focus on 
the genetic information encoded in the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes.” 
(Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad at p. 14)  
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This constitutes a dramatic turn away from previous practice, and marks the moment 
in which IP begins defining ‘life’ in informational terms. Information as the 
determining feature of the genetic code is now accepted as the central characteristic of 
the genetic sequence – containing a noticeably “scriptural element” (Kay 2000), as a 
DNA sequence is rendered in the format of a “sequence of the individual subunits 
(bases) of the nucleic acid that determines hereditary features” (Lewin 2004, 1) - 
these can be expressed in a written form, which is a pre-requisite for any potential 
application for IPRs. 
However, the judgement’s change towards the informational paradigm does 
not completely overturn the notion of markedly different man-made versions of DNA. 
The Court determined that cDNA “does not present the same obstacles to 
patentability as naturally occurring, isolated DNA segments” (at p. 16). It rather is an 
“exons-only molecule that is not naturally occurring” (Ibid.). Here, interestingly, the 
structure of the molecule is deemed to be the most significant aspect once again – and 
the sheer informational structure of the cDNA strand is not considered. This is 
contrary to the fact that “[t]he nucleotide sequence of cDNA is dictated by nature, not 
by the lab technician” (at p. 17) – as submissions argue “[t]hat may be so, but the lab 
technician unquestionably creates something new when cDNA is made” (Ibid.). The 
character of this ‘new something’ is not set out in detail, and it is acknowledged that 
due to the informational sequence being the same, “a short strand of cDNA may be 
indistinguishable from natural DNA” (Ibid.). The fact that the Supreme Court is 
maintaining this distinction shows that it is unwilling to follow the District Court’s 
complete turn towards the informational definition. Rather, the notion of a “marked 
difference” created by an inventive step is still upheld – and thus the patenting of 
some form of genetic information.  
 
2.  Law as one of the ‘multiform tactics of government’: Maintaining IP while 
accommodating informational-genetic conceptions of life  
Rather than enabling further instances of commodification, the Myriad decision’s 
changed view of the ‘truth’ about life is attempting to reconcile the informational 
understanding of the genetic code with a continued existence of IPRs on information 
derived from human genetic materials. The result is a compromise predicated on an 
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enduring finding of “marked difference” between cDNA and isolated DNA. This 
rendered some of Myriad Genetics’ patent claims void, however, it also held up 
others. This chapter argues that this accommodation shows that the Court is 
navigating the overwhelming scientific and social influence of an informational-
genetic conception of life (the ‘genetic dispositif’) while at the same time seeking to 
maintain IPRs as a tool for the bioeconomy, and for the normalisation of knowledge. 
In responding to the challenge of the move of knowledge over life onto the genetic 
level, law as a “tactics” of government is re-adjusting the “right disposition of things” 
(Foucault 2000, 208). At stake in this adjustment is nothing less than the continued 
existence of the IP regime in the area of genetic materials, and its important functions 
regarding the maintenance of a central canon of knowledge (see this chapter), and as 
an area of expert knowledge enabling the conduct of “governing at a distance” (Miller 
and Rose 2008, see next chapter). Knowledge is crucial for governing according to 
the right disposition of things, and the change towards the informational-genetic 
conception of life intensified the utility of knowledge of “the nature of things” 
(Foucault 2008, 28) by seamlessly integrating knowledge of the individual with that 
of the population, and also – through the medium of information - with further use in 
the bioeconomy.  
 
2.1. Governing the normalisation of technical knowledge 
Foucault’s account of the emergence of the new art of governing emphasized the 
central role of scientific method and medical knowledge, in particular with regards to 
strategies aimed at the fostering of life and health of the population. These “include 
forecasts, statistical estimates, and overall measures” and involve “a set of processes 
such as the ratio of births to deaths, the rate of reproduction, the fertility of a 
population, and so on” (Foucault 1997, 243 and 246). These sources of information 
then gave rise to potential biopolitical strategies. Initially this knowledge was 
gathered from observations of individuals, compiled in an “apparatus of writing” and 
analysed according to a new comparative system “that made possible the 
measurement of overall phenomena, […] the calculation of the gaps between 
individuals, their distribution in a given ‘population’” (Foucault 1977, 190). The 
notion of a “population” for the purposes of governing could only emerge as a result 
of this collection of individual cases.  
 109 
Knowledge is thus one of the central factors that ensure the appropriate 
operation of government. Foucault points out “[t]he constitution of knowledge 
[savoir] of government is absolutely inseparable from that of a knowledge of all the 
processes related to population in its larger sense – that is, what we now call the 
economy” (Foucault 2000, 217). This points to a contingency of ‘truth’ upon 
measurements of processes in the population – identifying “the nature of things”, and 
upon an economic way of governing – determined by “the question of the too much 
and the too little” of governmental intervention (Foucault 2008, 28). However, 
Foucault asks “[h]ow can the phenomena of ‘population’, with its specific effects and 
problems, be taken into account in a system concerned about respect for legal subjects 
and individual fee enterprise?” (Ibid., 317, quoted also in Dean 2010). A fault line of 
potential conflict thus runs between the notion of “political economy” and governing 
for “the optimization of the life of the population” according to the nature of things 
(Dean 2010, 120). This underlying tension between priorities of governing is 
governed by laws in the mode of a responsive “tactics” of governing (Foucault 2000, 
211), navigating demands made on the basis of technical knowledge while also still 
ensuring the economy (i.e. appropriateness in economic terms) of this disposition of 
things. 
This perspective sheds new light on the uneasy compromise in the Myriad 
decision, reinterpreting it as the product of a confluence of two different dynamics 
prioritising on the one hand the continued existence of IPRs on knowledge derived 
from human genetic materials, and on the other hand seeking to contribute to the 
normalization of the genetic-informational conception of life. In managing this 
tension, IP law is becoming governmentalised. Previously, “the life/nature-is-nothing-
more-than-chemistry argument” (Carolan 2010, 117) effectively “closed down” 
debates about the patenting of genetic sequences, and settled definitional arguments 
as predominantly “technical” issues (Calvert and Joly 2011, 13 f.). In this, patent law 
provided specific rules that enabled the patenting of genetic sequences, and turned 
these otherwise “fuzzy and uncertain objects” into tradeable entities (Ibid., 16). Genes 
are fundamentally “uncertain” and hybrid objects, as they “[consist] not in a structure 
but in the process that ‘expresses’ or actualises a given molecular strand” (Pottage 
1998, 747). As long as IP law provided clear patentability criteria for these objects, it 
succeeded in normalising an understanding of DNA that ‘governed’ for the market. 
However, the Myriad judgement’s turn complicated this function considerably, and 
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showed that the adoption of the informational-genetic paradigm causes tensions that 
could seriously overstretch IP law’s parameters. 
The Myriad decision reflects the emergence of a new scientific paradigm. 
Changing paradigms of (scientific) knowledge are closely connected to changes in 
paradigms of governance (Foucault 1970). Within a paradigm38 of knowledge, an 
apparatus or a dispositif of knowledge connects the various sites of decision-making 
at the macro and micro level of governing, containing a particular constellation or 
congruency of understandings of “labour, life, language” (Ibid., 250 ff.) – a shared 
basic epistemology39 making the development of sciences like biology, economics, 
and linguistics possible. These elements contain an epistemology that shaped for 
example the modern system – and within this system, knowledge derived in 
accordance with this epistemology needs to be seen as a central concern of power 
relations, or “power-knowledge”. Information science has emerged as the 
predominant paradigm of the twenty-first century and given rise to a dispositif that 
connects the life sciences with computer science and the economy. 
Within this paradigm, technical scientific knowledge needs to be understood 
as “power-knowledge”, which is the result of a deeply politicized process of 
contestations between different forms of knowledge. 40  A normalised canon of 
scientific knowledge is a result of a struggle between different forms of knowledge, 
and is constantly threatened by “insurrections” of other formerly “disqualified” or 
marginalised knowledges (Foucault 1997, 9). Here, a battle “not […] between 
knowledge and ignorance, but an immense and multiple battle between knowledges in 
the plural [took place] – knowledges that are in conflict because of their very 
morphology, because they are in the possession of enemies, and because they have 
intrinsic power-effects” (Ibid., 179, emphasis added). These power effects, especially 
on the level of control and ownership of knowledge, are founded “in a society where 
knowing the secret behind technological knowledge was a source of wealth” (Ibid.). 
IPRs are thus immersed in a political sphere at the intersection of economic governing 
and the determination of the nature of things, at the centre of “an immense struggle 
over the economic inductions and power-effects that were bound up with the 
                                                
38 For the notion of the paradigm see Agamben (2009b). This overarching notion of a paradigm of 
knowledge is not to be confused with science, as Deleuze points out (2006, 44). 
39 Deleuze highlights the centrality of this episteme: “Present or past, the visible is like the articulable: 
they are the object not of a phenomenology, but of an epistemology” (2006, 44). 
40 On the general political dimension of the natural sciences see for example amongst others Latour 
(1987), Jasanoff (2004; 2005). 
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exclusive ownership of a knowledge, its dispersal and its secret” (Ibid., 180, emphasis 
added). 
IP fulfils different functions within these struggles between competing 
knowledges. It establishes control over knowledge and research agendas, and 
enshrines a particular ‘normalised’ version of scientific truth in an officially 
recognised instrument such as a patent – assigning and amplifying science’s “intrinsic 
power-effects”. The Myriad decision’s turn towards an informational-genetic 
conception of DNA can be interpreted as a continued fulfilment of these important 
functions of the IP regime, which go beyond the sheer commodification of DNA 
sequences. Instead of prioritising patentability, the decision inscribed or normalised 
the informational-genetic paradigm in IP law, thus conferring power-effects on this 
type of knowledge. It contributes to the governing of ‘life’ by further normalising the 
genetic dispositif. As already pointed out in the previous chapter, genetic knowledge 
seamlessly integrates knowledge over the individual and the population within one 
code. The knowledge and ownership of this code is thus a particularly significant 
power-effect, crucial for questions of research projects, grants, publications, 
assessments of profitability, and also for personal insurance, questions of identities, 
and personal life choices. In the process of this normalisation, IP law also 
marginalises other competing understandings of life and the role of DNA, such as 
epigenetics and systems biology (see below). In this way, IP promotes research 
agendas that generate a type of ‘predictable’ knowledge over life. 
 
2.2. Governing science: The central dogma and the making of the ‘genetic dispositif’ 
The life science’s turn towards an informational-genetic understanding of life was not 
purely coincidental, as Kay points out. Kay’s study on the emergence of the DNA 
code as the paradigm for scientific research shows in detail how a change of ‘truth’ 
over life came about as a series of political decisions. After the Second World War, a 
research programme focussing on a “molecular vision of life” (i.e. the establishment 
of the discipline of molecular biology) was heavily promoted by institutions such as 
the Rockefeller Foundation and the California Institute of Technology (Kay 1993; see 
also H. Rose and Rose 2012; Yoxen 1981, 91). This molecular vision of life then 
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morphed into the genomic vision of life, as the informational paradigm41 colonised the 
biological and biochemical sciences. Importantly, the Rockefeller Foundation’s 
“Science of Man”42 agenda (Weaver 1933) went beyond the immediate scientific 
context from the beginning and confidently aimed at becoming a comprehensive new 
vision of life in the sense of a dispositif:  
 
“The motivation behind the enormous investment in the new agenda 
was to develop the human sciences as a comprehensive explanatory 
and applied framework of social control grounded in the natural, 
medical, and social sciences. Conceived during the late 1920s, the new 
agenda was articulated in terms of the contemporary technocratic 
discourse of human engineering, aiming toward an endpoint of 
restructuring human relations in congruence with the social framework 
of industrial capitalism. […] Within that agenda, the new biology 
(originally named “psychobiology”) was erected on the bedrock of the 
physical sciences in order to rigorously explain and eventually control 
the fundamental mechanisms governing human behavior, placing a 
particularly strong emphasis on heredity.” (Kay 1993, 8) 
 
This shows the breadth of this agenda, which had far-reaching effects beyond the 
scientific sector.43 Kay sets out the historical background of the molecular biology 
programme supported by financial backing first from the Rockefeller Foundation, 
then the US military, and finally from the National Institute of Health (NIH) (Ibid., 8 
and 9). Francis Crick’s “central dogma” of the unidirectional mechanism of “DNA 
makes RNA makes protein makes us” dominated this scientific programme for most 
of the twentieth century (Crick 1970; the term “dogma” proved controversial but 
illustrates the ambition of this specific interpretation of DNA, see Crick 1990, 109; H. 
Rose and Rose 2012, 31). However, while it still enjoys virtually unchallenged 
                                                
41 The molecularization of ‘life’ entailed also an informationalisation of the content of life, in which 
the basic content of ‘information’ is conceived of in a “thoroughly quantitative and statistical” way 
(Thacker 2005a, 97; 2005b; 2009; see also Dillon and Reid 2009, chapter 4). 
42 See for example Warren Weaver’s founding document Science of Man, which states for example the 
“conviction that discoverable laws govern the basic physiological and mental activities of man”, 
meaning that a wide range of human behaviour no longer was “outside the range of rational analysis” 
(Weaver 1933). 
43 Kay argues for the understanding of “the human sciences as a comprehensive explanatory and 
applied framework of social control grounded in the natural, medical, and social sciences” (1993, 8). 
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acceptance in the cultural sphere, its predominance is increasingly coming under 
attack in the scientific sector, as the end of this chapter will set out.  
Advances in the information sciences44 were central to the development of the 
informational-genetic conception of life (and the ‘genetic dispositif’). The abstract, 
“disembodied” conception of information made the definition of the qualitative 
content of life effectively lose its connection to the physical world and became “one 
of the major assumptions behind the gradual “encoding” of genetics during the same 
period” (Thacker 2005a, 98). Kay highlights the scriptural element of this code 
(reminiscent of the apparatus of writing establishing the corpus of statistical 
knowledge of populations of the 19th century) and states “this view of the genome as 
information system, a linguistic text written in DNA code, has been guiding theories 
and practices of molecular biologists since the 1950s” (Kay 2000, xv; also Nelkin and 
Lindee 1995). In this “[genetic] reductionist framework what is of greatest value is 
the code”, Thacker argues, and “this relationship between DNA, database, and value 
is made more concrete in commercial genome databases […] as well as in the U.S. 
PTO database categories containing patents on genes and gene-related compounds” 
(Thacker 2005a, 101 f.). IP law thus concretises the informational content of life, and 
acts as a depository of the disembodied genetic code. 
This ‘informationalised’ abstract scriptural notion of life traversed the 
boundaries of biology and economy, giving rise to ‘value’ that can be circulated in the 
bioeconomy. IPRs are crucial for both defining the monopolistic knowledge-object 
that can be circulated, and also for the accruement of value on the basis of licensing 
fees and monopolies in the market. But IP law also became immersed in a wider 
political project outside of science and the economy. The “Science of Man” vision of 
life became a very successful determining force in identity formation, a formidable 
point of reference for definition of a new somatic ethics (N. Rose 2008a) 45 
determining the parameters of ‘responsible’ healthy living of individuals and 
populations, and the gene became a “cultural icon” (Nelkin and Lindee 1995) in its 
own right. A genetic dispositif emerged that contained an all-encompassing genetic 
                                                
44 For an interesting and comprehensive account of the advances in the information sciences and the 
connection to the life sciences, see Dillon & Reid (2009), Chapter 4, ‘Informationalizing Life’. 
45 For the rights and responsibilities arising in this new somatic ethics, see next chapter. An example 
would be new responsibilities for healthy living according to ones’ genetic risk profile established by a 
personal genomic scan. Another responsibility, which will be explored in the next chapter, is the 
increasing pressure to contribute to research by donating materials and information – as a ‘responsible’ 
patient. 
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reductionist account of the essence of life in the scientific sector and in the cultural 
realm, promoted by its abstract informational promiscuity.  
Cooper argues that the connection between the emergence of the 
informationalised life science sector and neoliberal economy was especially 
productive, leading to a huge influx of venture capital (Cooper 2008) and increasing 
the dominance of the genetic-molecular vision of life. This connection has also been 
noted by other scholars (for example N. Rose 2007b; Dillon and Lobo-Guerrero 2008; 
2009). The connection between informational-genetic accounts of life and the 
circulation of this information in the economy has been one of the distinguishing 
features in the “neoliberal revolution” as Cooper points out (Cooper 2008, 3). She 
understands neoliberalism as a qualitatively different stage of governmental and 
economic development to that of liberalism, in which an intensified emphasis on 
financialisation and an enhancement of societal differences are the result of the 
limitation of the state’s role to the construction and maintenance of the financial 
markets and the conditions for trade within it.  
She describes this process as an “ever-tighter alliance between state-funded 
research, the market in new technologies, and financial capital” (Ibid.), and argues  
 
“the very value of knowledge […] is the result of a quite deliberate 
self-transformation of the U.S. economy and that of its allies, one that 
was pursued through the international organizations created in the 
post-World War II era, but with the ultimate effect of entirely 
redefining the landscape of world trade and imperialism.” (Ibid., 57)  
 
The effect of this strategy was very noticeable: “[i]n the United States in particular 
these interventions had a resounding effect on the life sciences. […] The project of 
U.S. neoliberalism, I argue […], is crucially concerned with the emergent possibilities 
of the life sciences and related disciplines” (Ibid., 3). 
IP law acted as a central method for the financialisation of life’s potentiality in 
neoliberalism’s “ever-tighter alliance” between knowledge, the market, and capital. It 
thus worked for the market – but it also contributed to the structuring of the biotech 
sector and the promotion of certain research agendas over others. This introduced IP 
law to the informational-genetic conception of DNA – which resulted in the inevitable 
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adoption of the genetic-informational conception of life in the Myriad decision, even 
at the expense of some categories of patentability of isolated genetic sequences. But 
Myriad’s uneasy compromise ensuring the continued patentability of some genetic 
sequences also highlights the persisting relevance of IP for the creation of ‘value’ 
from life in the economy. It is argued in the last section of this chapter that IP’s 
relationship with knowledge goes beyond this creation of value, encompassing the 
promotion of one form of scientific knowledge over other competing accounts of life.  
Rouvroy finds that “[g]enetic reductionism is encouraged by the patentability 
of genes and gene sequences” (Rouvroy 2008, 41). This draws attention to the way in 
which IPRs act as an economic device that promotes the predominance and 
normalisation of genetic truth discourses, encouraged by the criteria of patentability. 
However, it neglects to point out that this patentability relied on a chemical-molecular 
understanding of genetics in IP law, and that this patentability was recently limited in 
the Myriad decision. This not only endangered value creation but also IP’s 
contribution to the normalisation of an accepted canon of knowledge based on a 
predominant scientific paradigm. Genetic reductionism according to the “central 
dogma” understands the genetic code’s function as the determining force within the 
organism instead of allowing for more complex interactions with environmental 
factors. This produces relatively predictable and stable accounts of the body and 
illness on the basis of the genetic code. A focus on the promotion of predictable 
knowledge and its connection to patentability highlights another facet of the Myriad 
decision: it continued to maintain some form of gene patents in the face of competing, 
more complex accounts of life – which would pose more serious problems for 
patentability and for questions of governing.  
 
3. Competing Knowledges: Systemic Biology, Epigenetics and Synthetic Biology 
The genetic-informational conception of life’s challenge to the IP regime is 
highlighted even more when competing scientific accounts of life are considered. The 
recent developments in the Myriad case appear strangely out of step with 
developments in research paradigms of the life sciences. Here, a turn away from the 
reductionist genetic paradigm has taken place over the last twenty years (see for 
example Lock and Nguyen 2010, 330 ff., Lock 2005; H. Rose and Rose 2012; 
Landecker 2011; Braun 2007). Conceptions of life emphasising more complex 
interactions of genetic predispositions and the environment are becoming more 
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influential, as genetic determinism failed to fulfill the high expectations that it initially 
raised.  
In particular, epigenetics and systems biology are competing ‘truths’ over life, 
which are undermining the predominance of the genetic determinist’ view in a power 
struggle between knowledges. The IP system cannot connect to these complex notions 
in the same way as to the genetic-reductionist paradigm – which was given “economic 
strength” in particular by the IP system’s previous chemical-molecular definition of 
genetics. It is argued that the delayed turn towards the informational-genetic view 
weakened this strength, while other scientific conceptions emphasising ‘complexity’ 
would certainly reduce it even more. While the patenting of aspects of genetic 
interactions (for example biomarkers, SNPs, HAPs) has been on the rise, there are 
some indications that the patenting of genetic sequences alone has been declining (see 
for example Mills and Tereskerz 2011, 712; Hopkins et al. 2007; Gaisser et al. 2009). 
The patenting of complex post-genomic interactions cannot be achieved in the same 
way, as this section explains. IP’s problematic relation to more complex accounts of 
life thus highlights the power exercised in the field of knowledge by the Myriad 
judgement’s turn to an informational-genetic concept, preferring and further 
normalising one ‘truth’ over other competing scientific knowledges. 
 
3.1. New (old) truths: Systemic Biology and Epigenetics 
IP law has only recently adopted the informational-genetic dispositif, which had been 
the determining force of developments over the course of the 20th century. However, 
in the life sciences, Francis Crick’s “central dogma” of the unidirectional mechanism 
of “DNA makes RNA makes protein makes us” (H. Rose and Rose 2012, 31) has 
been increasingly called into question. A recent resurgence of different approaches to 
life can be traced back to other fields of research that were side-lined when funding 
focused on the establishment of molecular biology by the Rockefeller Institute and 
other funding institutions (Kay 1993; 2000; H. Rose and Rose 2012, 66). This 
paradigm of molecular biology was promoted over and above any other contemporary 
scientific discourses, and drew funding away from competing programmes such as 
systems biology, which “was dealt a devastating blow when the Rockefeller 
Foundation, committed to a reductionist approach, rejected their proposal for a 
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research institute in Cambridge […] in favour of a major investment in what was to 
become molecular biology” (H. Rose and Rose, Ibid., 66). 
Recently, systems biology has again drawn attention away from the ‘blueprint’ 
of life and focused instead on the overwhelming importance of complex interactions 
between biological systems and their environment. According to this school of 
thought, the potential for disease contained in the DNA code does not necessarily 
manifest itself in any case, only in particular circumstances – often depending on 
wider systemic factors. Rose finds that as “[a] genetic style of thought is giving way 
to a postgenomic emphasis on complexities (….) informational epistemologies seem 
to have reached their limit” (N. Rose 2007b, 47). Similarly, the field of epigenetics 
looks beyond the genetic code towards interactions with environmental factors for 
explanations of the emergence of particular conditions. Here,  
 
“[g]enes are no longer thought of as acting independently but rather in 
constant interaction both with each other and with the multiple levels 
of the environment in which they are embedded. […] DNA is no 
longer seen as an ‘informational macromolecule’ controlling the cell 
but rather as part of the web of molecules and their interactions that the 
cell employs during development.” (H. Rose and Rose 2012, 73; see 
also McAfee 2003, 204 f.)46 
 
The (re)emergence of epigenetics highlights the underlying assumptions built into the 
reductionist view of genetics. Rosenow terms this the “‘static-linear’ instead of 
‘complex-dynamic’ understanding of life”, which “is inextricably bound to a 
particular episteme that assumes the sovereignty of the subject and the latter’s control 
over the world as object, and that is deeply at odds with the episteme that is advanced 
in significant strands of scientific complexity theory” (Rosenow 2012, 532; see also 
Wynne 2005, 70).47 Braun also points to assumptions of control and sovereignty on 
the level of the bounded individual body containing molecular information. He 
                                                
46 For an introduction to epigenetics read for example: Carey (2012), Lewontin (2000); on the 
implications of epigenetics for our understanding of such commonplace things such as ‘food’ and the 
developmental origins of health and disease, see Landecker, who sets out a move away from 
understanding food in terms of energetical “conversion of matter” to “food as a form of molecular 
exposure” or food as “environment” (2011, 167). 
47 Rosenow focuses on the intersection of genetic conceptions of life and the biopolitical aim of 
securing the life and health of populations. 
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contrasts this view with that of the “post-genomic body” immersed in “a global 
economy of exchange and circulation, where the body is thrown into a chaotic and 
unpredictable molecular world filled with emergent yet unspecifiable risks” (Braun 
2007, 7). 
The informational-genetic conception of life thus accentuates predictability 
and control instead of focusing on the unpredictability and complexity characteristic 
of a novel and experimental research agenda (see Wynne 2005, 69). In the field of 
agriculture, studies conducted on the performance of transgenic crops provide an 
example of this imprecision and unpredictability, finding “patterns of mediocre and 
inconsistent crop performance and unpredicted effects that contrasts with the 
idealized image of agricultural genetic engineering as capable of increasing food 
production in an exact, ecologically safe, and economically sustainable manner” 
(McAfee 2003, 207). McAfee states that “[o]nly a narrowly molecular-genetic 
reductionist view, in which organisms are advanced Cartesian machines that can be 
understood by calculating the total of reactions among their molecules and atoms, 
would lead one to expect anything else” (Ibid., 209). 
IP’s normalised scientific accounts emphasise predictability and control – in 
line with the IP regime’s need for stable patentable objects. Here, reductionist 
“negotiations” and processes of abstraction give rise to an “apparently stable object” 
(Calvert 2008, 385), thus concealing an inherent ambiguity of genetic conceptions of 
life (Pellizzoni 2011; Carolan 2008; 2010; Rosenow 2012, 534; McAfee 2003; 
Pottage 1998). Carolan points out “[t]here are no purified sequences of DNA in the 
world of genetic testing; no isolated protein-encoding DNA sequences in a field of 
engineered canola plants” (Carolan 2010, 122, he refers to the infamous Monsanto 
cases). Without the mental processes of abstraction needed to imagine the existence of 
isolated DNA sequences in a living plant in a field, patent enforcement against 
farmers’ use of seed material would be impossible. This “interpretive flexibility” is 
necessary for the maintenance of IP claims, however, “too much flexibility would 
[…] threaten the patent regime” (Ibid.).  
IPRs on human genetic materials thus exert power through a “double 
reductionism” (McAfee 2003, 203), reducing scientific accounts of life to genetic 
code, and reducing the interactions and uncertainties contained in this evolving field 
of research to stable and predictable objects that can be traded in the economy. 
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Importantly, the Myriad decision maintains both these reductionist conceptions. 
Despite the limitation of patentability incurred by a turn towards informational-
genetic conceptions of DNA, Myriad still continues the normalisation of genetic 
reductionist knowledge. In this way, the Myriad compromise governs scientific 
research paradigms in a way that supports the market and provides predictable 
knowledge for questions of governing life by preferring informational-reductionist 
knowledges to competing complex accounts. An opening towards more complex 
understandings of life could have profoundly unsettling effects on IP, resulting in a 
loss of stable and easily definable patentable entities – which would be even more 
difficult to negotiate and significantly complicate the circulation of value in the 
economy and the strategic use of genetic knowledge for the governing of life.  
 
3.2. Managing complexity: Biotech patents in danger? 
There are definite limits to the IP regime’s potential for accommodating flexibility 
and complexity. Calvert analysed patents in the area of systems biology in 
comparison to the more traditional ‘gene patent’, finding that systems biology mainly 
relies on “computational techniques”, without which “the interactions between 
biological molecules and the networks that result are far too complex to be analysed” 
(Calvert 2008, 386). In this area, Calvert has identified only two potential emerging 
strategies of patenting: “patents on networks of interacting molecules” which “have 
given rise to concern that patenting a whole system or network could have negative 
consequences for further research” and “patents […] on computer-based models of 
biological systems […] attempting to simulate disease and drug action in silico” 
(Ibid., 389 f., emphasis in original). 
The IP regime is more successful in the broader area of synthetic biology, 
which for example “[tests] the models in systems biology by trying to build them as 
functioning biological systems” akin to “an engineering discipline” (Ibid., 391). 
Patents are issued on “complicated constructed networks and systems” but also on 
“functional and interchangeable parts (called ‘biobricks’)”, which “often make a point 
of articulating their open source aspirations […] not least because they explicitly 
attempt to make synthetic biology more similar to software code, which is modular, 
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standardized and re-usable” (Ibid., 392). 48 This shows an increasing convergence of 
IP in the life sciences with software IP49 discourse, further enabled by the recent turn 
towards informational conceptions of ‘life’ in IP law. Thus Myriad’s turn towards 
information can be understood as intensifying the integration of several scientific 
fields, with potentially productive results for the economy – but also producing more 
tensions and possible challenges. The adoption of information as the central paradigm 
in this way contributes to the integration (or “flattening”) of “transnational circuits”: 
“[constructing] one of those level playing fields, in which standardized intellectual 
property regimes, forms of ethical governance, standards and regulations, and 
information allow distinct and widely separated economic actors to trade with one 
another” (N. Rose 2008a, 46). 
The Myriad decision can thus be read as a significant power exercise that 
deepens economic exchange between different sectors of knowledge production and 
maintains the production of predictable accounts of life for the purposes of governing 
populations and individuals. However, this intensified integration and ‘flattening’ of 
circuits by rendering life in terms of information also leads to an intensification of 
reciprocal effects between information and the political sphere of life. Dillon and Reid 
argue that increased interconnections between information and life work to 
“(neo)liberalise” life, and “vitalise” order, thus increasing the influence of the politics 
of life and health on the economic and governmental order – and conversely, also 
increasing the influence of economic concerns on the politics of life (Dillon and Reid 
2009, 21). This highlights the subversive potential of this integration, creating new 
pressures on existing regimes such as IP law to account for life and health of 
individuals and populations. At the same time, considerations of life and health are 
tied even more closely to an economic calculus, reinforcing a “cost-benefit” relation 
(see detailed explanation in Elbe 2009, 67).  
This increased integration does however have the potential to significantly 
alter the relation of IP to conceptions of life. As information as such cannot be 
patented, an increase in complexity or increasing informationalisation could entail a 
future turn towards different forms of IP, such as copyright, method patents, and trade 
                                                
48 However, even open source agreements are a form of IP, as Calvert points out - they really are an 
open license. 
49 The potential for patents in the field of computer software is dwarfed by the issue of copyright. 
However, software patents are also possible. The “open source” movement is also much more 
influential in the software sector. 
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secrets. At the current juncture most of the actual transactions within the bioeconomy 
still rely on traditional reductionist representations of genomic science, as Rosenow 
points out (2012, 533). The Myriad judgement maintained this traditional paradigm in 
the patentability of cDNA, but nonetheless also directed future adjustments of the IP 
regime towards an informational definition of life, which may be more suitable for 
other forms of IP than the gene patent. This may cause changes in the use of IP, but 
also represents a complex process of accommodation of the IP system towards 
informational-genetic accounts of life – instead of an invalidation of IPRs by an 
opening towards more complex conceptions. This shows how the IP regime, by 
endorsing an informational conception, continued to exercise its role in the 
normalisation of predominant paradigms of knowledge. It continues to confer power-
effects on an economically useful form of scientific knowledge, which very 
effectively traverses the field of science towards the economy and governmental 
decisions, integrating knowledge of the individual and the population within one 
code. This highly ‘economic’ form of knowledge is elevated by means of IPRs over 
more complex conceptions, which would be more difficult to integrate. While 
complexity is thus being kept at bay, IPRs continue to produce the certainty needed 
for economic circulation and decisions made on the proper governing of populations. 
 
Conclusion 
IP’s conception of life is undergoing change – but not for the purpose of an increased 
patentability of life. This chapter argued that a governmental perspective could show 
how changes in IP’s understanding of life from a chemical-molecular to an 
informational-genetic paradigm are triggered by the overwhelming influence of a 
genetic dispositif permeating the scientific and cultural domain. In response to this 
powerful influence, the Myriad judgement adjusted the IP system’s view of life 
towards the informational-genetic conception – while also ensuring the continued 
patentability of certain isolated forms of human genetic sequences (cDNA) by arguing 
that this still constitutes a ‘markedly different’ man-made substance, not 
predominantly determined by its informational content. This uneasy compromise 
accommodated the tension between the informational-genetic paradigm and the need 
to maintain patentability of some genetic sequences. In this way, IP jurisdiction 
became a tactics of governing for establishing the right disposition of things, 
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governing for the market and at the same time also contributing to the further 
normalisation of informational-genetic conceptions of life.  
Normalised scientific knowledge is fundamental to a new art of governing. A 
governmental reading can emphasise IP’s important role in bestowing ‘power effects’ 
on the predominant scientific paradigm, thus elevating it over other competing 
concepts. The Myriad decision also reveals the continued function of this normalising 
power contained in IPRs. By endorsing the informational-genetic paradigm, IPRs 
reduced patentability of genetic sequences in some contexts, but also pre-empted a 
move towards more complex accounts of life. This normalisation of informational 
concepts also governs for the market, in which clearly defined informational-genetic 
sequences can be more easily circulated than complex notions such as systems 
biology’s interactions or epigenetics’ contingent gene expressions. As the next 
chapter shows, this normalised genetic scientific knowledge has very profound 
implications for the identities of individuals, which are now governed with reference 
to this ‘truth’. A new “somatic ethics” (N. Rose 2008a) takes shape around this truth, 
and individuals define their identity increasingly with reference to it. This new 
identity can also give rise to claims for access to the best treatment, or for greater 
participation in the use of IPRs. The influence of these new “genetic” subjects is 
already evident in the range of complainants and the kind of complaints brought 
against Myriad,50 showing a growing concern with the ways in which IPRs are 
limiting the provision of healthcare, enabling or preventing the availability of tests 
and the communication of test results. This challenge to IP’s relation to life will be 
analysed in the next chapter. 
 
 
 
                                                
50 Despite a wide range of claimants bringing the Myriad case to the level of the Supreme Court, only 
one claimant (Dr. Ostrer) was in the end decided to have legal standing in this IP dispute. This shows 
how IPRs continue to operate as a regime for exclusion in the Myriad case, as the next two chapters 
argue. 
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Chapter V Intellectual Property as a Regime for Exclusion – The 
challenge of ‘genetic subjects’ 
 
“My objective [...] has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our 
culture, human beings are made subjects.” (Foucault 2000, 326) 
 
The informational-genetic conception of life has had a pervasive influence on life 
beyond the immediate context of research and competition between scientific 
paradigms. On the level of the subject, it has given rise to “a new way of knowing 
yourself, apparently both enabling and obliging you to take control of your own 
biomedical destiny” (N. Rose 2008b, 424). As the last chapter already illustrated, the 
comprehensive influence of the genetic dispositif is giving rise to challenges to the IP 
regime’s relation to knowledge. This chapter takes the analysis of contestations 
around IPRs’ relation to genetic conceptions of life to the level of the subject. As 
access and control over genetic knowledge is becoming more fundamental to the 
formation of identities, subjects are increasingly encountering the IP regime as a 
limitation to their demands. These increasingly “active subjects” (Foucault 2000, 
341), incited to assume responsibility for their health, are challenging the exclusion 
from the decision-making procedure where it comes to ‘their’ genetic conditions. In 
the case of PXE International, they are even patenting their condition. This 
counterintuitive use of IP against commercial aims, but rather for more altruistic 
control over research agendas has given rise to new IP strategies used by medical 
research charities in the national context and public-private-partnerships (PPPs) acting 
internationally.  
 This chapter proposes an analysis of IP’s role in their encounter with “genetic 
citizens” (N. Rose 2007b; Heath, Rapp, and Taussig 2004), which connects patients’ 
demands for new forms of participation with new responsibilities encouraging 
individuals to donate their tissue and their medical information to research projects. 
At this intersection of the individual and the bioeconomy, it is argued, IPRs govern 
the use of genetic knowledge by maintaining the exclusion of active patients’ 
influence from the bioeconomy and from exercising control over research 
programmes. A closer look at the distribution of rights and responsibilities in a “new 
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somatic ethics” based on genetic conceptions of life (N. Rose 2008a) shows how 
challenges to the exclusionary function of IPRs are being contained in a process of 
accommodation emphasising the contribution to research without granting greater 
influence on research agendas. This exclusion is also taking place in international 
debates on IP’s relation to global health programmes and to donors of genetic 
materials (see next chapter). However, as alternatives to IP are discussed in both 
contexts, this regime for exclusion may not succeed in the long run.  
 
1. Patent Holders vs. Consumers – Challenging IP’s divisions  
The IP system institutes a stark division between IP holders and consumers. It is 
usually only influenced by and developed further in specialist deliberations, which 
recognise in particular the opinions of national governments, representatives of 
international organisations, and pharmaceutical industry (on complex positions and 
conflicts in the industry, see Roemer-Mahler 2013). The individual is only afforded 
the option of being a patent holder or a consumer, as a license taker or the consumer 
of the end product. Patients or donors of genetic material are not usually considered in 
IP law.51 Their contribution to patents on genetic information typically ends with the 
donation of materials and information, as the case of biobanks shows: here, control 
over the range of license takers and thus over who can use genetic information 
derived from the donations is not within the remit of the patient’s or donor’s power. 
But cases such as PXE International show how patients with specific genetic 
conditions are increasingly contesting this division by for example becoming both 
patent holders and patients. This growing influence of patients is also recognised by 
the biotech industry, which relied on patients as advocates for the ‘No Patents, No 
Cure’ campaign in favour of the EU’s Biotech Directive on the patentability of 
genetic information.  
At the same time, patients are increasingly encouraged to contribute to 
‘research’ by donating tissue (see below), which creates new responsibilities and 
draws further attention to the lack of influence on the type of research being 
conducted these samples. This situation is only directly addressed by projects of 
citizens’ science. The uBiome biobank project for example promises a “revolution” 
                                                
51 Only the EU Biotech Directive mentions a range of different subjects in its preamble, such as donors 
of genetic material and farmers. 
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by opening up decisions on experiments.52 This section gives a brief overview of 
challenges to the entrenched division between patent holders and patients, 
highlighting how patients have begun to use IPRs to exert control over the type of 
research done with the genetic material and information. The example of PXE 
International shows how an under-researched condition gave rise to an initiative of 
patients acting as patent holders, patenting the genetic sequence of their condition 
(pseudoxanthoma elasticum, or PXE) and thus exerting control over the research 
agenda in this very specific area. However, this approach only overcomes the 
exclusion of the individual from the ‘professional’ realm of patent holders and 
researchers by joining them – which is only possible in an economic context where 
the patients in question have the financial means to take out a patent in the first 
place.53  But PXE International and the example of Medical Research Charities 
(MRCs) illustrate a different use of IPRs. These entities prioritise different areas and 
methods of research to those chosen by the industry’s research and development 
(R&D) model, highlighting that IP’s confrontation with genetic subjects could not 
only challenge the parameters of IP’s participatory process, but also give rise to 
entirely different approaches to the financing of R&D. 
 
1.1. IP holders and consumers/patients – The subjects of the IP regime 
IP law’s general view of patients and donors of genetic materials is one of 
fundamental disconnection. This has been made remarkably clear in the landmark 
case of John Moore v Board of Regents of the University of California (1990) 51 Cal. 
3d 120; 793P.2d 47954. John Moore underwent treatment for hairy cell leukaemia 
including the removal of his spleen, after which cancer cells from the spleen were 
developed into cell lines and patented by his doctors without his knowledge. Between 
1976 and 1983 he was repeatedly asked to return to the hospital for further tests, and 
each time provided further samples of blood serum, skin, bone marrow and sperm – 
                                                
52 They promise: “We’ll also crowdsource our research questions: you will be able to design your own 
experiments” (uBiome 2013). 
53 This also shows that ‘biological citizenship’ can only really occur in a certain economic and 
geographical contexts. On the international level for example the argument of ‘market failure’ seeks to 
address international economic and health inequality, as the next chapter will point out. Selmeczi 
(2009) points out that biopolitical notions always already contain an element of abandonment, as the 
concept of the ‘population’ always excludes segments of society, especially on the international level. 
About general problems incurred in ‘upscaling’ Foucault’s ideas to the international, see debate 
between Kiersey, Rosenow & Weidner (2010) and Chandler (2010), discussed in chapter III. 
54 Available at http://www.eejlaw.com/materials/Moore_v_Regents_T08.pdf (accessed 14.1.2012). 
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this additional information was instrumental for the successful exploitation of the 
potential of the cell line. Eventually, when his doctor asked him to sign a broad 
consent form, which would have transferred “all rights” in “any cell line or any other 
potential product which might be developed from the blood and/or bone marrow 
obtained” (Skloot 2011, 228), Moore discovered that his doctors had already 
registered a patent on information derived from his cancer sequence – called ‘Mo’.55 
The Supreme Court of California ruled that Moore had no rights to either a 
share of the profits made from the use of his sequence, or for damages. The Court 
determined that the patient’s reasonable concerns were covered by the ideas of 
informed consent and fiduciary duty, which had been breached in this case, but did 
not entitle Moore to a share in the profits. Importantly, the cell-line itself was not 
considered Moore’s property, for “the patented cell line is both factually and legally 
distinct from the cells taken from Moore’s body” (Moore v Board of Regents at p. 12; 
see also previous chapter), and there is no precedent that holds “that a person retains a 
sufficient interest in excised cells to support a cause of action for conversion” (at p. 
7).56 According to the court, a decision in Moore’s favour would have had far-
reaching detrimental effects, effectively “hinder[ing] research by restricting access to 
the necessary raw materials” and “threaten[ing] with disabling civil liability innocent 
parties who are engaged in socially useful activities” such as research (at p. 15).  
Judge Arabian’s concurring opinion goes even further in his condemnation of 
Moore’s demands for a share of the profit:  
 
“Plaintiff has asked us to recognize and enforce a right to sell one’s 
own body tissue for profit. He entreats us to regard the human vessel – 
the single most venerated and protected subject in any civilized society 
– as equal with the basest commercial commodity. He urges us to 
commingle the sacred with the profane.” (at p. 19, emphasis in 
original) 
                                                
55 This designation is highly reminiscent of Henrietta Lacks’ treatment, and the resulting ‘HeLa’ 
immortal cell line (see Skloot 2011). 
56 Conversion is “a tort that protects against interference with possessory and ownership interests in 
personal property” (at p. 5) – and the main claim in Moore’s complaint. In this the court brushed aside 
the Court of Appeal’s application of Venner v. State (1976) 30 Md.App. 599 [354 A.2d 483], which 
found that “[i]t is not unknown for a person to assert a continuing right of ownership, dominion, or 
control, for good reason or for no reason, over such things as excrement, fluid waste, secretions, hair, 
fingernails, toenails, blood, and organs or other parts of the body (…)” (354 A.2d at p. 498; quoted 
after Moore v Board of Regents, p. 9 Footnote 28). 
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The IP regime’s view of the isolated cell line as entirely separate to the human body 
(see previous chapter) is, however, not considered to “commingle the sacred with the 
profane” in a similar manner.  
This highlights an entrenched legal ‘truth’ regarding the nature of isolated 
genetic sequences, and a complete dismissal of the patient’s continued interest in the 
use of this information for the purpose of ‘research’. The patient’s rights are only 
comprised of fiduciary duty and informed consent, and the commercial realm in 
which research is conducted and patents are registered is completely beyond the 
patient’s reach. It is clearly stated that high hurdles enforcing standards of 
accountability and legitimacy are against society’s interest in research. This 
effectively means that, due to the highly unpredictable content of future research 
using genetic information, patients are most likely faced with a yes/no decision at the 
level of informed consent to their treatment and all further use of the tissue and the 
information taken from this tissue – as even the example of UK Biobank’s more 
complex consent form shows (UK Biobank 2011, see below). Volunteer participants 
in the recently completed UK Biobank had the opportunity to consent to some tests 
and refrain from participation in others – but the transfer of IP rights on the material 
and the resultant information is final.57 The patient/donor is thus prevented by the 
patenting process from exerting influence on the use of IP derived from the donation. 
 
1.2. Patients as Patent Holders: The case of PXE International 
The controversial dichotomy of the patent holder and the patient/donor has been 
challenged especially with regards to influence on the future use of IP, where control 
over types of research can be exerted for example through the licensing process. In 
one of the most instructive examples of this type of influence, patients became patent 
holders to their ‘own’ genetic condition, thus directing the type of research conducted 
on this condition. PXE International is a non-profit organisation formed by Patrick 
and Sharon Terry in 1995, whose two children are PXE patients. PXE International 
consists amongst other things of a specialist PXE International Blood and Tissue 
                                                
57 UK Biobank consent form states: “I […] relinquish all rights to these samples which I am donating 
to UK Biobank” (UK Biobank 2011). This complete transfer of IPRs remains a standard even in open 
source biobanks such as the Personal Genome Project.Their consent form states: “Any tissue samples 
or specimens that you provide to the PGP as part of your participation in this study, including saliva, 
hair, blood or other biological tissues, are the property of and are owned by the PGP and not by you 
[…]” (Personal Genome Project 2012, 18). 
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Bank, which “accelerated the discovery of the gene associated with PXE” and led to a 
patent being issued on this sequence in the US in 2004 (PXE International 2015a). 
Since then, PXE International “steward[s] the intellectual property to equitably 
advance products and services around the world for the individuals and families living 
with PXE”, and has become “a role model for many other groups throughout the 
world” (PXE International 2015b).58 Their use of IP as part of their research strategy 
has been adopted by other organisations focussing on particular genetic conditions, 
and also larger scale organisations such as Medical Research Charities (see below). 
Here IPRs are specifically used for the improvement of health of others patients, 
“ensuring both open access to the gene for all researchers, and preventing royalty fees 
that might increase the costs to any individual seeking testing for PXE” (Heath, Rapp, 
and Taussig 2004, 164).  
Paradoxically, IP is used here in order to guarantee access to genetic 
information. Waldby and Mitchell argue that “the Terrys have appropriated the 
commodity form (in this case a patented gene) to create new flows of body tissues and 
information”, which “are patient-oriented (not doctor- or corporation-oriented), in that 
they seek to create a worldwide patient rights community” (Waldby and Mitchell 
2006, 154). Benefits of this approach are “allow[ing] PXE International to have 
access to venture capital in ways that were not otherwise possible” and ensuring 
“continuing flexibility” towards licensing of these patents (Ibid., 154 and 155). 
Perplexingly for an example of “commodification”,   
 
“[o]n the one hand, this approach seems to privilege a neoliberal model 
of competing groups of “stakeholders,” who circulate tissues and 
information within their groups but jealously guard against “free” 
dissemination to outsiders, […] [o]n the other hand […] this approach 
[…] does not treat people as resources to be “mined” but instead 
includes them within the informational flows normally accessible only 
to researchers and corporations” (Ibid., 155). 
 
Dickenson points out that this approach “suggest[s] a possible middle way between 
pure altruism and pure capitalism” (2013, 188). This thesis argues that the surprising 
                                                
58 For the way in which the Terrys are providing their support to other organisations see Heath, Rapp & 
Taussig (2004, 164). 
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use of a commodity without the expected exploitative results on patients or donors, 
but instead with the result of an increased inclusion of people into the area of research 
and pharmaceutical drug development becomes more plausible when looked at from 
the perspective of a new “somatic ethics” (N. Rose 2008a) instructing patients to take 
increased responsibility for their own health, especially with regards to knowing their 
genetic predispositions (see below). IP law is being used here for the purpose of 
governing genetic life by patients and for the benefit of patients. 
This new responsibility and the influence of genetic knowledge on identity 
formation become obvious in statements such as “Your DNA. Your Health.” or “Your 
DNA is the biggest influence in your life!” – in this case advertising the (now defunct) 
services of personal genomics firm decodeme.59 Similar claims made by a competitor, 
23andMe, gave rise to a ban on health-related genetic reports pending market 
authorization for medical devices by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 
The FDA’s concerns about “the potential health consequences that could result from 
false positive or false negative assessments” (FDA 2013) show how seriously the 
results of these genetic scans are taken – and how they can lead to very serious 
decisions on behalf of the newly diagnosed “pre-symptomatic ill” patients (Wehling 
2011, 234). Importantly, this knowledge also generates pressure on policy-makers, as 
patients demand existing regimes to change and to have greater access to testing and 
potential treatment. Instead of focusing on commodification, this thesis argues that 
these challenges can be better understood as an emerging biological or genetic 
citizenship (N. Rose 2007b; Heath, Rapp, and Taussig 2004), which is produced by 
genetic knowledge of life and health. This chapter turns to a closer look at IP’s 
relation to the emergence of new rights and responsibilities surrounding genetic 
conceptions of life after briefly setting out how especially collective legal subjects 
such as medical research charities are challenging IP’s exclusionary function, and 
patients groups are becoming involved in campaigns for the promotion of pro-IP 
legislation. 
 
                                                
59 See www.decodeme.com (accessed 5.11.2012). These personal genomics services are no longer 
offered by this company. A competing personal genomics company, 23andMe, also had to withdraw its 
health-related genetic reports after severe criticism by the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 
November 2013 (FDA 2013; 2014). It has since begun trading in the UK, offering testing kits for 
personal genome analysis and health reports that are no longer available in the US (23andMe 2015a; 
23andMe 2015b). 
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1.3. Patient groups and Medical Research Charities: The increasing influence of 
patients’ opinions  
A variety of collective legal subjects are increasing the influence of patients by 
strategically using IP for the promotion of research in particular genetic conditions. In 
the case of medical research charities, universities or research institutions (i.e. 
artificial legal or juridical subjects) hold patents for genetic conditions, but actively 
involve patients in decisions on their terms of use. One example is Cystic Fibrosis, 
where the University of Michigan, Johns Hopkins University, and the Hospital for 
Sick Children hold key patents (Chandrasekharan, Heaney, et al. 2010, S194). These 
patents have at times limited access to testing for the condition, as Chandrasekharan 
points out, “[t]he Cystic Fibrosis Foundation has been engaged in licensing decisions, 
making cystic fibrosis a model of collaborative and cooperative patenting and 
licensing practice” (Ibid.). As a result of involving patient representatives in the 
licensing process, patient’s concerns for access to tests and potential treatments have 
in these cases outweighed any interest in profit.  
Other research collaborations on genetic conditions have been operating in a 
similar manner, patenting genetic information on ‘long QT Syndrome’ (Angrist et al. 
2010), Hereditary Hemochromatosis (Chandrasekharan, Pitlick, et al. 2010), Tay-
Sachs and Canavan Disease (Colaianni, Chandrasekharan, and Cook-Deegan 2010). It 
was shown that active patent enforcement against competing providers of tests limited 
access to tests (Angrist et al. 2010, S111), and high costs also deterred patients 
(Powell, Chandrasekharan, and Cook-Deegan 2010). Another cautionary example is 
the patent registered by the hospital on the genetic sequence and testing methods for 
Canavan disease, which came as a complete surprise to the charity and families 
contributing information and samples to this research (Dickenson 2013, 191 f.). This 
shows that the exclusionary effects of IPRs are not automatically counteracted in all 
these models. Evans argues that 
 
“harms are most clearly seen when an exclusive (or no) license is 
issued by a patent holder, resulting in only a single laboratory that is 
allowed to perform a given test. In such circumstances, patient access 
to testing can suffer, most clearly when exclusive providers fail to 
contract with insurers such as state Medicaid programs, leaving 
patients without the option of a given genetic test should it be 
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recommended by their provider. Other harms of exclusivity include an 
inability to obtain second-opinion testing and concerns over quality, 
given that the most robust means of quality assurance are not available 
in the context of a single provider.” (J. P. Evans 2010, S3) 
 
High costs for tests continue to cause controversy, and are challenged by patients, as 
in the case brought against Myriad Genetics and the very strict enforcement of their 
patents on breast cancer markers BRCA1 and BRCA 2 (see facts in Gold and Carbone 
2010; also see discussion in previous chapter). Their IP strategy disregarded patient’s 
interests completely – and led to a collective legal challenge brought by patients, 
doctors, and the American Civil Liberties Union to “take back our genes” (ACLU 
2013).  
The influence of patients in the Cystic Fibrosis Foundation ensured a form of 
access to testing that was more in line with patients’ needs and thus placed access to 
testing before market exclusivity. Their involvement fell short of actual IP ownership, 
and thus did not amount to outright autonomous control over decisions as in the case 
of PXE International. However, it shows that the influence of patients can change the 
priorities of IP strategies – but not always in the same way and for the same purpose. 
The biotech industry has also noted the increasing influence of patients and has turned 
to patient groups for added legitimacy for example in their “No Patents, No Cure” 
lobbying campaign for the European Biotech Directive 98/44/EC on extending 
patenting to the biotech sector (1998).  
The inclusion of patient groups came as a response to the negative result of the 
initial vote in the European Parliament in 1995, which came as a shock to the 
industry. Debate and public opinion at the time in Europe was very critical of the 
notion of ‘patenting life’ and was not in favour of extending IP to information derived 
from human genetic materials. The industry’s response to this debacle was to fight 
“fire with fire”60:  
 
“Faced with such an onslaught, the industry hired a British lobbyist, 
Paul Adamson, who met with patients' groups and helped persuade 30 
terminally ill patients in wheelchairs - people likely to benefit from 
                                                
60 SmithKline Beecham alone reportedly allocated 30 million Euros for a broad “pro-Directive 
Campaign” (Calvert and Joly 2011, 9; Corporate European Observer 1998). 
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biotechnology research - to greet members of the Parliament on the 
days of crucial votes on the legislation. The patients wore bright 
yellow T-shirts painted with the slogan "Patents for Life" and chanted, 
"No Patents, No Cure!" It worked. Three years after it was first 
rejected, the Life Patent Directive passed, 432 to 78, in a final vote in 
May 1998.” (Bilefsky 2005) 
 
This marked a turnaround in PR strategy, turning the opposition’s slogan “No Patents 
on Life” on its head. It also clearly acknowledged and operationalised the increasing 
influence of patients (see Calvert and Joly 2011) – albeit as a means for increasing the 
reach of the IP regime. 
Calvert and Joly argue that the involvement of patients made the “No Patents, 
No Cure” strategy particularly effective: “[patient charities and organizations] were 
by far the most influential lobby groups in respect to the Directive. Many Members of 
the European Parliament voted in favour of the Directive under strong pressure from 
these interest groups in what was described as ‘the largest lobby campaign in the 
history of the EU’” (Ibid., 9). The industry has since then tied the demands of patients 
into their legitimation of IPRs:  
 
“Protecting intellectual property rights is essential to encourage 
research and development, leading to new and better medicines. Only 
with effective patent laws can we continue to bring therapeutic 
improvements to patients, ultimately resulting in better patient care.” 
(Novartis 2015) 
 
But Calvert and Joly also point to the way in which these patient groups were 
“manipulated” by the industry (Calvert and Joly 2011, 9).61 Connections between the 
pharmaceutical industry and patients groups for lobbying purposes such as the “No 
Patents, No Cure” campaign are often suspected of being instances of ‘astroturfing’ – 
a term which denotes the use of artificially created ‘grassroots’ movements. More 
recently, the pharmaceutical industry’s deployment of patients’ influence has been 
                                                
61 A Greenpeace report claims that “It was later disclosed that the lobbyists, who claimed to be 
speaking in the name of European patients, were in fact paid by the pharmaceutical industry and had no 
mandate from the patient organisations they purported to represent to lobby in favour of the patent 
directive” (Schweiger 1999), also claimed by Scullion (2002). 
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criticised as the industry “mobilised” patients in support of their bid against new rules 
requiring the disclosure of trial data (Sample 2013).62  
Nevertheless, the pharmaceutical industry’s strategic use of patients 
acknowledges the increasing influence of patients. This chapter argues that patients’ 
demands for increased involvement in the direction of research and development are 
part of a wider challenge to IP based on genetic conceptions of life. From this 
perspective, these examples can be read as instances of active participation of patient 
groups demanding their rights as “biological citizens” (N. Rose 2007b; Heath, Rapp, 
and Taussig 2004). But the industry’s campaign for an extension of the patentability 
of ‘life’ shows that patients’ involvement in IP strategies is more complex than this 
concept suggests. It rather points out that a “new somatic ethics” (N. Rose 2007a; 
2008a) based on genetic conceptions of life consists of rights and responsibilities 
conducting the conduct of patients. A closer analysis of IP’s confrontation with 
genetic subjects shows the emergence of patients’ responsibility to contribute to 
research, which is not matched by an equal increase of participatory rights. IP thus 
responds to challenges as a regime for exclusion, which “governs” the division 
between donations and further use of samples. The next chapter then argues that this 
function of IPRs can also be traced within international debates on the relation of IP 
to life, where “a new moral economy of R&D” for example emphasises notions of 
sharing in drug development projects (Lezaun and Montgomery 2015, 5). 
 
2. ‘Producing’ Subjects – The Genetic Dispositif and the Somatic Ethics of “Genetic 
Citizens” 
The increasingly complex influence of patients on the use of IP can be better 
understood as a result of biopower’s productive relation between truth discourses 
about life and modes of subjectification (Rabinow and Rose 2006; Foucault 2000).63 
Foucault repeatedly stressed the constitutive relation of truth discourses to subject’s 
identities, which the subject’s individual conduct in turn validated and reinforced: 
                                                
62 Clinical trial data (regarding side-effects and failed trials) is not routinely disclosed, even after 
gaining market approval – which can have serious adverse effects on public health (see argument for 
disclosure in Goldacre 2012). The industry argues trial data should be covered as a form of ‘trade 
secret’ – which constitutes a separate category of IP and is becoming an important areas of IP policy 
making internationally. 
63 Modes of Subjectification are also sometimes termed modes of objectification or modes of 
subjectivation (Butler 2005). For more background on the concept of subjectification, see for example 
discussion in Odysseos (2011), Edkins (1999), Butler (2010, first published 1989). 
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“This form of power that applies itself to immediate everyday life categorizes the 
individual, marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, 
imposes a law of truth on him that he must recognize and others have to recognize in 
him. It is a form of power that makes individuals subjects” (Foucault, Ibid., 331). This 
section first explores the parameters of processes of subjectification, and then looks at 
the production of biological or genetic subjects, which arguably emerge on the basis 
of genetic knowledge over life.  
 
2.1. The ‘conduct of conduct’ and the making of the genetic subject 
Analyses of governmentality look at the constitution of the subject as a part of the 
reproduction of relations of power. This raises questions about the relation between 
norms for the conduct of the individual and the subject’s freedom of action within 
governmentality. Rose, O’Malley & Valverde draw attention to the particular 
connection between “techniques of the self”, freedom, and forms of governmentality:  
 
“[...] technologies of the self were formed alongside the technologies 
of domination such as discipline. The subjects so created would 
produce the ends of government by fulfilling themselves rather than 
being merely obedient, and in Rose’s phrase (Rose 1989) would be 
obliged to be free in specific ways.” (N. Rose, O’Malley, and Valverde 
2006, 89)  
 
This highlights the way in which the ‘fulfillment’ of the self becomes conducive to 
the maintenance of governmental goals, incited by processes that “govern at a 
distance” (Miller and Rose 1992) through “regulated self-responsibility” (McNay 
2009, 62).64 As Foucault points out, the analysis of governmentality is fundamentally 
concerned with “the way in which one conducts the conduct of men” (Foucault 2008, 
186) – showing how power is exercised in order to produce subjects that are “open 
and amenable to governmental interventions and techniques” (Odysseos 2011, 445). 
The economic subject, homo oeconomicus, constitutes “the interface of government 
and the individual” in governmentality (Foucault 2008, 253), and is an “entrepreneur 
                                                
64 McNay sets out that “[Foucault’s] idea of self as enterprise […] understands the commodification of 
subjective experience not so much through ideas of passive consumerism, standardization and 
heteronomy, as through ideas of active differentiation, regulated self-responsibility and depoliticized 
autonomy” (McNay 2009, 62). 
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of himself, being for himself his own capital, being for himself his own producer, 
being for himself the source of [his] earnings” (Ibid., 226). This individualisation of 
the subject and the transfer of responsibility to this individual for conducting itself in 
a responsible, approved (or ‘normal’) manner is a marker of a specifically neoliberal 
form of governmentality, as McNay points out. The transfer of responsibility to the 
individual gives rise to the notion of the “self as enterprise” (McNay 2009). 
Foucault points out that, besides participation in the economy, governing 
increasingly takes the health and well-being of the population as its aim, and the 
conduct of conduct on the level of populations is increasingly fostered and directed 
accordingly (in the “population-biological processes-regulatory mechanisms-State” 
series of “biopolitics”, Foucault 1997, 250; see also Foucault 1978, 139). In this 
conduct, “maintenance of the healthy body became central to the self management of 
many individuals and families” (N. Rose 2007a, 4). Responsible patients were  
 
“[e]ncouraged by health educators to take an active interest in their 
own health, and ‘activated’ by the new cultures of active citizenship, 
many refused to remain merely ‘passive’ recipients of medical 
expertise. ‘Patients’ became ‘consumers’ actively choosing, and using 
medicine, biosciences, pharmaceuticals and ‘alternative medicine’ in 
order [sic] maximize and enhance their own vitality, demanding 
information from their doctors, expecting successful therapies, and 
liable to complain or even go to law if they are disappointed.” (Ibid., 
11)  
 
This process is not one of unidirectional domination, but rather a diffuse exercise of 
power that has the potential to sustain and also to challenge existing regimes. Within 
governmental networks, Miller and Rose point out that “[e]ach actor, each locale, is 
the point of intersection between forces, and hence a point of potential resistance to 
any one way of thinking and acting, or a point of organization and promulgation of a 
different or oppositional programme” (N. Rose and Miller 2010, 208, first published 
1992). While the exercise of power makes individuals into subjects, this does not 
necessarily imply a top-down imposition of a normalising strategy on the individual 
by the state: “biopower […] [was] consentingly invoked by many social groups […]. 
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The health of all […] became a priority of all” (Elbe 2005, 407). Normalising power 
is thus exercised by various actors, including the individual or “active” citizen, and 
always contains the potential for a subversion of existing power relations. 
But the power of active patients to challenge healthcare provisions in order to 
enhance their vitality is also accompanied by emerging responsibilities. Rose argues 
that the conduct of “active patients” is conducted by a “new somatic ethics” 
governing the political sphere of life and health, which shares an “elective affinity” 
with the bioeconomy (N. Rose 2007a; 2008a). The previous chapter of this thesis 
argued that the operation of this elective affinity could be traced in IP’s production of 
truth discourses of ‘life’, which normalised the informational-genetic view of life (the 
genetic dispositif) at the expense of other more complex accounts of ‘life’. This 
informational-genetic conception combines knowledge of the individual and the 
population in one code, which enables the integration of this information into the 
bioeconomy. This chapter argues that this genetic dispositif influences the formation 
of identities, conducting the conduct of subjects according to genetic ‘truths’ in a new 
somatic ethics, which also transfers healthcare responsibilities onto the subject. The 
increasing integration of genetic information into the bioeconomy further intensifies 
the exposure of the subject to this truth – thus amplifying the tensions between 
exclusive IPRs and new rights and responsibilities of ‘active patients’. Before this 
chapter turns to an exploration of IP’s role in the maintenance of the division between 
patent holders and patients/donors, the next section sets out new rights and 
responsibilities affecting the conduct of “active patients” in a “new somatic ethics”. 
 
2.2. New Rights and Responsibilities: ‘Genetic’ Citizens and Somatic Ethics 
The shift of life to the genetic level has profoundly affected the identity of the 
individual and given rise to new rights and responsibilities on the basis of this 
‘truth’.65 It is argued here that this pervasive influence of genetic knowledge on the 
conduct of conduct goes far beyond Foucault’s brief problematisation of the use of 
genetics in “the control, screening, and improvement of the human capital of 
individuals, as a function of […] reproduction” (Foucault 2008, 228 f.). Rather than 
this deterministic scenario of selective reproduction, the far less clear-cut 
                                                
65 The reach of these rights and responsibilities does not extend to all participants of society, and surely 
not to all humans world-wide (see critique in Selmeczi 2009). It is rather mostly limited to influential 
segments of Western societies. For the implications of IP’s exclusionary function on the international 
level, see next chapter. 
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interpretation of genetic risks has led to the emergence of the “pre-symptomatic ill” 
(Wehling 2011, 234). It also enfolded the individual in a new somatic ethics setting 
out the conduct of responsible patients, in which“[h]uman beings identify and 
interpret much of their unease in terms of the health, vitality, and morbidity of their 
bodies; they judge and act upon their soma in their attempts to make themselves not 
just physically better, but also to make themselves better persons” (N. Rose 2008a, 
46). The active patient is incited to know and improve his/her health according to this 
new “law of truth” (Foucault 2000, 331) – and through this is arguably becoming a 
biological or genetic citizen, whose demands for better medical treatment wield 
biopower (N. Rose 2007b; Heath, Rapp, and Taussig 2004). This biopower challenges 
existing healthcare regimes, and also IP’s exclusive assignment of ownership over 
genetic knowledge, but it is also being limited by IP’s continuing maintenance of 
divisions between patent holders and patients.  
The “molecularisation” of life (see for example Novas and Rose 2000) shifts 
the understanding of the ‘nature’ of the subject to a different level, marking a shift of 
the medical gaze similar to the change in the eighteenth century (see N. Rose 2007b, 4 
f.), changing “[n]ot only the names of diseases, not only the grouping of systems were 
not the same; but the fundamental perceptual codes that were applied to patients’ 
bodies” (Foucault 1963, 64). Novas & Rose term these molecularised concepts of life 
and of disease a “new ‘molecular optics’” (2000, 48), while Heath, Rapp & Taussig 
refer to the development of new forms of self-understanding of the individual, 
adapting to the new ‘truth’ about his/her medical destiny contained in his/her genetic 
code as “a genetic ‘micro-anatomo-politics’” (2004, 154). Importantly, Novas and 
Rose point out that “[t]hese developments [...] re-shape the ways in which we are 
governed, and the ways in which we govern ourselves”, “creat[ing] an obligation to 
act in the present in relation to the potential futures that now come into view” (Novas 
and Rose 2000, 486). 
This obligation to act in the present according to the demands of potential 
futures “come[s] into an association with all the other shifts that are assembling 
somatic individuality, with the norms of enterprising, self-actualizing, responsible 
personhood that characterize ‘advanced liberal’ societies” (Ibid., 488). Subjects are 
thus incited to operate with reference to these connected identities (or modes of 
subjectification) of the genetic and enterprising individual. In contrast with Novas and 
Rose’s focus on the individual, Raman and Tutton stress that the influence of the life 
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sciences does not only amount to a ‘disciplining’ of the individual’s conduct, but still 
remains connected to knowledge generated at the level of the population (Raman and 
Tutton 2010, 721). Critiquing notions of a wholesale transformation of Foucault’s 
“old biopolitics from above” to a “new biopolitics from below”, they argue that “truth 
discourses about life contain a hybrid of molecular and population categories” (Ibid., 
722). Thus “old” and “new” modes of biopolitics coexist in the molecular age, giving 
rise to population-based governmental interventions such as national biobanks and 
“strategies for infection control”, as well as a new “pastoral or enabling” role of the 
state (Ibid.). 
At the heart of a new biopolitics “from below”, the concept of biological 
citizenship (or genetic citizenship)66 encapsulates the rights claimed by the active 
patient within this new somatic ethics. Based on the biological condition of the 
entrepreneur of the self, these rights have the potential to challenge governance and 
health providers, “[articulating] claims to participation in social and political life and 
to the recognition of certain individuals’ or groups’ identities, expertise and specific 
needs based on their (supposedly) biological or genetic conditions” (Wehling 2011, 
225).67 In particular, “these practices challenge conventional notions of a divide 
between lay people and experts” (Heath, Rapp, and Taussig 2004, 152). While Novas 
(2006) and Rose (2007b) respectively emphasise the power of ‘hope’ in generating 
demands made by patients and patient organisations, Wehling cautions against 
overstatements in this direction by drawing attention to the contrast between new 
demands and the amount of new responsibilities imposed on the individual “to 
optimize ‘healthy’ bodies and minds” (Wehling 2011, 227). 
The clearest examples of biological citizens are for instance patient groups, 
which are formed around a common genetic condition (such as Huntington’s disease 
or PXE). These patient groups can organise support for their condition more 
effectively and make more successful demands for research on that condition than any 
individual patient would be able to make. They can liaise with pharmaceutical 
companies and serve as research repositories for them, which also can improve the 
amount of research done with regards to their particular condition. Patients of more 
complex diseases such as arthritis and diabetes are also increasingly organising in this 
                                                
66 Genetic citizenship is the term used by Heath, Rapp and Taussig (2004). In this thesis both ideas will 
be referred to interchangeably, with the predominant focus on their conception of rights and 
responsibilities of the individual in a new somatic ethics based on the molecularised view of ‘life’. 
67 Wehling provides a comprehensive overview and critical evaluation of the concept (2011). 
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way (Heath, Rapp, and Taussig 2004, 159). At its most successful point, this 
activation of patients has the potential to radically reverse the roles between experts 
and patients, as Novas & Rose find: “the ill patients themselves, those 
‘asymptomatically ill’ and their families [...] are increasingly demanding control over 
the practices linked to their own health, seeking multiple forms of expert and non-
expert advice in devising their life strategies, and asking of medics that they act as the 
servants and not the masters of this process” (Novas and Rose 2000, 490).68 However, 
this radical potential is limited by the simultaneously increasing moral duties of the 
individual, as Wehling points out. 
Most critically, the mobilising influence of hope for new treatments further 
essentialises conceptions of ‘good’ patients, which actively participate in 
pharmaceutical trials and the formation of biobanks etc., and thus are contributing to 
the generation of knowledge – but also of economic value. In particular,  
 
“deeply emotional representations of the fears and hopes of sufferers, 
and their expectations that new medical technologies will deliver them 
from their suffering, structure many popular representations of patients 
and their illnesses, and are often deployed by medical charities, 
support groups and others in seeking to raise funds to keep that hope 
alive.” (N. Rose 2007b, 136, quoting from Nik Brown)  
 
The power of hope thus not only gives rise to biopolitical challenges, but also 
engenders subjectivities that contribute to the production of economic value. The 
invocation of the power of biological citizens is in this way tempered by an “‘elective 
affinity’ between the spirit of biocapital and our contemporary somatic ethic” (N. 
Rose 2007a, 5).  
The remainder of this chapter argues that IP is central to the management of 
this “elective affinity” and contributes to the governing of demands made by patients 
by maintaining a division between the realm of economic relations and the 
biopolitical challenge of active patients. This exclusionary function prevents the 
                                                
68 An interesting example for the power of such demands is the campaigning of DEBRA (the 
Dystrophic Epidermolysis Bullosa Research Association), which sees “‘parents [use] their bloody, 
blistering babies like a battering ram’ to capture Congressional attention” (Heath, Rapp, and Taussig 
2004, 155). In this case, “babies’ bodies [breach] the boundaries between home, state, and civil 
society” (Ibid.), creating a strong motivation amongst politicians for helping the afflicted. 
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bioeconomy from being affected by a potentially radical role reversal between 
patients and experts. The next section of this chapter shows how the IP regime 
maintains a separate sphere of (bio)economic value by structuring the participation of 
active patients (or biological citizens) in this area. While alternative models of 
participation are explored in examples of citizens’ science, an analysis of debates 
around participation by “research patients” or “research citizens” shows how the 
demands of genetic citizens are being controlled. While patients are increasingly 
incited to fulfil a new responsibility of voluntary participation in trials and research, 
the bioeconomy still functions by remaining largely closed off from decisive 
influence exerted by patients on the use of donated materials in Rose’s “transnational 
circuits of vitality” (N. Rose 2008a, 46). This management of biopolitical challenges 
“from below” (Raman and Tutton 2010, 722) is then also traced in emerging 
challenges to the exclusionary function of IP in an international version of a “new 
moral economy of R&D” (Lezaun and Montgomery 2015, 5) – representing an 
international version of the “biopolitics from above”. 
 
3. ‘Genetic Citizens’ or ‘Research Patients’? – IPRs as a regime for exclusion of 
challenges from a ‘new biopolitics from below’ 
Anne Kerr (2003a; 2003b) provides a more complex understanding of the rights and 
responsibilities of “genetic citizenship”, emphasising in particular the continuing 
means of exclusion of individuals from the decisions made in research and medical 
treatment. Looking at modes of participation in biobanks, Kerr highlights the pivotal 
role of experts in maintaining this exclusion – while patients’ “responsibilities for 
self-education and self-surveillance” are increasing (Kerr 2003b Ibid., 221). Wehling 
also emphasises “undesirable consequences and new forms of stigmatization or even 
exclusion” caused by the “biologization or geneticisation of rights, responsibilities” 
(Wehling 2011, 240). Their critical reflections on the actual rights and responsibilities 
of subjects in a new somatic ethics show continuing restrictions to participation 
encountered by the ‘empowered’ active patient of the new molecular biopolitics from 
below (see previous section). This section argues that IPRs are instrumental to the 
maintenance of the division between biological citizens and experts. In the example of 
large-scale biobank projects, IPRs are shown to work as a regime for exclusion 
maintaining limits to participation. These large-scale projects are then contrasted with 
alternative approaches to IP in examples of citizens’ science. However, while these 
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appear to challenge the distribution of rights and responsibilities, at closer inspection, 
they are even more dependent on and instrumental in the perpetuation of 
responsibilities contained in a new somatic ethics. The IP regime thus engages with 
and governs demands for patients’ participatory rights by structuring entirely separate 
spheres of influence. 
 
3.1. IPRs’ role in the division between citizens and experts 
Kerr points out that rights and obligations are already contained within the concept of 
citizenship, understanding “citizenship as a set of inter-linked processes of inclusion 
and exclusion of individuals based on the allocation of entitlements, obligations and 
immunities, which depend upon notions of their contribution to society” (Kerr 2003a, 
45). However, participatory rights are not the same for experts and citizens. Experts 
are involved in patients’ decision-making on the personal level (with regards to 
genetic testing or participation in biobanks) and also contribute to policy-making. In 
contrast, patients or citizens “are not considered to be sufficiently competent to make 
a significant contribution to this [policy-making] process. Their rights in this arena are 
therefore limited, but their responsibilities for self-education and self-surveillance 
remain” (Kerr 2003b, 221).  
This division between citizens and experts can be seen for example in the 
structures of UK Biobank, in which the role of the citizen was set up as “one of self-
surveillance and information provision to clinicians rather than as members of any 
independent overseeing body” (Ibid., 218; see also discussion in Dickenson 2013, 
187). In contrast, some other governments consult citizens, for example for 
Denmark’s biobank or in EU policy making, where patients “help [...] formulate 
research and ethics policy” (Heath, Rapp, and Taussig 2004, 165; see also discussion 
at the beginning of this chapter). At best, the involvement of patients/ citizens 
stretches towards this consultative role, while their general responsibilities have 
increased, including self-surveillance, involvement in research activities, and the 
donation of information and samples. The divide between the role of the citizen and 
the realm of science and the bioeconomy is maintained by institutionalised specialist 
knowledge, in spite of patients’ increased expertise of their own conditions. 
Rose and Miller point to the constitutive role of expertise in “advanced 
liberalism”, where they enable the economy of governing as little as necessary by 
maintaining the public/private divide (N. Rose 1993; Miller and Rose 2008). In this, 
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experts fulfill a double function: on the one hand “[experts] would ally themselves 
with political authorities [...] translating political concerns [...] into the vocabulary of 
management, accounting, medicine [...]”, while also “[o]n the other hand, they would 
seek to form alliances with individuals themselves, translating their daily worries [...] 
into a language claiming the power of truth, and offering to teach them the techniques 
by which they might manage better [...]” (N. Rose and Miller 2010, 206). The 
discussion in the previous section on the subversive potential of biopolitical 
challenges showed that this use of the language of truth can contain the potential for 
challenge to the political discourse, but it also instils “self-regulatory techniques [...] 
in citizens that will align their personal choices with the ends of government” (Ibid.). 
As the previous chapter argued, IP normalises specialist knowledge and 
elevates a particular vision of life over other, more complex versions. In addition to 
this, the area of IP law needs to be understood as a very specialist area of knowledge 
itself, which has high entry barriers contained in specialist legal knowledge of IP 
procedures and in high costs for registration and enforcement of rights. These 
requirements make it necessary for IP holders to be highly organised and to have 
sufficient funds for the maintenance of their rights. Specialist lawyers are often 
required for the actual registration procedure of IPRs – which, in a similar way to 
medical experts, translate the applications of individuals “into a language claiming the 
power of truth” and also work with authorities overseeing the area of IP policy, 
translating policy preferences into the language of IP management. These structures 
align choices over directions of research with the ends of the IP system – through 
“self-regulatory techniques” incited by patentability criteria. These criteria ensure the 
economic utility of research outcomes and enable IP to “govern at a distance”. 
The specialist area of IPRs thus can be understood as fulfilling the function of 
experts in the governing of the problematization of life, translating concerns and 
inciting appropriate behaviour of subjects. In this, IPRs are also instrumental in 
maintaining the division between the public area of direct government intervention, 
and the private area in which the priorities of governmentality “govern at a distance”. 
Criteria for economic utility of research conduct the conduct of IP holders. But 
importantly, the high hurdles for participation in the IP regime towards all other 
subjects need to be understood as part IP’s governing of life as well. Examples of 
challenges by active “biological citizens” show that they are either given the option of 
using IP themselves (as in the case of PXE), or of participating in a research project 
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by signing a blanket consent form transferring all rights – and thus being entirely 
excluded from IP. In this way, IP continues to structure the participation of “active” 
patients in decisions on the further use of information derived from their donation, 
especially for economic purposes – thus shielding this area from challenges posed by 
active citizens who may seek to use genetic information for other purposes. This is 
where the tactical dimension of IP’s role becomes apparent, which maintains the 
operation of economic circuits of exchange while challenges based on genetic 
conceptions of life are being kept at bay.  
The increasing relevance of genetic knowledge as part of the genetic dispositif 
also intensifies the tactical dimension of this division. IP’s role establishing control 
over research agendas and economic use of donations needs to be interrogated as a 
separate power exercise to that of the “commodification” of life. The increasingly 
tactical use of IPRs as a regime for exclusion from this particular domain is especially 
obvious in biobanks, where rhetoric emphasises altruistic contributions. Here, IPRs 
undoubtedly continue to separate the use of donations by the biobank from the sphere 
of influence of the “biological citizen”. The emergence of new justifications for this 
exclusion is especially telling, showing that IP is engaging with new demands by 
patients. Kerr points out how this division is presented as being in the public interest: 
“In these discussions, the public’s interests (to better drugs and diagnostic tests) are to 
be secured through the entitlements of the private sector to own genetic knowledge 
and the public’s obligation to facilitate this by co-operating with research” (Kerr 
2003a, 48).  
The more frequent reference to research as being in the interest of public 
health shows that IP is responding to new priorities that otherwise would challenge its 
legitimacy – but this response also has subversive potential. While IP’s intervention 
continues to ensure the exclusion of direct interferences by “active” citizens in 
research agendas and in the economic use of samples, it also opens a debate about 
IP’s relation to life and health that had previously been deemed “settled” (Rajan 2006, 
64) by bioethical arrangements outside of IP. This leads to a contestation of IP’s 
legitimation within a new frame of reference, which is explored in the next sections 
and the next chapter. Debates about the role of ‘research patients’ show how IP 
negotiates the demands of patients as a regime for exclusion, encouraging 
contributions to research but not granting broader rights of participation implied by 
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notions of ‘citizenship’. This is then contrasted with new approaches to IP in citizen’s 
science projects, which depend even more on the motivation to contribute to research. 
 
3.2. Exclusion in the name of research: IP and the notion of the ‘research patient’  
IP’s exclusion of patients from control over their donated materials and information 
can thus be read as governmental ‘management’ of biopolitical challenges. This 
exclusion can for example be traced in the UK government’s recent life science 
policy, announcing an “opening up [of] the NHS” and giving all “willing patient[s]” 
the chance to be “a research patient”, as “[i]t is simply a waste to have a health 
system like the NHS and not to do this kind of thing” (Number 10 2011, emphasis 
added). As part of this strategy, the UK government seeks to “consult on actually 
changing the NHS constitution so that the default setting is for patients’ data to be 
used for research unless of course they want to opt out”69, so that “every time you use 
the NHS you’re playing a part in the fight against disease at home and around the 
world” (Ibid.). Notably this was not a concession granting patients the potential 
empowerment of being research citizens, but rather a statement marketed as a “game-
changer” to the pharmaceutical industry, addressing the then imminent ‘patent cliff’ 
and the recent closures of Pfizer’s laboratories in Sandwich and AstraZeneca’s at 
Charnwood (Ibid.).70  
This strategy is part of wider changes in the UK life science sector aiming to 
make genetic information available for research. These consist for example of the 
recent completion of UK Biobank, and the widening of the UK’s Life Sciences 
Strategy to include the sequencing of whole genomes of cancer patients. The ‘100,000 
Genomes Project’ aims to make the “UK […] the first country in the world to 
introduce the technology within a mainstream health system, with up to 100,000 
patients over three to five years having their whole genome – their personal DNA 
code – sequenced” (Number 10 2012; Genomics England 2015). The “unlocking [of] 
the power of DNA data” is meant to “revolutionise [the] fight against cancer and help 
                                                
69 This proposed change is highly reminiscent of Iceland’s controversial (overturned) biobank 
legislation (see also Weldon 2004, 165). The UK government’s policy initiative has since given rise to 
the (failed) consultation on the care.data initiative, seeking to combine medical records with date of 
birth, full postcode, NHS number, and gender of each NHS patient in a commercial databank (NHS 
Choices 2014). 
70 This statement was made for the benefit of the Financial Times’ Global Pharmaceutical and 
Biotechnology Conference. The ‘patent cliff’ refers to the simultaneous expiration of a large number of 
important pharmaceutical patents at this point in time, without an equally strong range of follow-up 
products in the development pipeline (Y. Chen, Varghese, and Prescott 2012). 
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100,000 NHS patients” (Number 10 2012). Overall this strategy seeks to open genetic 
sequences and the NHS health records to research projects and exploit this data in 
economic circuits of exchange, without granting citizens a say in this use beyond the 
basic level of their (presumed) consent. The failed ‘care.data’ programme sought to 
open NHS records to “carefully chosen”71 commercial partners (NHS Choices 2014). 
Similarly partners would pay licensing fees for the use of information contained in 
UK Biobank. Patients do not have any direct say in the use of the data derived from 
their samples, while they are incited to contribute by promises of “help”72 and the 
notion of making an important contribution to the fight against cancer (UK Biobank 
2010; 2011). These initiatives thus clearly invokes hope and responsibilities in order 
to capitalise on donated materials and medical information, while IP imposes a clear 
dividing line between patients and control over samples in the biobank. 
These projects show how new norms of patient behaviour are being created, 
encouraging voluntary donations for the public good of ‘research’. A new somatic 
responsibility in the “fight” against cancer permeates contemporary life science 
discourse more broadly, shown for example in the central message of the 2013 
advertising campaign by Cancer Research UK: “By sharing the stories of seven 
cancer survivors, we can demonstrate that our research is saving lives”, and the 
tagline “I am alive because of research” below the pictures of individual “survivors” 
(Cancer Research UK 2013). This change in what it means to be a ‘responsible’ 
patient can be compared to the situation with regards to organ transplantation, where 
Wehling “observe[s] a remarkable shift in bioethical discourse away from individual 
rights and choices towards emphasizing the individuals’ moral duties to collective 
goods and interests as well as various proposals for new institutional arrangements 
(among them regulated markets) aiming at an increase in organs for transplantation” 
(Wehling 2011, 236).  
The notion of a ‘research patient’ thus marks a shift of emphasis from 
participatory rights of citizens towards a duty of patients to contribute to a collective 
good by volunteering information and samples. 73 IP then implements the exclusion of 
                                                
71 There is no indication of the criteria that may apply to this choice (NHS Choices 2014, see question 
on “Will confidential information be shared?”). 
72 This very vague notion of ‘help’ derived directly from the donation undermines assumptions of 
informed consent, as Weldon argues (2004, 166). She also questions the focus on individuals, at the 
expense of collective forms of identification such as society, families and citizenry (Ibid., 162). 
73 The personal genomics firm 23andMe encourages the continued participation of donors by giving 
them titles such as “research pioneers”, “research trailblazers”, and “research captains” – or even 
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the “active” and responsible patient from any involvement in the use of these samples. 
This very effectively limits potential challenges made by “biological citizens”, thus 
ensuring control over samples for research and the bioeconomy. This shows how IP 
exerts power, but also raises the question for how much longer this wholesale transfer 
of control is tenable. The emerging area of citizens’ science already explores greater 
participatory rights of the individual donor. 
 
3.3. Citizens’ Science74  – Contesting IP’s exclusionary regime? 
Other recent biotech projects explored a different form of involvement of the 
individual in research: crowd-sourcing funds and samples, and addressing the 
individual as a citizen, not a patient/donor. One project sought to decipher the 
microbiome75, and promised to be the “World's FIRST citizen science project to 
sequence the human microbiome.” In contrast with other biobanks, they state: “We 
will involve the public in not just collecting the samples, but in analyzing the data, 
generating and testing hypotheses, and doing as much official ‘science’ as possible. 
We want this to be the first shot in a revolution in how science is done around the 
world” (uBiome 2013, emphasis in original). In this crowd-funded project, individual 
participants pledge money to contribute, and receive a test kit (and a t-shirt) in return 
for their investment.  
The approach to IP on the information contained in this biobank is also 
different: “Your data is open to the world... if you choose. Your data is yours – you 
can download it, share it, do whatever you want with it. We encourage you to opt-in 
to share your data with our scientists, but we respect your privacy and will not force 
you to do so” (Ibid., emphasis in original) – this seems to represent a different way of 
establishing a biobank, but also raises concerns with regards to the consent structure 
in place. Research conducted on genetic material aims to explore its potentialities, 
                                                                                                                                      
“active genomes” (Dickenson 2013, 186). These pioneers have no share in the IP derived from their 
donations. 23andMe’s first patent however took some of these pioneers by surprise, and caused outrage 
(Ibid., 191). 
74 Citizens’ Science refers to projects which seeks to involve laypeople in genuine research, for 
instance in evaluating images from satellites, observing nature, or in games “creating [a] large-scale 
library of synthetic RNA designs” (Eterna 2015; overview see Scientific American 2015). 
75 The MicroBiome represents the genome of the bacteria living on and in the human body, and differs 
depending on the part of the body. Research looking at the influence of bacteria on health is a relatively 
recent interest, but can also be seen as part of the ‘post-genomic’ turn of the life-sciences. uBiome 
states “The microbiome may be as important to human health as the human genome, but unlike the 
genome, you can change your microbiome. Because of this amazing potential, understanding the 
microbiome has become one of the most important scientific inquiries of our time” (uBiome 2013; see 
also Arthur 2013; Harman and Wakeford 2014 on the microbiome and birth). 
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thus complicating statements about its likely future content – which creates problems 
for possibilities of a later withdrawal of consent, and the continuing further usage and 
treatment of the information derived from it. If “your data is yours”, this also raises 
questions about the later publication of research findings, and about the potential 
raising of license fees for third party usage. However, in a project that relies entirely 
on donated funding and voluntary provision of samples, the likely participant will 
already have a strong desire to voluntarily contribute to research, which may serve to 
keep potential issues at bay. 
This strong desire to contribute to research, and the fact that in this particular 
case it was strong enough to raise over three times the originally required amount of 
money, shows how much the responsibility to optimise health has become a powerful 
motivator for voluntary contributions to genetic research.76 In the example of the 
microbiome project, individual contributions go far beyond the involvement needed 
for traditional biobanks. But in contrast to these well-developed responsibilities, 
definitive rights of participation connected to the notion of citizenship are not as 
pronounced – even in the microbiome project, which is far more open than other 
projects.  
The rhetoric of citizens’ science presents knowledge and research as a form of 
general empowerment, which enables individuals to understand the ‘truth’ about their 
bodies. Its relation to IP is still largely untested, as projects are still relatively new. 
While these participatory structures can challenge IP’s exclusionary function, the 
empowered citizens in these projects fail to challenge the new responsibilities of the 
subject. Instead, as the identity of the genetic citizen is based on knowledge of their 
genetic condition, this ‘empowerment’ of the subject automatically reinforces the 
validity of genetic truth discourses, and the responsibilities arising from them. 
Healthcare practitioners and national health services also tap into this notion 
of empowerment without actual rights by promoting personalised medicine (for 
instance based on pharmacogenetics77). This vision of personalised medicine hopes 
for example that “in the future, we will all carry SMART cards, which will contain 
our genetic information.  Using these SMART cards, a GP will able to prescribe the 
                                                
76 Another example is the “open source” genome of Manu Sporny (Sporny 2011; Sporny 2015). This 
shows a strong interest in being part of research but also becoming part of the bioeconomy, being quite 
literally an ‘entrepreneur of the self’. 
77 Pharmacogenetics is “the study of the genetic basis for the difference between individuals in 
response to drugs” (Institute of Translational Medicine 2015a). 
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right drug at the right dose at the right time” (Institute of Translational Medicine 
2015b). This is also part of the UK’s new life sciences strategy, harnessing “three 
quite fundamental shifts in the practice of modern medicine: a coming revolution in 
biomedicine, in data for quality and proactive care, [and] in the role that patients play 
in controlling their own health and care” (D. Campbell 2014). Importantly, a national 
programme of “personalised medicine” would formally impose new obligations on 
the individual patient to know and to disclose their own genome. This form of 
inclusion, however, would still fall short of the participatory rights implied by the 
notion of citizenship – especially when faced with exclusion from control over 
information by means of blanket transfer of IP. IP’s affinity with this notion of limited 
empowerment thus ‘manages’ biopolitical challenges by active genetic patients, 
deflecting demands for participation in the further usage of information. 
Citizens’ science challenges the exclusion of patients from control over expert 
knowledge by IPRs to some extent, yet simultaneously reinforces somatic 
responsibilities of the self-actualising subject. The emergence of notions of the 
‘research patient’ stressing subject’s empowerment through contributions to research 
can be read as evidence of processes of accommodation folding the active patient’s 
demands into the existing system without disruption. By excluding participation by 
anyone but the IP holder, the IP system plays a central role in ensuring control over 
the bioeconomy’s further use of information derived from donations and national 
medical health records. This exclusionary function of IPRs has thus far managed 
challenges from a “biopolitics from below” (Raman and Tutton 2010, 722, see 
above), which however in the long run could fundamentally question the economic 
utility of IPRs as a whole. The analysis highlighted how new forms of IP strategies 
put pressure on the economic and biopolitical legitimacy of this exclusionary regime. 
Alternative IP strategies are also emerging in the sector of global health, reflecting a 
growing influence of patients’ concerns. The last section points out how juridical 
subjects such as medical research charities and public-private-partnerships (PPPs) are 
challenging IP in a “biopolitics from above”, strategically employing IP with the aim 
of improving the life and health of populations. 
 
4. Contesting exclusion in a “biopolitics from above” – New strategic uses of IP 
So far this chapter set out various ways in which the exclusionary effects of IPRs are 
being challenged by a greater emphasis on patients’ concerns – either voiced directly 
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by patients, or taken on board by new juridical entities such as medical research 
charities. These began using IP in novel ways, not for economic gain but as strategies 
for the improvement of patients’ health. This section argues that on the international 
level, legal subjects such as public-private-partnerships, patent pools, and medical 
research charities are similarly operating in an emerging somatic ethics within 
international organisations located at the intersection of health and the economy. Due 
to its strong links to institutions, this ethics is more reminiscent of what Raman and 
Tutton term an “old biopolitics from above” (Raman and Tutton, Ibid.), implementing 
strategies that take into account concerns for the life and health of populations 
worldwide. It is argued that these entities’ tactical use of IP is further evidence of IP’s 
emerging role as a tactics of governing challenges posed by a politics of life. Specific 
strategies engaging with exclusion within these organisations are analysed in the next 
chapter in greater detail. This section introduces a range of new juridical subjects that 
operate at the international intersection of health and IPRs, challenging the 
exclusionary effects of IPRs – but still operating within this system instead of 
radically altering it. The next chapter then explores more radical challenges to the 
international IP regime, in what has been interpreted by Lezaun & Montgomery as “a 
new moral economy of R&D” (2015, 5). 
 
4.1. IP strategies of Medical Research Charities – Charity or business venture? 
As already set out above, Medical Research Charities (MRCs) such as the Cystic 
Fibrosis Foundation are increasingly actively making use of IP for the attainment of 
their goals. An example of this can be found in the declared mission of the Wellcome 
Trust, one of the biggest MRC in the UK: “The mission of the Wellcome Trust is to 
foster and promote research with the aim of improving human and animal health. This 
is the driving force behind all of the Trust’s charitable funding activities, and the basis 
for its policy on the protection and use of intellectual property rights” (Wellcome 
Trust 2000). This marks a turn away from charities’ previous relative neglect of 
‘commercial’ interests such as IP. Looking at different instances of patenting, the 
Wellcome Trust sets out its strategy in more detail, for example with regards to the 
patenting of DNA sequences: “[...] the Trust is supportive of these if there is sufficient 
information to indicate that the DNA sequences in question can be used to develop 
healthcare benefits. The Trust does not support the patenting of raw DNA sequences 
in the absence of such information. This is in line with EU law [...]” (Ibid.). MRCs are 
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thus not generally opposed to IP and are operating within the same parameters as 
private industry – even with regards to information derived from human genetic 
materials. 
This is reflected in the advice given by the Association of Medical Research 
Charities (AMRC) on the use of patents and their potential for the sector:  
 
“Although charities cannot support a piece of research solely for 
financial gain, there may be circumstances where a charity’s objectives 
can be best achieved by ensuring that IP is protected and/or exploited. 
Indeed, because of the major costs involved in drug development and 
registration, failure to obtain IP may jeopardise its likelihood of 
successful introduction for patient benefit.” (AMRC 2007, 2)  
 
MRCs thus use IP in the same way as the pharmaceutical industry78, but in a manner 
consistent with priorities such as the promotion of healthcare and the targeting of 
research according to patients’ needs.  
At the same time, the pharmaceutical sector is turning towards the “public 
good”: “[a] new generation of leaders in the pharmaceutical industry is seeking to 
solve the dilemma of how to deliver value to their shareholders while meeting 
expectations that they should promote ‘the public good’” (CEWG 2012a, 29). F. 
Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. tries to resolve the tension between profit and public good 
by pointing out: “1,000,000,000 CHF investment; 7,000,874 hours of work; 6,587 
experiments; 423 researchers; 1 drug”, thus highlighting the cost and effort needed for 
the development of one drug (Roche 2012). 79  The importance of IP for the 
development of medicines is explained further: “Like all research-based companies, 
Roche needs patent protection to be able to recoup its long-term investments in 
                                                
78 This policy advice of the AMRC also responds directly to the UK government’s emphasis on 
creation of IP, “stress[ing] the economic advantages of using scientific knowledge to create wealth” 
(AMRC 2007, 1).  
79 F.Hoffmann-La Roche has one of the most elaborate and transparent internet presentations with 
regards to Corporate Responsibility, Ethics and Patient Involvement (Roche 2015a; 2015b; 2014). 
Their statements are largely representative of those by other leading international pharmaceutical 
companies. On 14.5.2012, the website of Merck (US) read “Improving Health Improving Lives” 
(http://www.merck.com/about/home.html), AstraZeneca’s tagline was “Health Connects Us All” 
(http://www.astrazeneca.com/Home), Pfizer outlined its “Commitments for a Healthier World” (Pfizer 
2015), and other companies prominently placed their initiatives in the field of access to medicines and 
treatment of neglected diseases, for example Novartis’ initiative in connecting with World Malaria Day 
(Novartis 2012). 
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research into new medical solutions and to pursue further innovations. Without 
patents and pricing that encourages real progress, innovation is impossible” (Roche 
2014). This has become the standard argument for IP in the context of health, 
highlighting the need for returns on investments that improve health for all – which, 
importantly, still prioritises economic profit over health. In contrast to that, MRCs 
prioritise improving life and health, which can, as shown above, give rise to different 
licensing strategies to that of the pharmaceutical industry. 
While MRCs’ IP strategies stay within the economic system, their strategic 
approach to IP management emphasises control and is more flexible and context-
dependent, as for example the case of a one-dose oral typhoid vaccine shows:  
 
“the Trust has funded a company to further develop a proprietary 
technology for application to a disease area that was not attractive to 
commercial investors. The Trust has structured the IP management 
arrangements to encourage the company to exploit Trust-funded 
research itself, but retains rights to intervene if the IP is not exploited 
for the benefit of the developing world.” (Wellcome Trust 2006)  
 
But the use of IP also highlights that this remains an adjustment within the existing 
economic system’s parameters, not the introduction of a radical alternative. Patent 
pools and PPPs are using similar flexible IP management strategies in the sector of 
global health, addressing the needs of populations in developing countries in 
particular. 
 
4.2.  Patent Pools and Public Private Partnerships – Prioritising global health? 
Within the sector of global health, new patent pools seek to address public health for 
the benefit of patients in developing countries, who are usually excluded from 
pharmaceutical companies’ considerations. Patent pools bring together available 
patents regarding one particular disease, making information about existing patents 
accessible and negotiating voluntary or reduced licenses on existing medicines, thus 
making research and distribution of knowledge in the pharmaceutical sector more 
effective and flexible - especially where it comes to patents covering pharmaceuticals 
that are needed in developing countries. In general terms, patent pools address the 
“anticommons effect” of “the existence of multiple patents, held by multiple patent 
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owners (a patent thicket)” (Verbeure 2009, 3, emphasis added) – but they do not 
contest the existence of IP in general. In contrast with the situation regarding software 
patents, “[a] principal argument for patenting biomedical inventions is the fact that 
typically, post-invention development costs far exceed pre-invention research 
expenditures, and firms are unable to make this substantial investment without 
protection from competition” (Ibid., 15). 
Patent pools seek solutions to the exclusionary effects of IP within existing 
international economic structures, especially in situations “when the IP rights 
necessary to arrive at a commercial end product such as a kit for diagnostic testing are 
held by patentees too numerous or heterogeneous to agree on licensing terms” (Ibid., 
15f.). The recently established international Medicines Patent Pool is an example of a 
single-issue international patent pool focusing on HIV/AIDS medication. Their aim is 
to “[make] patents work for public health, while giving pharmaceutical innovators 
compensation for their work” (Medicines Patent Pool 2011).80 Lobbying on behalf of 
HIV/AIDS patients in developing countries, this patent pool successfully negotiated a 
range of voluntary licenses with pharmaceutical companies. This may have been 
particularly successful due to the international focus on HIV/AIDS (see for example 
Elbe 2005), increasing the pressure on companies to make their treatments available 
to patients in developing countries in particular. The combination of this pressure with 
a relative “failure” of the market in developing countries makes a compelling case for 
voluntary licences in these cases without a significant loss of profits (see next 
chapter).  
The use of voluntary licenses by patent pools shows that this approach can 
only work in specific contexts, limited geographically to mainly least-developed 
countries. The executive director of the Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative 
(DNDi) criticises WIPO’s patent pool Re:Search (WIPO 2012b) because of its limited 
geographical reach: “it currently aims to improve access to neglected disease 
medicines in just the 49 least-developed countries, [whereas] he thinks it should aim 
to increase access for all developing countries” (quoted after Frantz 2012). But many 
                                                
80 Another example is WIPO’s Re:Search initiative, which pools IP and information in the area of 
tropical diseases, tuberculosis, and malaria (established 2011, merged with the Pool for Open 
Innovation, see WIPO 2012b). Its remit is more comprehensive than that of Medicines Patent Pool, 
comprising “not just intellectual property (IP) but also intellectual capital, including screening hits, 
expertise and know-how” (Frantz 2012). 
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PPPs also use tailored IPRs strategies within geographically limited exemptions 
granted by the pharmaceutical industry.  
PPPs have become significant partners of international organisations in the 
implementation of framework aims in the field of global health, and have specialised 
on particular diseases and local contexts in the process (see Rushton and Williams 
2011). These targeted projects can be very effective but are more difficult to replicate 
on a larger scale, as the Medicines Patent Pool had to discover. An idea of the sheer 
number of emerging PPPs can be gleaned from the Health Partnerships Database, 
which seeks to “systemically [sic.] collect data about a new breed of PPPs coalesced 
around the health needs of the poor” (ESRC Innogen Centre 2008).81 In the best case, 
“[t]his relatively new trend in global health cooperation is demonstrating significant 
possibilities for tackling problems that formerly seemed intractable, particularly those 
requiring increased research and development (R&D) on drugs and vaccines for 
diseases disproportionately affecting the poor” (Buse and Waxman 2001, 748).  
PPPs and Product Development Partnerships (PDPs) make strategic use of IP 
by deriving income from the products they developed (Brooke et al. 2007, 1757). The 
licensing regime employed by PPPs can be flexible and take into account the relative 
economic positions of the licensees – as in the example of the licensing regime of 
FIND Diagnostics: 
 
“When research has the potential to result in an invention (patentable 
or not), we negotiate with the partner(s) in advance to ensure that the 
IP rights generated by the project will be managed in such a way 
that the benefits are passed on to patients in resource poor settings. 
Industry partners assign all rights to FIND for royalty-free use of their 
technology in the public and private non-profit sectors in high endemic 
countries, while the industry partner retains distribution rights for 
developed countries and the private sector in developing countries. 
This enables the partner to recover R&D costs and to create the returns 
needed to develop new technologies.” (FIND Diagnostics 2015)  
 
                                                
81 The Health Partnerships Database was previously called the Initiative on Public-Private Partnerships 
for Health (IPPPH), which closed down in 2005. 
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Just as in the case of patent pools, this strategy counteracts IP’s exclusionary function 
in a particular geographical and social context. This limitation is intentional, as a 
group of PDPs points out in a position paper for the EU’s Horizon 2020 Framework: 
“PDPs were created specifically to address the research gap present in the 
development of products for diseases that lack viable commercial markets. PDPs use 
different models of IP management and licensing arrangements in their partnerships 
with academic institutions and private companies, aiming to de-link the costs of R&D 
from the cost of final products” (AERAS et al. 2012). 
Lezaun & Montgomery note that PPPs have begun to share IP, and use it “as a 
lever to attract others into risky collaborative ventures” (Lezaun and Montgomery 
2015, 3; see also Williams 2012). This is contrary to the usual exclusionary function 
of IP, and gives rise to “a new moral economy of R&D” emphasising collaborations 
(Lezaun and Montgomery 2015, 5). However, PPPs combine priorities set by public 
sector organisations such as the WHO with the mechanisms of the private sector. This 
approach contains both the potential for more targeted and efficient implementation 
efforts and the unpredictable consequences of introducing the private sector’s 
economic rationale to the area of ‘public’ health. This has given rise to fears “that 
new partnerships are leading down a slippery slope towards the partial privatization 
and commercialization of the UN system” and “that partnership enables nation states 
to abdicate their responsibilities for the promotion and protection of their citizens’ 
health”, as for example “it is charged that the independent setting of standards was 
jeopardized during the elaboration of the guidelines for the management of 
hypertension because of the influence of a firm that stood to benefit from them” (Buse 
and Waxman 2001, 750). Despite these concerns, PPPs are increasingly involved in 
global health policies, and the WHO sees PPPs and PDPs as central to the future 
financing and facilitation of research and development of medicines (CEWG 2012a, 
31). 
Thus neither patent pools nor PPPs/ PDPs are intending to challenge the 
notion of IP in general. They rather address the needs of certain patients from within 
the parameters of the international economic system. In this way they acknowledge 
the increasing demands of patients while they are at the same time reinforcing the 
general function of IP – from which they derive income. However, the emerging 
“moral economy” surrounding the financing of R&D in global health projects 
combines the use of IP with a politics of health, in which PPPs can be seen to be 
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“governed at a distance” as they implement centrally defined priorities in small-scale 
private projects. Instead of focusing on IP’s economic function, it is argued in this 
thesis that PPPs are becoming involved in a version of somatic ethics developing 
within international organisations operating at the intersection of global health and the 
economy. The result is an ongoing process of accommodation between biopolitical 
and economic priorities, on the national and international level. The next chapter 
explores particular challenges to the IP system arising from this ethics, which even 
include frank debates on the introduction of alternatives to IP. Examples of human 
rights challenges and an increasing focus on the argument of ‘market failure’ could 
have radically unsettling effects on IP’s legitimation. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter set out challenges to the IP system made by “active” patients defining 
their identity and wellbeing increasingly on the molecular level. This showed how the 
subject’s identity is affected by a change of the truth over life, and how the subject’s 
attention to health on the genetic level can present an increasing challenge to IP’s 
exclusive control over knowledge. Patients’ participation in decisions on the further 
usage of knowledge can lead to new strategic uses of IP, as the examples of PXE 
International and MRCs showed. Even on the international level, a range of juridical 
subjects uses IP in strategic ways to address the needs of patients especially in 
developing countries. However, most of these strategies remain regional exemptions 
to the IP regime, and do not challenge the overall legitimacy of this system. IP’s 
exclusionary structures still prevent the participation of active patients in decisions on 
the further usage of genetic information. At the same time, demands for participation 
made by active patients further entrench healthcare responsibilities of the “genetic” 
citizen, who is encouraged to donate materials and information to research. IP can 
thus be understood to “govern at a distance” in the same manner as experts, ensuring 
the complete transfer of control over genetic knowledge. In contrast to this 
management of active patients, the next chapter evaluates IP’s response to the use of 
human rights and the ‘market failure’ argument in strategies that pose a more 
fundamental challenge to the IP system.  
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Chapter VI Contesting exclusion on the international level – Emerging 
strategies in the name of life 
 
“The game is in Europe, but the stake is the world.” (Foucault 2008, 56) 
 
The function of IP as a regime for exclusion appears in its starkest form on the 
international level. Here, as this chapter sets out, the complete division between IP on 
human genetic sequences and the ‘source’ of this material is even more entrenched. 
Tellingly, debates about IP’s treatment of genetic materials are being mostly held in 
international organisations outside of the IP system, such as the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) and the supplementary Nagoya Protocol on Access to 
Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their 
Utilization (ABS) to the Convention on Biological Diversity (‘Nagoya Protocol’). 
However, since the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health (2001) even the 
core of the IP system has begun to engage with questions of life and health, and the 
previous chapter set out how legal subjects such as patent pools and PPPs have 
employed IP in new strategies implementing global health aims. Some analyses go as 
far as saying that a “paradigm shift” towards greater openness is underway in the IP 
regime (Morin 2014; Lezaun and Montgomery 2015; to some extent also Williams 
2012; Pogge, Rimmer, and Rubenstein 2010; Gibson 2009). This chapter analyses the 
emergence of particular challenges to the IP system’s relation to life in policy debates 
in WTO, WHO, and WIPO. It argues that in these debates, the IP regime is beginning 
to respond to tensions that could more fundamentally disrupt its legitimacy.  
This chapter focuses on detailed processes of transformation in the role of IP 
within major international organisations, which differ from the individual challenges 
brought by active patients and medical research charities explored in the previous 
chapter. The connection between the international IP regime and global health 
stretches across several international organisations, which usually operate entirely 
autonomously from each other. Against this backdrop, the emergence of a trilateral 
cooperation between WIPO, WHO, and WTO (2013) and a developmental agenda 
within the IP organisation WIPO are striking and challenging changes. Focusing on IP 
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as a regime of global biopower could provide a critique of the exclusionary character 
of this regime as a foundational exclusion or “abandonment” of large parts of the 
world’s population (Selmeczi 2009; Agamben 1998; Godoy 2013, see discussion in 
chapter III). This perspective can however not explain the emergence of new IP 
strategies and a “new moral economy of R&D” (Lezaun and Montgomery 2015, 5) 
within global health projects. This chapter goes beyond this critique, and directs 
attention to emerging strategies that challenge IP’s relation to life in the international 
sphere, where slow change is brought about even at the heart of the IP system. In a 
newly developing policy area of IP and global health, arguments relying on the right 
to health and strategies converging around the concept of ‘market failure’ are 
increasingly contesting IP’s legitimacy. 
 
1. IP as a regime for exclusion on the international level 
The places of origin of human genetic materials and the location of industries 
involved in deriving further use from these samples are distributed very unevenly 
across the globe. Because of this, the use of IP on human genetic sequences has in the 
past given rise to widespread controversy internationally. Critiques have termed these 
practices “biopiracy” and argued that they amounted to a second “enclosure of the 
commons” (Shiva 1998; Boyle 2003; May 2010, see discussion in chapter II). In 
response to these critiques, new mechanisms for access and benefit sharing (ABS) 
were suggested and developed especially with regards to plant genetic material. The 
Nagoya Protocol to the CBD is the most tangible result of this process, and came into 
force only very recently (12th October 2014). However, important members of the 
international community such as the US and Japan are still not signatories to this 
instrument or have failed to ratify, and the practical implementation of measures still 
remains largely unexplored (see overview in Oberthür and Rosendal 2014). 
Furthermore, the relation between this ABS agreement and TRIPS remains unclear, as 
the Nagoya Protocol and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) have been 
negotiated outside of WTO structures.  
Processes of exclusion need to be understood as a separate strategic power 
exercise of the IP system, as shown in the previous chapter. This chapter argues that 
the IP system exercises power not only by bestowing exclusive rights on the IP 
holder, but also by operating in relative isolation on the international level. The 
continuing international division between IP on information derived from human 
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genetic materials and the places of source of this material highlights IP’s exclusionary 
role in its starkest terms. On the basis of this realisation, the chapter then explores 
strategies challenging IP’s institutional isolation on the international level within an 
emerging frame of reference centred on life, which requires new legitimations from 
the previously entirely separate IP system. These responses are better understood as 
instances of governing. This thesis’ analytical perspective on IP as an emerging 
tactics of governing highlights how IP’s exclusivity is beginning to be contested in 
debates about IP and health, and IP and human rights, held within pro-IP international 
organisations such as the WTO and WIPO. The IP system continues to fulfil its 
economic role, however, this now needs to accommodate demands made on the basis 
of life and health, leading to a process of accommodation in which IP begins to act as 
a tactics of governing between life and the market. 
 
1.1. Deriving exclusive rights from international bioprospecting and biobanking 
projects 
The relation between IP and genetic conceptions of life on the international level has 
been marked by several highly controversial instances of “bioprospecting” (Robinson 
2010, 11) in developing countries followed by registration of gene patents on the 
gathered ‘materials’ in industrialised countries. Most notable amongst these was the 
Human Genome Diversity Project (HGDP)82, which collected a diverse range of 
genetic samples from different distinct peoples across the world, and gave rise to 
allegations of racism and ‘biocolonialism’. Indigenous peoples referred to it as the 
“Vampire Project” and strongly criticised the range of chosen donor populations and 
the patents derived from the samples later on (see Thacker 2005a, 134). An unrelated 
patent application on a leukaemia-resistant human T-cell line derived from a Papua 
New Guinean, filed by the US Department of Health and Human Services and the 
National Institutes of Health in 1993 (Oriola 2007, 6; Thacker 2005a, 134) was also 
heavily criticised for the cursory way in which it dealt with the original donor. These 
issues were addressed in the later Human Genome Project (HGP) in a dedicated 
‘ELSI’ (Ethical, Legal and Social Implications) programme, entirely funded as part of 
the larger project itself. This programme focused in particular on the question of 
                                                
82 This is a separate human genome project to the Human Genome Project (HGP), which focused on 
the mapping of all human genes, sequencing multiple variations of each gene in order to come up with 
a more complete picture.  
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informed consent. IP is usually not included in such formal considerations of 
bioethics beyond the question of informed consent. 
The HGP proved less controversial due to the ELSI programme and the 
project’s less racially charged connotations, however, further controversies arose 
when an Australian pharmaceutical company named Autogen attempted to create a 
biobank containing blood samples and DNA of Tonga’s people in 2000 – also seeking 
to capitalise on this community’s relative isolation and distinctiveness. The project 
was dropped in the face of vociferous criticism from Tonga’s population, which 
complained that the informed consent procedures disregarded Tonga’s particular 
social structure and the importance of the family unit within it. Consent could thus not 
be obtained from the individual alone, but needed to take into account the views from 
the extended family group (Nwabueze 2007, 167). However, Autogen’s project 
addressed previous criticisms made of ‘bioprospecting’ programmes by promising to 
share the proceeds of any commercial products derived from the research, 
establishing laboratories on Tonga and assigning property rights over individual 
genetic samples to Tonga’s government – effectively nationalising this property 
(Ibid.).  
A similar approach to property was taken by deCode’s Icelandic Population 
Biobank. However, in the Icelandic case “informed consent was claimed on behalf of 
the people of Iceland through an act of parliament” (Senituli and Boyes 2002, 4; see 
also Fortun 2008). This model differs from other biobanks, which adopted a much 
more protectionist position towards the material and background information, as for 
example was the case in Sweden (Nilsson and Rose 1999, 894). Part of the Icelandic 
plan was to establish a Health Sector Database (HSD) in the Act on a Health Sector 
Database (No. 139/1998), passed by the Icelandic parliament on 17.12.1998, “which 
would link its clinical and research data to both the Icelandic health care system 
records and the genealogies” (H. Rose 2003, 78).83 The Icelandic government created 
a tissue bank “to complement the HSD” in the Act on Biobanks No. 110/2000 
(Nwabueze 2007, 156). This tissue bank and the HSD operated on the basis of 
licenses, so that the property in the materials collected remained with the government 
                                                
83 Iceland was selected because of its moderate size, geographical isolation, good level of healthcare 
and high per capita income. Furthermore the Icelandic population was also judged to display a 
particular “enthusiasm for science and technology and its fruits [that] is not shared by most other 
Europeans”, and to be a “‘good’ population because of their claimed homogeneity” (H. Rose 2003, 80 
and 81). 
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of Iceland. However, the blanket presumption of consent encountered strong 
criticism, and “six years later that statute was overturned as unconstitutional, and 
subsequent national biobanks such as those in Australia, Estonia and the United 
Kingdom have required explicit consent at the time of donation” (Dickenson 2007, 
126). 
Interestingly, the transfer of IP was not directly discussed in ethical debates, 
even in these very contentious examples of biobanks and bioprospecting projects. 
Bioethics debates usually revolve around the issue of informed consent to counter 
allegations of ‘biocolonialism’ perpetrated by companies based in industrial countries, 
and are slowly also including problems of IP in informed consent structure 
(Dickenson 2004). The assumption of IP rights by the Icelandic government did not 
give rise to a debate similar to that of its presumed consent – and still does not, as the 
details of the transfer of rights in the recently established structures of UK Biobank 
show. Where it comes to intellectual property, the consent form of UK Biobank 
clearly states: “I […] relinquish all rights to these samples which I am donating to UK 
Biobank” (UK Biobank 2011). There is an option for withdrawal from the programme 
promising “UK Biobank would destroy your samples (although it may not be possible 
to trace all distributed sample remnants)” (UK Biobank 2010). Thus the transfer of 
property rights is permanent, even though the samples themselves may be destroyed 
at a later date. UK Biobank then grants licenses to private corporations and scientists 
for the use of the genetic information (UK Biobank 2007, 13).  
Exclusive rights are derived from individually donated samples in all these 
examples of bioprospecting and biobanking projects – held either directly by a private 
company or in some cases by the respective national government. These rights are not 
directly contested in bioethics debates – but they are nonetheless criticised strongly by 
the Biopiracy and New Enclosure literature. In response, demands for Access and 
Benefit Sharing (ABS) aim to ensure a more direct connection between the donation 
of the materials and the eventual profits made from the intellectual property and 
commercialised products derived from this donation – albeit only in the area of plant 
genetic material. ABS agreements such as the Nagoya Protocol have been debated 
extensively for example under the CBD, suggesting amongst others a requirement for 
the disclosure of the provenance of the sample used for a particular patent application 
– but have not been included into the list of minimum provisions for patentability 
under TRIPS.  
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The IP system thus remains doubly exclusionary – assigning exclusive 
monopoly rights to private entities and at the same time excluding any reference to 
the origin of samples used for the genetic ‘invention’ in question. This detachedness 
is mirrored in the division of debates between pro-IP international organisations such 
as WTO and WIPO, and pro-ABS organisations such as the CBD. This separation 
between sites of debate also masks a division of interests between industrial, IP-
producing countries and developing countries, which are often the location of 
provenance of samples used in the production of IP. As the next section will show, 
this division of debates perpetuates the exclusive status of IP, as ABS agreements fail 
to make inroads on the TRIPS system. While the relation between the Nagoya 
Protocol and TRIPS is still under discussion, the exclusivity of the IP system remains 
especially effective in the area of IPRs on information derived from human genetic 
materials, where no similar ABS agreement has been negotiated. 
 
1.2.  Addressing international imbalances through Access and Benefit Sharing 
The Nagoya Protocol’s attempt to counteract the exclusionary function of the IP 
system through a mandatory disclosure requirement must be considered briefly, 
despite its primary applicability to plant genetic materials and traditional knowledge. 
It aims to address the imbalance between the cost of maintaining biodiversity and the 
relative ease in which plant genetic resources can be accessed in bioprospecting 
programmes, and then commercially exploited by corporations without maintaining 
any connection to the material’s place of origin. The protocol’s goal of “[creating] 
incentives for biodiversity conservation” is thus especially addressing the global 
geographical distribution of resources and industry in this case: “[…] many tropical 
developing countries are particularly rich in terrestrial species and related genetic 
resources (GR) and associated traditional knowledge, whereas the technological 
capacity to exploit GR is concentrated in developed countries” (Oberthür and 
Rosendal 2014, 1).84 A similar geographical division between donors and industry 
also gave rise to condemnations of the HDGP and other programmes seeking to 
exploit human genetic materials with particularly ‘interesting’ traits. 
                                                
84 Oberthür and Rosendal point out that “[a]t the onset of the CBD negotiations, developing countries 
held only about 1 per cent of all patents in biotechnology, and by 2005, that figure had increased to 4 
per cent” (2014, 4). 
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 The most ambitious part of the negotiations leading up to the Nagoya Protocol 
sought to introduce a mandatory disclosure requirement into IP law, containing “the 
origin of genetic material as well as information to confirm that it has been acquired 
in accordance with [prior informed consent] and [mutually agreed terms] 
requirements” (Ibid., 7). This requirement would have established a direct link 
between patents and the origin of genetic material from which information has been 
derived – and could thus for example have fundamentally altered the minimum 
requirements for patentability of information derived from genetic materials. This 
undertaking proved too ambitious, and was in the end not included in the final text of 
the Nagoya Protocol.  
The introduction of a disclosure requirement is however still under 
consideration in the ongoing negotiations in WIPO’s Intergovernmental Committee 
(IGC) on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and 
Folklore. WIPO’s IGC is part of the organisation’s larger development agenda, in 
which this traditionally pro-IP institution is currently engaging. WIPO used to be the 
central international organisation for IP related matters, until the TRIPS agreement 
took over this role within the WTO in an instance of strategic “regime-shifting” by 
industrial countries (Helfer 2004, 18 ff.). While, as an independently funded UN 
agency, WIPO continues to derive its funding from IP registration fees, and thus 
remains central to and supportive of the IP system, it has recently begun hosting an 
ambitious development agenda – arguably more in line with UN human rights 
standards (on this “resurgence” of WIPO see May 2006, 74; Muzaka 2013).  
Since 2001, negotiations in WIPO’s IGC have been navigating a similar split 
between developing countries and developed countries as the one reflected in the 
ratification procedure of the Nagoya Protocol – where the EU remained the most 
important full member representing the interests of developed and IP-producing 
countries (on the role of the EU in the negotiations and its interests see Oberthür and 
Rabitz 2014). WIPO in contrast has a much broader range of member states, including 
the US, which makes these negotiations potentially more likely to bring about change 
– and thus can be interpreted as a strategic “regime-shift” by developing countries 
with the aim of “[integrating] rules generated in other international regimes into the 
organization [WIPO]” (Helfer 2004, 69; also Muzaka 2013). However, industrial 
countries and the biotech lobby have thus far strongly opposed the introduction of a 
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disclosure requirement in WIPO’s IGC, and continuing negotiations are not getting 
any closer to resolving this issue (Third World Network 2014; Saez 2014c).  
This failure to include a mandatory disclosure requirement both in the Nagoya 
Protocol and thus far also in WIPO’s negotiations highlights the resilience of the IP 
system’s exclusionary function internationally. Oberthür & Rosendal underline this 
continuing exclusion by pointing out “IPRs are guaranteed by governments and not 
touched under ABS, while ABS is trying to correct the consequences by delegating to 
decentralized negotiations between private/public actors” (Oberthür and Rosendal 
2014, 8). Thus the Nagoya Protocol’s attempt at addressing the division between the 
source of genetic materials and its commercial exploitation resulted in a treaty that 
operates outside of IP law – especially as long as the relation between TRIPS, the 
CBD, and the Protocol remains undetermined.85 
While the interests of IP-producing countries have thus been enshrined in a 
very enforceable international legal system, the interests of developing countries 
remain sidelined, excluded from recognition in the requirements for patentability, and 
have only limited success within negotiations on international agreements seeking to 
address this situation. Despite this, debates about IP’s relation to life especially in 
developing countries are being conducted within the most significant international 
pro-IP institutions. This chapter argues that negotiations about the treatment of 
genetic resources and the health of populations constitute sites of challenge to the 
exclusionary function of IP, arising from life as a new frame of reference for IP’s 
legitimation. These challenges and their potential can be better understood as 
strategies for intervention on the IP system in the name of life and health, in response 
to which IP begins to act as a tactics of government. Instead of focusing on a possible 
interpretation of IP as a form of biopower, which as part of the liberal system 
inscribes a constitutive exclusion of the expendable parts of the world’s population, 
this thesis’ reading analyses the detailed processes through which governmental 
rationalities evolve, and how law becomes a tool of governing in a response to 
changing conceptions of life. 
 
                                                
85 The relation between TRIPS and the CBD is still being discussed as part of the review procedure of 
Article 27.3b TRIPS – regarding the patentability of plant and animal inventions. The 2001 Doha 
Development Agenda broadened the scope of these negotiations to include the resolution of the relation 
between TRIPS and CBD (WTO 2015a). 
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2. The Doha Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health: Problematizing the 
health of populations 
The exclusionary paradigm of the IP regime is undergoing change. New debates are 
increasingly emphasising “greater policy flexibility and greater access to knowledge” 
(Morin 2014, 276; Williams 2012), and the boundary between the public and the 
private domain is becoming “porous” (Lezaun and Montgomery 2015, 4). The Doha 
Ministerial Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health (2001) constituted the starting 
point for an ongoing deliberation of the connection between IP and life on the 
international level, involving the three most significant organisations at this 
intersection: the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the World Health Organisation 
(WHO), and the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO). These three 
organisations have subsequently engaged in explorations of the intersection between 
IP and life, recently resulting in a trilateral cooperation and the release of a study on 
‘Promoting Access and Medical Innovation: Intersections between Public Health, 
Intellectual Property and Trade’ (WHO, WIPO, and WTO 2013). These debates do 
not directly address human genetic materials, but discussions of IP’s relation to health 
include all pharmaceuticals and tests currently under development. 
It is argued here that these initiatives can be better understood as part of a 
process of accommodation between IP law and a growing emphasis on the life and 
health of populations within these international organisations. This emphasis has 
elsewhere been interpreted as a “new moral economy” in which PPPs are sharing 
knowledge (Lezaun and Montgomery 2015, 4). This thesis argues that these 
developments highlight the engagement of these organisations in the wider 
problematization of IP’s relation to life for the purposes of governing. The Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health established a link between previously 
entirely separate policy fields and also between separate organisations working on 
health and IP. This development is beginning to break down the exclusionary regime 
of IP, giving rise to tensions to which IP law’s reacts responsively as a tactics of 
governing. The policy debates around IP and life still maintain the exclusionary status 
of IP, but are increasingly legitimating this with reference to life and health. After 
setting out the emerging link between health and IP, this chapter turns to challenges 
formed within these new discourses of legitimation. Here, the confrontation with the 
right to health and the argument of market failure could present radical challenges to 
IP’s legitimacy. 
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2.1. Establishing a link between health and IP: Problematizing global life 
The Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health represented a major success on 
the behalf of developing countries, as Correa points out: “The eventual adoption of a 
declaration on Public Health and TRIPS was the outcome of a carefully elaborated 
strategy by developing countries” (Correa 2000, 3). It clearly set out and affirmed the 
rights of countries to make use of existing flexibilities of the IP system for health 
purposes, and also contained a moratorium on full implementation of TRIPS for least-
developed countries until 2016. In particular, it directly acknowledges “public health 
problems afflicting many developing and least-developed countries, especially those 
resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics”, and 
“reaffirm[s] the right [...] to use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, 
which provide flexibility for this purpose” (WTO 2001, No. 1 and 4). These 
“flexibilities“ are made up of, most importantly, a recommendation of interpreting 
existing provisions “in the light of the object and purpose of the Agreement as 
expressed“, also the “right to grant compulsory licenses”86, the “right to determine 
what constitutes a national emergency [...] it being understood that public health 
crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other 
epidemics, can represent a national emergency“, and the recognition that each 
Member State is “free to establish its own regime for [the exhaustion of intellectual 
property rights]87” (Ibid., No. 5).  
Thus the Doha Declaration “[i]mplicitly […] recognised the concern of 
developing countries about the effects of TRIPS on access to medicines” (t’ Hoen 
2009, 19). As a result, life became problematized for the purposes of governing on a 
global scale, and the concerns around IP and global health became a new policy area 
within international organisations. In the wake of the Doha declaration, a much larger 
number of compulsory licences was issued. 88  Examples for recent high-profile 
compulsory licences are those issued by Brazil (2007)89 and by India (2012)90. India 
                                                
86 A compulsory licence is issued in cases of health emergencies without the consent of the patent 
owner (WTO 2015). 
87 The ‘exhaustion’ of IP refers to the limitation of the rights holder’s influence after a licensed sale. 
88 “By the end of 2007, 52 developing States had issued post-Doha Declaration compulsory licences, 
indicating that the Declaration has had the desired effect of prompting needy States to make use of the 
Article 31 exception” (Joseph 2011, 225). 
89 Between 2001-2007, Brazil mainly relied on the threat of a compulsory licence. In 2007 it finally 
issued one on AIDS medication (ICTSD 2007).  
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has since also increasingly developed its own position on patentable subject matter. In 
2013 India’s Supreme Court denied Novartis a patent on the cancer medicine Glivec 
(Gleevec), arguing that it did not constitute enough of an innovation compared to its 
previous version (Supreme Court of India 2013). This announced a stricter approach 
to patentability as a response to ‘evergreening’ patent applications, thus expediting 
the availability of medicines as cheaper generic versions.91 The production for export 
under compulsory licence was another contested way in which IP adversely affected 
developing countries’ capacities to improve public health. After debates stalled in 
2001, it was finally resolved in 2003 in a further declaration on the implementation of 
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration (WTO 2003), making it possible to export 
medicines under a compulsory license to countries that do not have the capacity to 
produce drugs themselves. 
Since Doha, the connection between IP and public health has also been 
strengthened in the area of IP management (CEWG 2012a, 56), in which rules can 
differ from country to country. This is an area that does not directly address the 
conditions for the issuing of patents, but looks at the conditions around the patenting 
process, such as regulatory approval for medicines. In this area, bolar provisions92, 
extensions of data exclusivity93 and orphan drug disease rules94 are flexibilities that 
are very regularly considered and evaluated in WTO, WHO and WIPO documents on 
public health (see for example WTO 2002), and also in a range of other publications 
and activities in this sector (for example in the business models of PPPs). These 
flexibilities operate on a level below that of compulsory licenses, which are much 
more powerful interventions but are not issued very often in practice.95 
The Doha declaration on TRIPS and Public Health was however not only the 
result of developing countries’ pressure for a stronger recognition of the connection 
                                                                                                                                      
90 This was the first compulsory licence issued by India, raising concerns of a new attitude towards IP 
in India (Controller of Patents, Mumbai 2012; Estavillo 2012).  
91 ‘Evergreening’ refers to the practice of extending patents beyond their initial 20 years by introducing 
small changes to the substance’s composition and then registering a new patent on this essentially 
unchanged version. 
92 Bolar provisions streamline the market approval process to facilitate a quicker transition to generic 
versions of medicines after the expiration of the original patent term (WTO 2002, 44). 
93 The period of data exclusivity covers clinical test data to delay the entry into the market of a generic 
version of the drug in question. This extends the window of profitability in return for the research effort 
that went into drug discovery in a variety of desirable areas (for example neglected diseases). 
94 Orphan drug rules prevent other medicines addressing the same condition from getting regulatory 
approval in a particular national market, thus encouraging the development of treatments for rare 
diseases. This period of marketing exclusivity usually covers a period of 7-10 years. 
95 In fact, issuing such a license is in practice discouraged, and only relatively powerful countries 
manage to successfully make effective use of them. 
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between health and IP. The negotiations were conducted against the backdrop of 
mounting concerns about the flexibility of the system even in the countries usually in 
favour of strong IP rights (t’ Hoen 2009). The anthrax scare in the US at the time 
raised the spectre of a compulsory licence issued by the US for the protection of the 
health of its population, which “forced all WTO Members to ask themselves how 
much of a prisoner they wanted to be of their own patent systems” (Ibid., 30). This 
situation suddenly reversed the usual division of interests. The US found the existing 
system too rigid to respond to health security crises, which require vast amounts of 
pharmaceuticals in a very short amount of time – an objective that the licensing and 
import systems cannot deliver reliably. In this case, the health of its population had to 
be secured even at the expense of IP standards. This highlights the subversive 
potential of the biopolitical motivation of “securing” health (Dillon and Lobo-
Guerrero 2008; Elbe 2009), which has in this case given rise to an entirely new policy 
sector surrounding IP and global health. 
 
2.2. Legitimating IP and ‘TRIPS Plus’ treaties in the name of health 
The history of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health can thus be read as 
the introduction of the IP regime to the problematization of governing global life. On 
the basis of this new connection, a new policy sector emerged at the intersection of IP 
and global health. The promotion of life and health became a new point of reference 
for the international IP regime, in what could be interpreted as an international 
version of somatic ethics influencing international organisations occupied with 
discussions on IP and health. This reading emphasises the wider implications of a 
“politics of life” within international organisations, giving context to the finding of a 
“new moral economy of R&D” (Lezaun and Montgomery 2015, 5) and its potential 
conflicts with the IP regime. The IP regime is already accommodating this new point 
of reference, as highlighted by the growing influence of health in the US 
government’s subsequent attempts of negotiating ‘TRIPS Plus’ bilateral treaties. This 
process of accommodation can give rise to unexpected tensions within the IP regime – 
as the discussions of the confrontation with the human right to health and the 
argument of market failure show (see below).  
 The US government has been negotiating higher IP and IP enforcement 
standards nationally and internationally. On the national level, the US attempted to 
expand the reach of US copyright legislation to the rest of the world by means of 
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national legislation in the failed SOPA (Stop Online Piracy Act) and PIPA (Protect 
Intellectual Property Act), which all formed part of the “Campaign to Protect 
America” (Sell 2008, 6). International standards of IP enforcement have been under 
negotiation in the controversial Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), 
Trans-Atlantic Partnership (TPP), and Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP). While ACTA, for example, does not mention public health, it still 
applies to pharmaceutical products, and could affect the effective distribution of 
medicines and the ease of management of public health programmes – by seizing 
goods in transit “alleged to be infringing “local” patents on their way through 
European airports” (Abbott 2009, 44; UNAIDS 2011, 34; Roffe and Spennemann 
2006). At the same time, ACTA and higher IP enforcement are promoted in order “to 
protect the health and safety of European consumers”, and critics are reassured that 
ACTA “contains explicit public health safeguards” (ACG, Andema et al. 2012). 
Debates about ‘TRIPS-Plus’ standards are thus challenged because of their possible 
detrimental effects on public health and as a result even these bilateral negotiations 
are becoming suffused with considerations of the health of populations. 
 While these bilateral US initiatives are negotiated outside of the WTO, WIPO 
and WHO structures96, further negotiations in these international organisations on the 
role of IPRs in the field of health also revolve around the compatibility of IP with the 
priority of global life (see overview of debates at WTO 2015b). WTO Director-
General Pascal Lamy found in these debates “a shift in focus from the ‘compatibility’ 
of trade, intellectual property and health to the more dynamic and constructive 
‘coherence’ between them” (WTO 2011). Over the last decade, the WTO, WHO and 
WIPO have started a process of “consolidating their technical cooperation activities”, 
resulting for example in a trilateral study on ‘Promoting Access and Medical 
Innovation: Intersections between Public Health, Intellectual Property and Trade’ 
(WHO, WIPO, and WTO 2013; other studies look at access to medicines and 
treatments, innovation and public health, CIPIH 2006; and also provide a general re-
assessment of existing international treaties in terms of the way in which they can 
serve to promote public health, WTO 2002; see also list of available documents at 
WHO 2015). 
                                                
96 This could be understood as another interesting instance of regime shifting (following Helfer 2004), 
in which the US is seeking to inscribe its own understanding of IP’s relation to health and security. 
Negotiations are held in unusual secrecy for trade matters (see description of negotiations in Geist 
2010). 
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 The report on Strengthening Global Financing and Cooperation (CEWG 
2012a) stands out for its particularly critical perspective on the IP system’s potential 
for the promotion of global health goals. The WHO’s independent Consultative 
Expert Working Group (CEWG) on Research and Development suggested 
alternatives to the existing system, which were greeted as a “breakthrough 
opportunity” (Stiglitz 2012), but were subsequently severely delayed and watered 
down in extended and ongoing negotiations at the World Health Assembly (WHA) 
(Love 2012; WHO 2015; Balasubramaniam 2014; 2013a; 2013b). While the emphasis 
within most of the other documents remained on the assumption that IP will promote 
public health within a functioning market through the encouragement of innovation 
(on this theoretical justification of IP see Merges 2011, 270 ff.), the CEWG report 
employed the argument of “market failure” in order to highlight the limits of the IP 
legitimation. 
The remainder of this chapter explores specific challenges emerging within 
this new frame of reference for the legitimation of IP. IP’s failure to enable access to 
medicines has been criticised as a “market failure” in relation to life and health, and 
has given rise to deliberations of genuine alternatives to the existing IP system. 
Similarly, the relation of IP to the right to health is being explored, and human rights 
are considered in negotiations on treaties in WIPO’s Intergovernmental Committee 
(IGC) on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge and 
Folklore. It is argued that understanding these two arguments as instances of the IP 
regime acting in a “responsive” way shows how IP as a tactics of governing 
negotiates tensions between life and the economy: while these strategies push the IP 
system to its conceptual limits, these challenges are governed and managed by long 
delays and slow deliberations.  
  
3. Emerging Challenges: Human Rights and ‘Market Failure’ as Strategies for 
Intervention in the Name of Life and Health 
Some debates within these core institutions at the intersection of life and the global 
economy are openly questioning IP’s legitimacy in the context of global health aims. 
This section points out that the argument of market failure and the use of human 
rights are potentially more radical strategic contestations of the exclusionary effects of 
the IP regime on the international level. The emergence of a new policy area around 
IP and global health produces tensions between competing priorities in these 
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negotiations – between life and property. It is argued that these tensions and responses 
to these arguments within the WTO and WIPO are indicative of a slow process of 
accommodation within the international IP regime towards demands made in the 
name of life. This would constitute an opening of this exclusionary apparatus that 
could have fundamentally “disruptive” potential in the sense of Golder & Fitzpatrick: 
IP law could “[disrupt] itself through becoming receptive of resistances that 
constantly challenge its position, its content, its being” (2009, 71). However, the long-
term potential of emerging global health strategies of IP law still remains unclear. 
Lezaun & Montgomery observe that the current emphasis on sharing and openness in 
the “pharmaceutical commons” may be followed by a return of exclusionary practices 
capitalizing on “expectation of future enclosures” (2015, 21).  
This possibility of a return to exclusionary practices however partly depends 
on the outcome of debates in the IP system on alternative financing methods and the 
relation of the IP system to human rights. This section sets out these two challenges to 
IP’s exclusionary function on the international level, confronting it with the 
“problem” of life. First, the emerging confrontation between human rights (especially 
the right to health) and IPRs is still very recent, but tensions between these forms of 
‘rights’ are mounting and are yet to be resolved (Helfer and Austin 2011; Cullet 2007; 
Matthews 2010; Grosheide 2010; Joseph 2011; Hilberg 2015). The negotiation of 
human rights challenges to IP is explored in the example of ongoing negotiations in 
WIPO’s IGC on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowledge 
and Folklore. Second, the concept of market failure is another example of a challenge 
to IP’s relation to life: the aim of increasing access to medicines is here coupled with 
a critique of the economic function of IP (CIPIH 2006; CEWG 2012a; Trouiller et al. 
2002; Williams 2012). Both challenges have the potential of contesting the legitimacy 
of IP, but their interventions are being ‘managed’ by processes of accommodation – 
in decade-long negotiations in the IGC and through the watering-down of alternatives 
suggested by the CEWG. 
 
3.1. Introducing Human Rights 
IPRs and human rights are two important areas of international law which have only 
very recently been brought into contact, in fact, “[l]ittle more than a decade ago, few 
observers acknowledged the existence of such a relationship or viewed it as more than 
marginally relevant to the important issues and debates in each field” (Helfer and 
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Austin 2011, 1). An example of this encounter is the recent trilateral study of WHO, 
WIPO, and WHO, which describes the issue of public health as having “long rightly 
occupied front rank among priorities for global cooperation”, and states “[t]he right to 
health is a universal human right, just as the burden of disease is shared by all 
humanity” (WHO, WIPO, and WTO 2011, 2). This recognises the relevance of the 
demand for the right to health within the IPRs system, thus creating an opening of the 
IP system to interventions made from the perspective of all humans, not just those 
directly involved and having a stake in the IP system. However, as this section sets 
out, this potential has to be re-evaluated with regards to the “ambivalent” potential of 
human rights to not only contest but also to sustain and entrench existing 
arrangements, by “conduct[ing] the behaviour and go[ing] to constitute the very 
identities of those who deploy them” (Golder 2013, 7; Hilberg 2015).  
 
3.1.1. Confronting IP with the ‘positive’ right to health 
The right to health has been laid down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(1948) under Art. 25, the WHO Constitution (1946), and further defined in the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1976) under Art. 
12: “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health”. The 
precise content of the right to health is however not clearly and universally defined, 
resulting in differing interpretations between for instance different EU states (McHale 
2010, 278 f.), and in different positions towards this right held in different 
international institutions. 97  In contrast to that, the IP system is very strongly 
institutionalised, and contains mandatory minimum standards that have to be rendered 
enforceable within the national legislature of each member state. In these, existing 
TRIPS flexibilities address health concerns only in a very specific set of 
circumstances and can only be understood as short-term measures. Beyond these, 
critics contend that the TRIPS system “undoubtedly elevates IP rights over other 
potentially conflicting rights” (Joseph 2011, 216). 
The confrontation with rights granted to all human beings has the potential to 
disrupt IP’s exclusionary function at the most fundamental level, as demonstrated by 
the challenge of the Brazilian constitution’s effective guarantee of the right to health 
                                                
97 For one authoritative interpretation issued by a UN body see General Comment No. 14 (2000) on 
Art. 12 ICESCR by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR). 
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to the IP system (Matthews 2010; Biehl et al. 2009; Reubi 2011). Here, patients 
invoked the right to health in demands for access to antiretroviral medicines, and in 
2001 the Brazilian government became embroiled in a conflict with the US on the 
issue of compulsory licenses (t’ Hoen 2003). This direct confrontation ended with a 
settlement in the face of widespread protest demonstrations. Similarly, the 
pharmaceutical industry’s attempted legal challenge to the South African 
government’s stance on antiretroviral medicines was dropped in 2000 because of a 
high-profile media campaign protesting the enforcement of IP (Godoy 2013, 42; 
Hestermeyer 2007, 11 ff.). These examples highlight the mobilising power of the right 
to health, and the disruptive potential of this challenge. But an understanding of the 
role of human rights in the deployment of governmental power can provide a deeper 
understanding of this encounter, which is often also presented as entirely 
unproblematic (WHO, WIPO, and WTO 2013). The incremental goal-setting 
development of the right to health in combination with slow-moving negotiation 
procedures shows how this confrontation results in slow processes of accommodation 
rather than upheaval. 
 Most developments in the area of international human rights law take the 
form of soft law98, which works through voluntary and non-enforceable processes of 
goal setting. This attribute of progressive fulfilment is especially pronounced in 
“positive” human rights, which “[require] States to take actions to fulfil the rights 
therein” – in contrast with “negative rights”, which “[require] only that States refrain 
from rights violating behaviour” (Joseph 2011, 21). 99 The right to health and also the 
general right to property 100  are both positive rights, which are realised in an 
incremental process – whereas the current IP system consists of mandatory, 
enforceable standards, which do not share the same flexibility for accommodating 
new priorities. However, while human rights thus pressure for higher standards and 
                                                
98 The category of soft law “is not of itself ‘law’” but still commands particular power through 
“recommendations, guidelines, codes of practice or standards”,  “signalling the evolution and 
establishment of guidelines, which may ultimately be converted into legally binding rules” (Shaw 
2003, 111). The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 is an example. It is mostly used to flesh out existing 
standards. 
99 Economic, social, and cultural rights such as the right to health and the right to property are usually 
seen as positive rights, whereas political and civil rights are commonly seen as negative rights, 
however, as Joseph points out, “all human rights entail both positive and negative characteristics” 
(Joseph 2011, 21). 
100 The TRIPS IP system is a specific version of this contested ‘right to property’, but not coextensive 
in content, see General Comment No 17 on Art 15 (1) c ICESCR by the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (2006). 
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can accommodate tensions, their potential effect on the IP system (representing 
property) is not clearly determined. 
 
3.1.2. The paradoxical potential of rights: Incremental processes of accommodation 
The increasingly direct confrontation between the IP system and human rights has so 
far triggered a number of new developments according to Helfer & Austin’s incisive 
analysis:  
 
“(1) increased attention to the neglected cultural rights of indigenous 
communities; (2) efforts to identify the adverse consequences of 
TRIPS and TRIPS Plus treaties for the realization of economic, social, 
and cultural rights; (3) a growing recognition of the human rights 
responsibilities of multinational corporations; and (4) attempts by 
those same corporations to invoke the human right of property as an 
alternative legal basis for protecting intellectual property.” (Helfer and 
Austin 2011, 49)  
 
These developments show how comprehensively the human rights argument has been 
introduced to the IP system – paradoxically both as a means of challenge to TRIPS 
and TRIPS Plus treaties, but also as a justification for the protection of IP. In this 
encounter, Helfer & Austin argue that human rights have the potential to “[expose] 
serious normative deficiencies of expansive intellectual property protection rules from 
a human rights perspective” (Ibid.). However, this section argues that the question of 
the “counterhegemonic” potential of human rights (Godoy 2013, 5) has to be 
contrasted with the “paradoxical” nature of human rights (Brown 2000, 231). This 
paradox refers to the way in which reliance on human rights captures and conducts 
the conduct of dissenters to fit essentialised ‘minority’ identities fundamental to 
human rights norms, and more amenable to the priorities of the (neo)liberal system 
(Golder 2011; 2013; Odysseos 2010; 2011).  
As Odysseos argues, the source of this paradoxical role of human rights 
becomes more obvious in the “ontogenesis” of the subject of rights, which is a “self-
governing subject” akin to the economic subject of neoliberal governmentality (the 
homo oeconomicus), and “contribute[s] positively to the deployment of pastoral 
power and the governmentalisation of the state” (Odysseos 2010, 755). This 
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underlying complementarity reveals human rights’ contribution to the governing of 
life and the economy, beyond Foucault’s (notoriously conflicted) statements on the 
role of human rights101: “Foucault’s cursory dismissal neglects the ways in which 
human rights, and their engendering of homo juridicus, participate fully in the 
governmentalisation of the state and the creation and reorganisation of the conditions 
of freedom, domestically and internationally” (Ibid., 754). In this way, human rights 
“[become] one of the varied tactics of government” (Ibid., 755), can even be seen to 
“discipline dissent” (Coleman and Tucker 2011) in the very moment in which it is 
registered in the language of rights by “[conducting] the behaviour and 
[…][constituting] the very identities of those who deploy them” (Golder 2013, 6). 
Odysseos (2011) shows this gradual process at work in resistance campaigns, in 
which reliance on human rights and court procedures leads to the increasing adoption 
of essentialised modes of subjectification. 
The realisation of this underlying complementarity of the subject of rights and 
the economic subject, and human rights’ disciplining effect on dissent sheds light on 
human rights’ supportive potential to governmentality’s priorities – and undermines 
the notion of their counterhegemonic potential. Human rights’ potential challenge to 
the IP system can thus be recast as relative to their promotion of the priorities of 
governmentality. As argued above, the increasing use of the right to health within IP 
policy discourse has the potential to challenge IP’s relation to life by introducing a 
wider range of perspectives to the exclusionary apparatus of IP. This potential 
however now appears tempered by human rights’ constitutive relation to the new art 
of governing. The right to health’s challenge to IP is thus less radical when the 
“disciplining” effects of the procedures involved in this mode of contestation are 
taken into account. These effects can be traced for example longstanding negotiations 
in WIPO’s IGC on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional 
Knowledge and Folklore. 
WIPO’s IGC seeks to formulate international agreements on IP’s treatment of 
genetic resources, traditional knowledge, and folklore as part of WIPO’s ambitious 
development agenda (May 2006; Muzaka 2013). This resulted in a direct 
confrontation between the fundamentally pro-IP body WIPO and its UN human rights 
                                                
101 As pointed out in chapter III, Foucault famously found human rights to be “mask” of power 
relations (Foucault 1977, 222). He later argued for the potential of human rights for confronting 
governments on the floor of the UN in 1981 (see Foucault 2000, 474; Keenan 2010; Patton 2005; 
Whyte 2012). 
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obligations. Years of protracted negotiations even resulted in debates about a 
fundamental incompatibility between development and IP (Saez 2014c). The 
unfolding impasse in these negotiations highlights the profound nature of human 
rights’ challenge to the IP system, and the sheer magnitude of problems encountered 
by the relatively rigid IP system’s attempt to accommodate human rights demands. It, 
however, also contrasts this potential power of rights with the “disciplining” effect of 
participation in these negotiations.  
Most strikingly, this relatively open negotiation of the usually specialist policy 
area of IP law allows a great variety of different actors to participate. An even wider 
variety of actors can register comments and suggestions on already negotiated texts, 
and there is a fund available for the support of NGOs participating in the consultation 
(WIPO 2012a). This is a radical opening of the IP apparatus towards a variety of new 
perspectives – those of potentially all humans. However, this opening also remains 
limited as all parties technically are only classed as “observers”, and the actual extent 
of the indigenous rights under discussion is still unclear, as the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007) has not been endorsed by a number of countries 
with significant indigenous communities, such as “Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
and the United States” (Helfer and Austin 2011, 51).  
Aside from understanding these actual negotiations as the result of a 
successful challenge in the name of minority rights, the greatest potential for 
contestation in these negotiations has derived from giving indigenous communities 
the opportunity to register their dissatisfaction with the present system. Thus the 
representatives of indigenous communities walked out of debates held in the 
Committee on Genetic Resources in 2012 in protest of their status as mere 
“observers” and issued a statement complaining of the limited way in which their 
suggestions had been included in the texts thus far (Saez 2012a). However, the next 
day a draft text of the agreement on genetic resources was still agreed after the 
communities had rejoined the negotiation (Saez 2012b). Nevertheless, through 
involvement in the process they had been able to protest their limited input on the 
final text, which still remains a highly contested work in progress. The 2014 WIPO 
General Assembly could not agree on a schedule for further negotiations in 2015, so 
that the decade-long process is currently on hold. 
This instance of protestation and subsequent re-negotiation however also 
shows the palpable “disciplining” effect of these negotiations on indigenous 
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communities’ resistance to the existing IP system. Similarly to Odysseos’ analysis, 
they are becoming “subjects in the process of being governmentalized” through their 
reliance on rights guaranteed by the system, revealing the function of “law as a tactic 
of government” (2011, 450). The participation in the IGC led to a debate about the 
future of IP in a forum that accepts the premise of the need for IP in general. As this 
challenge is being ‘managed’ by the IP system, indigenous communities and other 
participants are negotiating an agreement on access and benefit sharing that questions 
only the modalities of this premise, not the system as a whole. While they are thus 
afforded the opportunity to register some dissatisfaction, their dissent is “conducted” 
and governed in a manner that does no longer radically challenge the general IP 
system in general. 
 
3.2. Diagnosing Market Failure 
These processes of accommodation are also apparent in debates challenging the IP 
system’s “market failure” in developing countries. Under the auspices of WHO, the 
previously mentioned independent CEWG’s report on Research and Development to 
Meet Health Needs in Developing Countries: Strengthening Global Financing and 
Coordination (CEWG 2012a) argued that a “market failure” questions the accepted 
legitimation of IPRs in certain geographical and social contexts – with regards to their 
detrimental effects on access to medicines. IP is usually justified as a necessary trade-
off within the existing neoliberal ‘free market’ system, providing inventors with a 
financial return on their invention, thus making research and development (R&D) of 
drugs profitable in the long run. Robert Merges explains that in the “current 
convention” of IP,  
 
“[t]he traditional utilitarian formulation – the greatest good for the 
greatest number  – is expressed here in terms of rewards. […] The 
gains from this scheme, in the form of new works created, are weighed 
against social losses, typically in the form of the consumer welfare lost 
when embodiments of this works are sold at prices above the marginal 
cost of their production” (Merges 2011, 2).  
 
This trade-off, however, posits the existence of a functioning market, in which 
consumers (such as national health services) are able to pay an increased price for 
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new medications in the short term, and the availability of newer medication will be 
beneficial for all in the long term. These foundational assumptions are challenged by 
the argument of ‘market failure’, which has given rise to extended negotiations as 
well. 
 
3.2.1. Challenging IP’s market failure in Global Health 
The concept of ‘market failure’ was introduced to critiques of IP’s relation to life over 
the last ten years, in a process that has encountered delays and setbacks throughout. 
An earlier Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health 
(CIPIH) paved the way for the CEWG’s report by clearly setting out the uneven 
distribution of the global disease burden, and specifically questioning the potential of 
IPRs in addressing this issue:  
 
“Too few R&D resources are directed to the health needs of 
developing countries. In the private sector, companies do not have the 
incentive to devote adequate resources to develop products specifically 
adapted to the needs of developing countries, because profitability is 
mainly to be found in rich country markets. The great majority of 
health research funded by the public sector, takes place in developed 
countries, and its priorities principally reflect their own disease burden, 
resource position and social and economic circumstances.” (CIPIH 
2006, 172) 
 
Instead, CIPIH argued that as “a prerequisite for access”, “appropriate treatments 
should be available for diseases and conditions that disproportionately affect 
developing countries” (Ibid., 171). This may be seen as stating the obvious – 
however, in the area of IP this statement made under the auspices of a major 
international organisation constituted a breakthrough, reflecting the shifting frame of 
reference for IP policy towards “pro-access regimes” (Williams 2012, S129; Rushton 
and Williams 2012; Lezaun and Montgomery 2015).  
Instructed to “deepen the analysis” after developing countries rejected an 
earlier EWG’s (Expert Working Group) report on financing and R&D (CEWG 2012a, 
19), the CEWG picked up the theme of inequality and exclusion introduced by CIPIH 
and declared a “market failure” where it comes to providing functioning financing 
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models for R&D in developing countries (Ibid., 24–25). An example for such market 
failures is the “low level of investment in R&D on antibiotics” and vaccines (Ibid., 
24), which is already becoming a global health problem as rates of resistant bacterial 
strains are increasing. This example shows that the market does not always tend to the 
most pressing health issues globally (and nationally). The declaration of this fact 
within an international dialogue on the future role of IP in global health policies poses 
a major challenge to its accepted role in a neoliberal economy.  
The notion of market failure generally addresses an economic situation in 
which a market operates inefficiently. This common economic concept is used in 
economic theory in a broad range of ways – but in the WHO’s statements it is used 
with the express intention of addressing IP’s failure with regards to the health of the 
global population. However, recent WHO statements show that at times this argument 
is also taken on in defence of the IP system. Statements on the industry’s failure to 
develop an Ebola vaccine before the outbreak in 2014 stress that “market failure, not 
IP, [is] the issue in Ebola treatment shortage” (Saez 2014b). This statement seeks to 
dispel concerns raised about existing patents on an isolated genetic strain of the Ebola 
virus, for example on “the isolated human Ebola (hEbola) viruses denoted as 
Bundibugyo (EboBun)” (Saez 2014a).102 Williams argues that the presence of pro-
access actors “has given the IPR/trade regime an opportunity to reconsolidate, and 
helped offer it new legitimacy after a period of sustained attacks with regard to its 
negative impact on drug access” (Williams 2012, S129). This period of 
“reconsolidation” in the face of substantial challenges to IP’s legitimacy can be 
interpreted as a part of a process of accommodation taking place at the intersection of 
life and the economy. 
 
3.2.2. Exploring alternatives to IP 
In the face of a failed market, the CEWG report explores radical alternatives to the IP 
system in order to finance and promote research. One suggestion calls for overt public 
involvement in the formulation of new priorities for R&D in a “global framework on 
research and development” guiding research towards health concerns of developing 
countries. The report also introduces a classification of diseases that directly connects 
                                                
102 Patent Application No. CA2741523A1 (http://www.google.com/patents/CA2741523A1?cl=en 
accessed 22.10.2014). This patent shows that global health’s relation to IPRs always also includes the 
issue of the treatment of genetic information.  
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disease prevalence with economic circumstances. In contrast with IP’s recognition of 
orphan (i.e. rare in overall terms) or neglected diseases (mostly neglected tropical 
diseases, which are prevalent in developing countries), the report introduces Type I, II 
and III diseases:  
 
“Type I diseases are incident in both rich and poor countries, with 
large numbers of vulnerable populations in each. Type II diseases are 
incident in both rich and poor countries, but with a substantial 
proportion of cases in poor countries. Type III diseases are those that 
are overwhelmingly or exclusively incident in developing countries.” 
(CEWG 2012a, 18, Footnote 2)103  
 
This classification is an intervention seeking to establish a point of reference 
that supports findings of market failure. Based on this system, the report recommends 
for example the removal of orphan drug rules and extensions of data exclusivity, as 
“there was no evidence that data exclusivity materially contributes to innovation 
related to Type II and Type III diseases and the specific R&D needs of developing 
countries in relation to Type I diseases” (Ibid., 54). This would fundamentally alter 
the system of accepted IP flexibilities set out in the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and 
public health, making redundant two of the three main measures of IP management in 
the context of health. 
 Furthermore, the CEWG report seeks to “[delink] the costs of R&D from 
production prices” (Ibid., 19 and 53) by suggesting a system of public prizes for 
fulfilling certain research aims. The explicit aim is “to replace the current [IP] model 
with a government-supported prize fund”, as  
 
“[w]ith a prize system, innovators are rewarded for new knowledge, 
but they do not retain a monopoly on its use. That way, the power of 
competitive markets can ensure that, once a drug is developed, it is 
made available at the lowest possible price – not at an inflated 
monopoly price” (Stiglitz 2012).  
 
                                                
103 Both the CIPIH and CEWG report use the Type I, II and III categories (see t’ Hoen 2009, 83). 
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However, these more radical recommendations rely greatly on the availability of 
alternative sources for sustainable funding for R&D efforts according to new 
priorities (CEWG 2012a, 63). Under consideration are “the proposal of a new indirect 
tax, voluntary contributions from businesses and consumers, taxation of repatriated 
pharmaceutical industry profits, and new donor funds for health research and 
development” (Ibid., 20, table 1.1). 
Subsequent negotiations in the WHA significantly diluted the CEWG’s 
suggestions and halted further progress in this direction at least until 2016 (CEWG 
2012b; Kiddell, Iversen, and Gopinathan 2013).104 In this regard, the lengthy process 
going back to the CIPIH report (2003) can be interpreted as another example of a 
process of accommodation in protracted debates in organisations that are generally in 
favour of IP’s continued existence. The persistent obstacles to implementation of 
recommendations and attempts at re-negotiation in the WHA are another indicator. 
Beyond that, these debates show how the IP system faces critique from two sides in 
this case – in terms of its relation to health and in economic terms. But Williams 
points out that the pro-access regime has so far “failed to challenge the underlying 
economic rationale for strict and global drug patents” (2012, S129). The market 
failure argument creates only a regional exception to the usual IP regime, and does 
not aim to overturne the entire system. 
But the argument of market failure still constitutes an overt intervention 
against IP’s exclusionary function that in certain circumstances seeks to supplant the 
market’s determination of the direction of research with an officially formulated 
agenda. The report proposes to set research targets centrally, as an act of official 
intervention that counteracts the failure of the market. This strategy is reminiscent of 
a “biopolitics from above” (Raman and Tutton, 2010, 722), instead of representing a 
more “capillary” diffusion of biopower. The alternative system of disease 
classification diffuses power in a more capillary manner, enabling decisions on the 
applicability of IP rules at diverse sites without recourse to a central decision-making 
body. The increasing involvement of PPPs and PDPs in global health programmes 
also contributes to the diffusion of biopower. IP’s relation to these different elements 
of a “new moral economy of R&D” (Lezaun and Montgomery 2015, 5) can thus be 
                                                
104 Comments made by Médecins Sans Frontierès in 2013 still deplore the lack of progress with regards 
to the main recommendations, for example a global R&D framework (Médecins Sans Frontières 2013). 
However, some preliminary steps have been agreed on at the 67th WHA in 2014 (DNDi 2014). 
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understood as a complex process of accommodation to an ethics of a new policy 
sector. Here, the IP regime responds to tensions tactically. While concessions towards 
failed markets certainly do not extend to an instant threat to the entire IP system, this 
responsive management of critique could give rise to a situation in which IP law 
begins to “[disrupt] itself through becoming receptive of resistances that constantly 
challenge its position, its content, its being” (Golder and Fitzpatrick 2009, 71). The 
exploration of alternatives to the current IP system, even in limited circumstances, 
could mark a starting point for new challenges. 
 
Conclusion 
The international IP regime still remains exclusionary, especially with regards to 
attempts at establishing a connection between sources of genetic materials and their 
further use by industry. Here, IP acts as a very effective and absolute regime for 
exclusion of participation towards developing countries. However, within an 
emerging policy area of IP and global health, the role of IPRs is undergoing change. 
Beginning with the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, the connection 
between IP and global health agendas has given rise to new strategic uses of IP in 
business models of PPPs and PDPs. A “paradigm shift” (Morin 2014) towards 
openness is beginning to challenge IP’s legitimacy as a mechanism for promoting 
research and development of medicines that respond to the health needs of developing 
countries. These debates on IP and global health are notable because they occur at the 
core of the IP system, unlike the entirely separate CBD and Nagoya Protocol 
negotiations. Here, some arguments begin to successfully challenge IP’s exclusion of 
large parts of the world’s population within international organisations usually 
predominantly concerned with the protection of IP. Market failure and the right to 
health both question IP’s legitimacy on a fundamental level by promoting the 
inclusion of a wider range of perspectives. However, a closer analysis of the actual 
processes of contestation shows that this disruptive potential is being ‘managed’ by 
extended negotiations, limited concessions, and the subject of human rights’ active 
contribution to the fulfilment of neoliberal priorities. In these processes of 
accommodation, the IP regime contributes to the governing of tensions between life 
and the economy. 
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Chapter VII Conclusion 
 
The informational-genetic conception of life gives rise to value within a neoliberal 
economy – but it also intensifies the problematization of the governing of life. This 
thesis argued that the resulting tensions could be better understood from an analytic 
perspective that can grasp the wider social influence of the notion of the genetic code, 
which gave rise to a new system of truth over human existence, inscribed on the 
molecular level of the body – and which opened up the body to interventions on the 
molecular level. The analysis of IP’s encounter with a genetic dispositif was 
conducted on three different levels, reflecting a confrontation with the constituent 
elements of biopower: truth, the subject, and power exercised in the name of life 
(Rabinow and Rose 2006, 212). In this way, the analysis of IP’s treatment of genetic 
knowledge over life moved beyond previous critiques of the ‘commodification’ of life 
by means of IP. Instead of placing overwhelming emphasis on the determination of 
social relations by economic exchange processes, this analysis can account for a wider 
range of incentives and responsibilities for participation in the creation of knowledge.  
An adapted understanding of the role of law in a governmental system 
highlighted IP law’s contribution to the governing of life in an otherwise perplexing 
series of judgements on the definition of DNA and in strategic uses of IP ensuring 
open access to knowledge in a new somatic ethics. It argued that IP law is 
instrumental in setting up and ensuring the functioning of the market, but also begins 
to respond tactically to resistances created by the pervasive influence of the genetic 
dispositif. The increasing significance of the intersection between genetic conceptions 
of life and the IP regime intensified these tensions. An analysis of these tensions 
highlighted IP’s role in establishing control over knowledge for the purpose of 
participation in the bioeconomy, and its role in the normalisation of knowledge.  
In this reading, two trajectories of challenge were identified as significant sites 
of IP’s responsive engagement with exteriority (Golder and Fitzpatrick 2009, 56): the 
question of participation in the bioeconomy, and tensions surrounding the 
normalisation of knowledge. These were explored as unfolding contestations over 
truth discourses over life, responses to demands made by “genetic” subjects relating 
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to control over genetic truth, and in new strategic interventions challenging IP’s 
relation to life. The analysis of these trajectories highlighted the particular processes 
of development within a “governmental” rationality, confronted with changing 
conceptions of life. This contributed to an understanding of governmentality by 
stressing the role of law as a tactics of the government of life, to an understanding of 
biopolitics by underlining adjustments to a rise of a new genetic and informational 
conception of life, and to the study of international relations by showing that 
international legal frameworks and institutions are integral to emerging key areas of 
political contestation based on the pursuit of life and health. 
 
1. Broadening the analysis on contestations of IP 
The analysis focused on two trajectories of challenges that were not understood 
adequately in an overwhelming emphasis on ‘commodification’: the role of IP as a 
regime that excludes participation in the bioeconomy, and the role of IP in 
establishing control over a normalised version of knowledge over life. This 
perspective illuminated otherwise contradictory recent developments affecting the 
patentability of ‘life’, emerging strategic uses of IP by subjects that are not primarily 
motivated by economic incentives, and interventions that challenge rules for access to 
the bioeconomy within a national and an international context. Incentives for 
participation in research can for example be understood with reference to a “new 
somatic ethics” of the self (N. Rose 2008a), containing new rights and responsibilities 
that are formed on the basis of genetic truth. The analysis of new modes of 
subjectification showed how IP contributes to the management of their participation 
in biobanks and personal genomics collections by enabling the derivation of economic 
value from voluntary donations given to support “research”, while also at the same 
time preventing any further influence on the use of these donations. This highlights 
how IP operates tactically alongside an ethics that incites the individual to voluntarily 
contribute to research – in which IP then control the further economic and scientific 
use of the collected information. 
Understanding contestations around IPRs from this perspective can also 
contextualise relatively surprising developments such as the Myriad decision, which 
introduced an informational definition of genetic sequences into IP law, but in effect 
reduced its patentability. This came as a shock to the pharmaceutical industry and was 
the result of a protracted struggle over the ‘nature’ of genetic sequences in the lower 
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courts. Instead of focusing on the paradox of diminishing commodification, this 
perspective can link this change to a broader problematization of life for the purpose 
of governing. A governmental analysis emphasises the growing importance of 
knowledge over the natural processes of ‘life’ for the determination of appropriate 
strategies promoting the life and welfare of the population. This thesis stressed that 
the relevance of knowledge over life was intensified by the informational-genetic 
conception of life, which links knowledge of the individual and of population. The 
genetic dispositif contains a particularly efficient code for knowledge of “the nature 
of things” (Foucault 2008, 19). Chapters III and IV argued that an understanding of 
the pervasive influence of the genetic dispositif can explain the normalisation of 
informational-genetic truth over life within IP law, even at the expense of the 
patentability of some forms of genetic sequences. 
These questions of access to and control over knowledge were traced in an 
industrial and policy sector that connects the international and national level. On the 
international level of IP law, the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health 
marked the emergence of new “pro-access regimes” (Williams 2012) and a “new 
moral economy of R&D” (Lezaun and Montgomery 2015). Since then, IP law also 
became embroiled in a process of accommodation between its economic role and its 
centrality to questions of life and health, giving rise to many high-level reports, legal 
summaries, and instructional workshops. These gave rise to arguments of market 
failure and the right to health’s connection to IP, which have the potential to 
fundamentally challenge the IP system’s economic legitimation. The analysis showed 
how the IP regime responds tactically to these challenges in a process of 
accommodation. This process however engrains a new frame of reference in which 
genuine alternatives to the existing IP system can be explored. 
 
2. The governmentalisation of IP law: Contributions and limitations 
The analysis showed how the function of IP law undergoes change as its relation to 
life becomes a new point of reference. This reading contributes to governmentality 
studies in international relations, which has thus far neglected to study the role of 
intellectual property at the intersection of life and the economy. It also introduces the 
methods of critical legal studies to the discipline of international relations, affecting 
the way in which law is studied here. The focus on law in this study deliberately 
directs attention to the foundational role of law, governing for the market through the 
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creation of predictable objects for exchange. This role is being challenged by IP’s 
relation to genetic conceptions of life, which for example complicates the 
predictability of underlying truth discourses of life. In this, the analysis also adds to a 
political economy of IP by investigating the connection between the juridical and the 
economic sector, drawing attention to law’s different contributions to the maintenance 
of market parameters. 
This perspective expands the purview of objects and subjects of government. 
By addressing the “genetic” subject’s conduct of conduct based on a molecular vision 
of life, this thesis expands the analysis of processes of governing to include more 
diffuse exercises of power in a new “biopolitics from below” (Raman and Tutton 
2010, 722). Similarly, within the emerging policy sector of IP and global health, PPPs 
and PDPs are also exerting power that “governs” the use of knowledge for the 
purposes of improving the life and health of populations. These new strategic uses of 
IP have been neglected by previous studies of IP as an international regime enabling 
biopiracy. By conceiving of IP’s role here as one of “governing”, this analysis 
emphasises ongoing contestations and developments within the regime, instead of 
understanding IP as global (exclusionary) biopower. Demands for participation and 
the re-inscription of processes of exclusion can in this context be read as parts of an 
ongoing governmental process of accommodation. 
The concept of biopower can open up otherwise confusing and conflicting 
developments by directing the focus of analysis away from previously well-exercised 
sites of inquiry. Instead, this thesis captures the complexity of IP’s relation to life by 
concentrating on the role of subjects, the construction of truth, and new strategic aims 
for the use of IP. This analytical contribution reveals IP’s part in the governing of life 
through determining access and assigning control over knowledge, and lays the 
foundation for further empirical research and normative critiques. It specifically 
enables greater attention to processes of exclusion in a legal regime that connects 
international standards with national legislation in a unique way. It also facilitates 
new normative critiques of exclusionary processes in the otherwise pro-access and 
pro-sharing projects of citizens’ science and research projects claiming to “empower” 
patients and citizens. Furthermore, IP’s contribution to the construction of a 
predictable account of human life also demands more thorough engagement. Using 
the notion of a confrontation with biopower enables a different approach to these 
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issues, going beyond the usual focus on “bioethics” (for an overview of bioethics see 
Dickenson 2012). 
However, the analytical power of understanding IP as a tactics of government 
also has limits. As already pointed out at the beginning of this thesis, the central claim 
of this study is not that the entire IP regime is undergoing drastic change. This study 
rather sought to examine otherwise inexplicable contradictory developments within 
IP’s application to notions of life. The IP regime undoubtedly still remains a very 
effective apparatus that ensures the patentability of genetic sequences for the benefit 
of the biotech industry, as Rosenow for example points out (Rosenow 2012). Also, 
analyses of tensions within the international sphere of IP law cannot take into account 
the national variants of this IP system. Further empirical study could investigate 
different regional approaches to access and control.  
Similarly, focusing on the changing role of law within a governmental 
rationality diverts attention from the continuing function of law as an expression of 
sovereign power, and as a disciplinary tool. As Foucault pointed out, these three 
modes of power exercise continue to coexist within a governmental rationality 
(Foucault 2007, 8; Elbe 2009, 64 ff.). Further studies of developments within the 
international IP regime could trace IP’s involvement in sovereign, disciplinary, and 
biopolitical power exercises.  
Finally, recent critiques of governmentality studies within international 
relations also highlighted the danger of over-emphasising the extension of 
international (neo)liberalism (Selby 2007; Chandler 2010, see also discussion in 
chapter III). This thesis focused on very specific debates within core institutions of 
the neoliberal international economic order, and on debates conducted within 
undeniably neoliberal countries such as the US. However, these findings cannot be 
transposed into statements on a global condition. “Genetic” citizens can only exercise 
their rights and fulfil their obligations within a very specific economic and cultural 
context. Other social and economic contexts will not generate the same engagement 
with the IP regime, as Godoy’s investigation of human rights campaigns against IP in 
South America discovered (Godoy 2013). Tensions analysed within this thesis thus 
must be understood as relatively recent and also reflective of specific institutional 
debates on the international level. The emergence of IP and global health as a new 
policy sector within certain international organisations is thus a truly international 
issue, which needs conceptual attention. IP’s confrontation with life, however, is an 
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issue that connects the national and international level of IP law due to the wide 
minimum standards of patentability guaranteed in TRIPS. 
 
3. The tactical roles of IP: A regime for exclusion and for the normalisation of 
knowledge 
The analysis of IP’s contributions to the governing of life showed that beyond the 
commodification of ‘life’ by means of IP, this regime also fulfils a number of other 
important functions. IP determines the limits to participation in the bioeconomy and it 
normalises certain types of knowledge at the expense of others. These roles are 
revealed as they are coming under pressure in their encounter with biopower. Here, 
even genuine alternatives to the IP system are being deliberated in some cases. For 
example, the most common legitimation of IPRs as an important tool for encouraging 
and rewarding expenses of research and development has been challenged in 
interventions that explored alternatives to IP such as prize funds and suggested an 
official list of priorities for research rewarded by money raised in form of taxation 
(CEWG 2012a). This challenge has been countered in campaigns by the 
pharmaceutical industry emphasising the costs of producing new medicines, linking 
this cost to the aim of furthering life and health. This marks the emergence of a new 
frame of reference, which is being taken on not only by developing countries and 
patients, but also by the industry and pro-IP institutions. Two trajectories are running 
through interventions made by industry, institutions, PPPs, PDPs, MRCs, and 
patients: the contestation of limits to participation and the increased use of IP for the 
purpose of exercising control over knowledge in order to improve access for 
researchers and exert control over research agendas. These trajectories are connecting 
a new somatic responsibility of contributing to research, and a new emphasis on 
sharing and openness. 
 
3.1. The problem of ‘access’ – IP as a regime of exclusion 
One focus of critique emerging around IP is the question of access to medicines. On 
the international level this issue is mostly explored in the context of developing 
countries. New strategic uses of IP within these contexts operate through regional 
exemptions granted voluntarily by the pharmaceutical industry. These voluntary 
licenses appear less self-effacingly generous if they are understood in combination 
with the argument of ‘market failure’, which critiques the absence of legitimating 
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conditions for the IP regime’s usual function of deriving profit for the purpose of 
financing research. This argument contains a strong normative critique, which can 
give rise to widespread condemnations of the IP regime’s exclusionary effects. At the 
same time, the pharmaceutical industry does not derive meaningful profits from a 
failed market. This confluence of strong critique and absence of profits can make the 
negotiation of voluntary licenses for failed markets more likely. Especially where it 
comes to medicines for conditions such as HIV/AIDS, ‘failed markets’ strongly 
challenge the legitimacy of IP monopolies. In response to the very stark exclusionary 
function of IP in this case, the Medicines Patent Pool successfully negotiated a range 
of voluntary licenses. These regional exemptions however fail to challenge the overall 
legitimacy of IP, and rather constitute a part of a process of accommodation towards 
priorities of global health. 
This role of IPRs is mirrored within other geographical and economic contexts 
as well, where their exclusionary character is also becoming increasingly contested 
from the perspective of life and health – yet this challenge is less effective due to the 
absence of ‘market failure’. The prevention of easy access to their BRCA1 and 2 
breast cancer gene testing kit was one of the factors that led to the long running 
lawsuit against Myriad Genetics in Assoc. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad (2013). 
Very high prices and a very strong enforcement policy prevented scientists from 
disclosing test results to patients in certain situations105 and from scientists and 
patients accessing other laboratories conducting similar tests (which were then closed 
down after warnings issued by Myriad). This exclusionary function of IPRs – which 
is the original function of a monopoly – comes under pressure from new modes of 
subjectification engendered by a somatic ethics placing emphasis on responsible 
conduct of the individual in terms of health. As individuals (and governments) are 
turning to analyses of their genomes in order to determine their personal risks, 
genome scans are becoming part of the health-conscious repertoire of the 
entrepreneurial autonomous subject of neoliberal governmentality. In some cases, 
IPRs are standing in the way of broad availability of these tests, while in others, IPRs 
function as a dividing line between the services offered to the individual (such as gene 
scans, determination of genetic risks, and in some cases also explanation of results to 
better “know” yourself) and the services then provided by the business to other 
                                                
105 This occurred for example when they conducted ‘research’ under the research exception granted in 
the licensing process – this does not allow them to ‘treat’ patients. 
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businesses: licensing out the use of the aggregate dataset for use by commercial 
research. 
Here, IPRs operate as a regime of exclusion, demarcating the area of influence 
of individuals (donors/patients/customers) from that of experts and business. The 
sphere of participation by individuals is thus structured as one of mostly customers, 
which need to be giving informed consent and then possibly receive instruction by an 
expert based on their results extending to the formation of new norms of conduct. 
Within the sphere of business, in contrast, IPRs turn this information into a 
commodity that can be circulated in the bioeconomy. Control over the use of this 
information rests with the business, not the customer, who is only involved in a 
yes/no decision of consent to the general use of their data.  
In contrast to this exclusion from the sphere of business, examples of patients 
as holders of IP on their ‘own’ genetic condition have shown that this control was 
exercised for different priorities than that of economic gain – showing that the 
question of access and participation has implications beyond this economic function. 
Here, demands for access became the actual motivation for using IP, giving patients 
control over research and the accessibility of research results. Medical research 
charities have been most influential in translating these interests in viable research 
strategies with specific health priorities, relying on the economic function of IP as 
part of their business model. This reliance on IPRs shows that similar to the argument 
of ‘market failure’, these biopolitical challenges are not de-legitimising IP, but rather 
only address the issues of access and control over research. They are thus part of a 
process of accommodation of the IP system to priorities of life and health, in which 
the IP law’s response to challenges in the name of life brings about the 
governmentalisation of law without actually abolishing IP. Within this unfolding 
process, IP continues to fulfil several functions, which makes it particularly resilient 
towards challenges by active patients. 
 
3.2. An economic ‘truth’ – IP as a tool for the normalisation of knowledge 
One important function of IP within a governmental economy is its contribution to a 
normalisation of knowledge – rewarding research framed as part of certain scientific 
paradigms while side-lining others. This role of normalisation remains important even 
in the face of changing research paradigms. IP’s changing understanding of ‘life’ 
shows how the genetic sequence went from a special chemical molecule to an 
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informational entity, and brought about changes in the patentability of genetic 
sequences in the process. A governmental reading can highlight how the episteme of 
‘information’ became central to an ever-increasing integration of different sectors of 
governing and deriving value from life – making an informational understanding of 
genetic sequences more amenable for use across the governmental apparatus. IP’s 
previous understanding of genetic sequences as primarily chemical molecules had 
been easily integrated into the IP apparatus, where information as such is not 
patentable. But the epistemic shift towards information proved more influential, and 
created problems for the IP regime as a result. 
The Myriad decision normalised genetic sequences as genetic-informational 
entities within IP jurisdiction, even at the expense of patentability of some forms of 
sequences. However, this step still stands in striking contrast to current influential 
scientific understandings of ‘life’ within the life sciences. Here, a turn away from the 
centrality of the genetic code is taking place, moving towards accounts emphasising 
complexity and interaction with the environment. Interestingly, a closer look at the 
changing jurisdiction on the ‘truth’ of life shows that this turn towards complexity has 
not been acknowledged or discussed, even though these fields of research date back to 
the foundational time of molecular biology. In this field, the ‘central dogma’ of 
genetic determinism marginalised all other conceptions of ‘life’ for most of the 
twentieth century – becoming influential throughout society and within cultural 
imagination at the same time. The IP system continues to prioritise this genetic 
determinist vision of life, and thus contributes to the maintenance of the ‘genetic 
dispositif’. This dispositif provides predictable knowledge that disciplines the 
individual (see Rouvroy 2008), informs biopolitical strategies on the population level, 
and is easily integrated within the bioeconomy due to its informational character. IP’s 
role in the normalisation of this predictable form of truth over life thus tactically 
marginalises other more complex knowledges of life, which have thus far not been 
able to compete with this central ‘economic’ function of the informational-genetic 
episteme. 
 
4. Private v public – IP on the contested dividing line in governmentality 
The range of IP’s functions places contestations around IP’s relation to life and health 
at the heart of a struggle between the ‘economic’ disposition of things and the well-
being of populations – expressed within neoliberal governmentality in adjustments 
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between the sphere of ‘public policy’ and the ‘private sector’, between “the question 
of the too much and the too little” of governmental intervention (Foucault 2008, 28). 
IPRs are, as Sell noted, “private power, public law” (2003), implemented by means of 
public law, enshrined in public international treaties, but ensuring private rights and 
representative of private industry interests. The history of the TRIPS agreement as a 
part of the WTO negotiations shows a strong involvement of industrialised public 
powers (national governments) representing the interests of their domestic industries, 
which rely on IP for parts of their business in the pharmaceutical industry and the 
motion picture and creative industries. 
Foucault’s work points out that direct interventions using public power carry a 
cost where it comes to their ‘economy’, but at times interventions are necessary to put 
in place the conditions that will ensure the functioning of private businesses within 
the market. The potential costs of the TRIPS agreement and the WTO became 
apparent at the protests surrounding subsequent rounds of negotiation in Seattle, and 
the attempts at rapprochement with developing countries in the Doha round. While 
there is of course a strong element of sovereign power contained in these international 
deliberations, the WTO framework also seeks to implement a global market, with 
certain guarantees in place for an increasingly ‘liberalised’ exchange system. This is a 
strongly neoliberal project, in which an ‘economic’ calculation of the appropriate 
amount of direct intervention aims to ensure a very particular ‘freedom’ of exchange 
amongst private entities. The relation to freedom at the core of this process is built on 
tensions, as Foucault points out: 
 
“the liberalism we can describe as the art of government formed in the 
eighteenth century entails at its heart a productive/ destructive 
relationship [with] freedom”. (Foucault 2008, 64) 
 
Part of the production of ‘freedoms’ thus always entails the destruction of freedom by 
means of direct governmental intervention. This ‘freedom’ is not an ideal notion of 
absence of government interference, but rather a very structured condition of 
relations, in which certain entities can thrive (in this case private businesses and 
entrepreneurial responsible subjects). The analysis presented in this thesis 
investigated IP’s changing role as part of these conditions of freedom, turning the 
emphasis away from the economy as the source of regulation (which would see these 
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structures as emerging out of the structuring force of capital, in the shape of a 
superstructure) towards an understanding of these conditions as interventions that 
make exchanges possible according to a certain rationality (as Foucault states “One 
must govern for the market, rather than because of the market” - Ibid., 121). This 
placed legal regimes for the market at the centre of this enquiry, introducing a more 
nuanced reading of the role of law in Foucault’s work on governmentality. 
Relying on Foucault’s analyses of ‘governmentality’ highlighted the way in 
which tensions within this productive/ destructive relation to freedom in 
(neo)liberalism are over time also influenced by increasing biopolitical challenges, as 
the fostering of life and health of populations is becoming more central to governing. 
This shows how a shifting terrain between private and public sector is central and 
essential to neoliberal governmentality, as new priorities are necessitating new levels 
of public intervention – as the example of the CEWG report’s reliance on new taxes, 
official prize funds, and public guidance of (global) public health research agendas 
shows. These recommendations have since been delayed and watered down, as they 
incurred the ‘economic’ critique of liberalism, which “always suspect[s] that one 
governs too much” (Ibid., 319) – showing how biopolitical challenges are being 
continually “managed” (Dean 2010, 120) within neoliberal governmentality. The 
private sector has in the meantime pursued ‘TRIPS Plus’ agreements, using the 
pharmaceutical and motion pictures industry’s influence to increase the protection and 
enforcement of IPRs in international agreements made outside the organisations in 
which the connection between IPRs and notions of life and health is being addressed.  
 
Conclusion 
Adjustments of (neo)liberal governmentality accommodating “state-phobia” 
(Foucault 2008, 187) with instances of direct biopolitical interventions thus give rise 
to a political sphere in which the neoliberal system adapts to new knowledges and 
evolves over time. Life became a sphere into which the economy could expand, 
creating value – but crucially, this expansion was made possible by a series of 
deliberate changes, not least the turn towards the informational-genetic truth of life 
promoted by the Rockefeller Foundation (Kay 1993). A governmental perspective 
reveals that this expansion also has the reverse effect of creating new somatic ethics 
(N. Rose 2008a) within an emerging political sphere of life and health, which then 
 193 
can also create challenges to the parameters of the insertion of life within the 
bioeconomy. 
This “reciprocal effect” between the “neoliberalisation” of life and the 
“vitalisation” of order (Dillon and Reid 2009, 21) highlights how a greater emphasis 
on the fostering of life and health of populations, disciplining the individual to 
become more ‘responsible’ of its own health, can pose a challenge to some elements 
of the neoliberal order – within which the IP regime represents a particularly tenuous 
compromise made for the encouragement of research and development. Foucault 
points out that monopolies “must be prevented […] [f]or freedom of the internal 
market to exist” (Foucault 2008, 64). This shows that the legitimacy of IP is directly 
derived from the role they play in supporting research and development, making the 
deliberation of alternative methods of financing research a potentially serious 
challenge to their legitimacy. However, in contrast to this reading emphasising the 
precarious position of IP within the ‘free’ neoliberal economy, an understanding of 
the continuing roles of IP in the governing of life shows that they may be more central 
to neoliberal economy than their ‘official’ legitimation claims. 
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